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2A bstract
This thesis deals with the ways in which the Polish United Workers’ 
Party's (PZPR) political discourse and its modes of political legitimation 
changed during the period of the transformation of the political system 
in Poland between 1988 and 1990.
The central hypothesis is that the PZPR retained a strong series of 
discursive continuities during this period, although partially reconstructed 
its discourses along three main axes: Civil - Public/Private, Geopolitical - 
West/ East and Historical - Past [Present. Each element emerged out of the 
PZPR's existing discourses and simultaneously transformed both them 
and the PZPR’s position within them. Thus one saw the emergence of an 
autonomous, semi de-institutionalised Communist Party, which became 
tied by its discursive commitments to an evolving political agreement 
following the 1989 round table talks that it was unable to reverse or 
oppose.
The thesis adopts a historical case study approach in which changes in 
PZPR discourses are analysed over four periods.
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7Foreword
The Solidarity logo, with its wobbly written ' Solidamoscl and the figure of 
Lech Walesa remain, even after the collapse of Communism in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the two most evocative and widely held images of 
Poland, particularly in Western Europe and North America. Solidarity 
represented all that was 'noble, good and honest,’ fighting for 'Western’ values 
against the tyranny of the ''Bast 'x The Polish anti-Communist opposition 
movement evoked much uncritical sympathy and support. It was, in 
many eyes often over-romantically, seen as the main beneficiary of the 
collapse of Communist structures, particularly from outside Poland, both 
in Western Polish emigre circles and more generally within the Western 
press and popular consciousness. It would (and should), as many argued 
during 1989,2 provide the basis for a transitional democratic regime, 
located within a broad coalition of Church, secular, centre-left and 
centre-right and trade union groups. In many respects, before its 
acrimonious split in 1990, it did.
As the political and institutional structures of Communism collapsed 
during 1989, the main focus of explanation assumed or implied a ’return to 
history' or a 'return to Europe.'3 "The phrase people use to sum up what is 
happening/ '  Garton-Ash noted in 1990, "is a return to Europe.’’* The 
’revolutions’ of 1989 represented, from this perspective, a return to 
normality and the traditions of the pre-war era, a return to 1939. ’1939,’
*Radio Free Europe and the Paris-based periodical, Kultura, amongst others, tended to overplay this aspect 
of the changes.
2Lipiec, J., (1990)
3Glenny, M., (1990); Ash, T.G., (1990a); Jedlicki, J., (1990)
4Ash, T.G., (1990a) Ibid. p.21
8from this perspective, represents not only the last period of Polish 
national sovereignty, but also the last period of democracy. It represents 
the civil, democratic and 'free' society craved by many under 
Communism.5 Communism was seen as merely an aberration, a product, 
in Poland, as elsewhere, of Russian imperialism and the peculiar division 
of Europe after the Second World War. This notion of 1returning to 
traditions' suppressed during the Communist period is without doubt valid 
and vital. However, two problems arise within the various 'romantic'6 or 
explicitly anti-Communist interpretations7 that see Solidarity as the 
benefactor of the end of Communism. One, the traditions, if indeed they 
are being or can be returned to, are themselves confused and fraught. 
Two, the Communist left, as well as the anti-Communist opposition can 
claim a stake in them. Polish politics during the 1930's must be located 
within the context of an externally dependent and semi-colonially 
penetrated national economy, weakly legitimated democratic, and at 
times authoritarian, structures of power, a strong socialist orientation 
among large sections of society and the political classes and a multi­
ethnic and diverse society. The notion of returning to normality, in the 
sense of stable and predictable politics, therefore, is returning to a 
situation in which normality was anything but prevalent.
Furthermore, varied and complex sets of political, ideological and 
constitutional relations and matrices have emerged since 1989. The new 
democratic State, for example, remained, until 1997, without a fully 
codified or consensually accepted constitution and curious new alliances
^Alexander, J.C. (1991) and Michnik , A., (1976). Habermas, J., (Holmes, L., 1993, p.45) refers to the 1989 
period as a "rectifying revolution," for example.
6Glenny, M., (1990), Ibid.
9and political ideologies have emerged. The post-Communist political 
map in Poland is not easily amenable to the traditionally dichotomised 
notion of political ideology along a left/right continuum. Much of the 
post-Communist left - comprised of the PZPR's successor, the Social 
Democratic Party of the Polish Republic (SdRP), the largest party in the 
electoral umbrella organisation, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD),8 and 
the post-Solidarity left, Labour Union (UP) and Socialist Party (PPS) - is 
committed to more market deregulation of the national economy than 
one would associate with traditional or Western European social- 
democratic parties.9 It also has significant support from the emerging 
ownership classes. The right, on the other hand, made up of post- 
Solidarity (mainly nationalist and Catholic-sponsored) parties, is attached 
to a stronger redistributive/active State and a Catholic-based constitution 
(see, for example, the issue of the Concordat, which obtained 
parliamentary ratification in April 199810). The political landscape of 
post-Communist Poland is marked not simply by a dichotomy of those 
committed to market and democratic reformism and those against, but 
also by a dichotomy of those attached to one version of 'Poland* and 
those attached to another. One symbolic community is centred on the 
secular post-Communist left, the other increasingly around the post- 
Communist clerical right.
7 Zubek, V., (1994) and (1995)
8 The SLD was officially registered as a political party in July 1999 and the SdRP ceased to exist.
 ^Verdery, K., (1996). Verdery focuses on the changes in Western social democratic thinking after the end of 
Communism. There is no absolute standard against which to assess social democracy, it is argued, and 
therefore there are problems of evaluating the process in the area of Central and Eastern Europe, which has 
neither a tradition of moderate or parliamentary socialism or of democracy at all.
Gazeta Wyborcza, May 4th 1998. The Concordat with the Vatican was signed by the Suchocka government 
in 1993, but did not receive parliamentary ratification until after the AWS-UW government took office in the 
autumn of 1997.
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This post-Communist political polarisation has its roots both in the post- 
1980 sectoral character of Polish public life and in the specific dynamics 
of the 1988-90 transition period. This thesis is one attempt to trace the 
process of Polish reform from the perspective of one, under researched, 
sector of this socio-political matrix, that of the often-stigmatised PZPR. 
It is not intended either as a condemnation of or an apology for the 
PZPR, but an attempt to throw some light onto an area where significant 
shadows remain.
Chapter 1
Terms and Focus
11
1. Introduction
This work addresses the ways in which, as the Communist11 political 
system in Poland changed between mid-1988 and early-1990, the leading 
party within it, the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR),12 reconstructed 
its modes of legitimation via discourse - how it legitimated itself. The 
PZPR redefined three key areas of its pre-existing discourses: one, of its 
own and of Poland’s history (Past vs. Present); two, of key aspects of its 
civil discourses, in relation, for example, to the State and society (Public 
vs. Private); three, of Poland's geopolitical situation (East vs. 'West). By 
appropriating qualitatively new and redefining existing historical, civil and 
geopolitical discourses, the PZPR was able, as the system changed in 
1989, to remanufacture a public representation of itself. This was a 
central plank in its process of political legitimation.
The term ’legitimation’ does not imply that the PZPR possessed legitimacy 
before, during or after 1989.14 This is a claim that is problematic for three
11 The terms Communist and State Socialist are used throughout the thesis to refer to the political and socio­
economic entity that was the Polish People’s Republic (PRL). Actually Existing Socialism and Real Socialism 
(Hausner, J., et al., 1992) have also been deployed to define the character of this system. A semiotic or 
etymological analysis of Communism lies beyond the scope of this work, however and the terms are used 
here interchangeably for reasons of simplification.
The PZPR is referred to throughout the thesis either as ’the PZPR’ or ’the Party.’
13 Legitimation is concerned with the process of altering and reconstituting existing rationales for seeking, 
obtaining and exercising power. The difference between political legitimacy and legitimation is subject to 
widespread discussion in political science, Campbell, J., (1986). This is discussed more thoroughly in chapter
2 .
l^Bamard, F. M., (1991); Bernhard, M. H., (1993). Most literature on Communist Poland and the PZPR 
starts from the premise that neither had any legitimacy: that they were equally lacking in the essential 
attributes necessary for such a term to be adequately applicable. They lacked legitimacy in the sense that
12
main reasons. One, the problem of evaluation. It is difficult to measure 
legitimacy in Communist societies, if not also the notion of legitimacy 
generally. Its conceptual terms and instruments themselves are subject, in 
many areas of the Polish case, to theoretical and political contestation. 
The legitimacy of the PZPR was conceived by advocates, for example, as 
automatically given and by opponents as non-existent.15 Two, the problem 
of focus - legitimacy of what? The apparent synonymity of State and 
Party made any analysis of the relative legitimacy of aspects of each 
awkward. Three, the overwhelming sense that the non-Communist 
opposition enjoyed legitimacy simply by being non-Communist.
The focus in this work is on the PZPR's, as distinct from the State's, 
search for legitimation - on the processes by which this political entity, 
within the context of a liberalising political system, sought to legitimate 
itself. Legitimation is used here because it focuses on the contingent and 
dynamic processes by which political entities, within given contexts, 
develop ways of reproducing themselves and their claims to hold political 
power. In this case, legitimation theory allows for a more subtle and 
varied analysis of the transformation period in Poland and imposes no a 
priori or absolute standards against which to measure legitimacy. This is 
important in the context of a theoretical debate imbued with heavy 
political connotations taking place throughout the 1990's concerning the 
role of the PZPR in that, for an authentic reconstruction of this period
Polish society normatively and actively rejected them and in that they were largely unable even to sustain a 
degree of political, economic or social stability sufficient to talk of legitimacy in terms of relative non­
instability.
^Carew-Hunt, R. N., (1963), p. 134. Communist ideology explicitly projects the legitimate domination of the 
leading party in terms of its ’historical mission.’ Polish opposionists, such as Michnik, A., (1976) op cit. p.56, 
argued that the leading party, for the same reason, could not obtain legitimacy. The question of legitimacy is 
relation to Communism appears to represent a case of what may call ’evaluative incommensurability’: a state 
in which there is no consensus as to what can act as relevant indicators of legitimacy. Since a consensual 
understanding of legitimacy cannot be adequately established it is better left alone.
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and this party to be possible, absolute standards and the judgements that 
inevitably underpin them, must be, if only temporarily, put to one side. 
The following extract well illustrates the bitterness with which many in 
post-Communist Poland recall Communism:
"At the round table in Magdalenka, just outside Warsaw, we witnessed a shameful 
collaboration with the Communists, followed by a guilt complex and blocked national 
catharsis. Millions of citizens who were condemned by Communism to a gloomy 
existence ofpoverty, alienation, and daily enslavement were now watching a scene from 
George Orwell's Animal IF arm. People and two-legged pigs ordered everyone to forget 
about the past in the name of the future. "16
The thesis explores the public political language - the ’discourse’11 - of the 
PZPR during the period 1988-90 as a method of exploring the specific 
dynamics of its legitimation. It is concerned with the types of discursive 
justifications the PZPR elite used to legitimate its changing role, in 
relation to key groups within the State, within society and internationally. 
The thesis focuses specifically on how the PZPR selectively 
reconstructed its public discourses. In particular it addresses how the 
Party discursively reassembled the nation's past and its own role within it, 
notions of what constituted civil society and relations between State and 
society as well as conceptions of both the East (the Soviet Union) and 
the West (Western Europe and North America). These discourses are 
treated as both markers (or 'signifiers'18) of the type of legitimational 
formulae employed by the PZPR and as analytical instruments for
16Bielecki, C., (1999)
l^Kubik, J., (1994), p.8. Discourse,’like ’ideology’ and legitimation,’is a problematic term, since it has such 
wide ranging definition and application. This work adopts the view that ’discourse’ legitimates political 
parties by Interpellating’ (see chapter 2) groups and individuals.
l^Kubik, j M (1994) Ibid. p. 13. Discourse is, he argues: "a set of semiotic facts (signs or signifiers) that 
govern the construction of the extra-discursive world.”
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explaining the pattern of change. Discourses thus both reflected the 
dominant modes of legitimation and also, in an interactive relation with a 
rapidly altering set of extraneous factors, themselves played a role in 
transforming them. Discourses, in other words, operated in a dialectical 
relationship with the power structures and political possibilities within 
which they were developed, both partially reflecting them, but 
simultaneously playing a semi-autonomous role in altering them.
The development of more authentic (that is a more interactive way of 
articulating its values and policies) as opposed to cosmetic (static and 
rhetorical) discourse out of Marxism-Leninism during 1989-90 is one of 
the key elements of the process of PZPR legitimation. The PZPR elite 
was seeking a medium for discussing problems, raising questions and 
defining its own and others' identities and hence possibilities for action. 
It was through revised discourses that the reformist wings of the PZPR, 
for example, managed to create a negotiating space and within it to 
negotiate a route through the first stage of the transformation process in 
1989. This process has had profound implications for the Polish 
transition after 1989 and, in particular, for the successes of the reformed 
PZPR, the Social Democratic Party (SdRP).
There was no system collapse in Poland, contrary to both the common- 
sense understanding of what happened in Central and Eastern Europe 
and many of what shall be termed 'monistic' theories19 - no date at which 
one can definitively locate the end of this socio-economic entity, other 
than in a purely formal, legalistic sense. Furthermore, the ways in which
^  Walicki, A., (1991). Walicki excellently outlines the propensity of many to deploy monistic (what he 
terms "totalitarian") theories to explain the collapse of Communism in Europe.
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the PZPR managed to legitimate its own transformation during 1989 
continues to cast a shadow in the post-Communist period20 and answers 
are neither self-explanatory nor can the assumptions that underlie them 
be taken as incontestable facts. There is, for example, an absence of 
primary material on relations between the Soviet Communist Party and 
the PZPR and on Soviet intentions. There is also limited research on the 
private motivations of Polish leaders. The moral questions of guilt and 
punishment for Communism, which dominate the post-1989 Solidarity 
parties, furthermore, makes any objective assessment more problematic 
than it might be otherwise.
A methodology based on the three previously outlined areas of discourse 
is deployed and concrete historical hypotheses used to explore the role of 
discourse in the legitimation of the PZPR during the period 1988-90. 
The method involves the construction of three ideal-type binary 
oppositions that marked PZPR discourses - 'Public' versus 'Private' (Civil) 
'West' versus 'East' (Geopolitical) and 'Past' versus 'Present' (Historical). 
They are used as markers to analyse changes over four stages from the 
opening of the Communist system in April 1988 to the final Congress of 
the PZPR in January 1990. The analysis is deliberately narrow, both 
analytically and chronologically, for reasons of empirical detail and 
theoretical coherence. The period represents a good example of a 
process of changing political legitimation.
20Wprost, April 23rd 1998. The all Solidarity governments have tried to frame de-Communisation legislation, 
each with little success. The question of whom is responsible for and what constituted crimes under 
Communism is both politically highly sensitive and logistically and legally problematic.
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2. Hypotheses
The main hypothesis is that the PZPR's political discourses performed a
the 1988-90 period. This relative autonomy performed important 
functions in the dialectical process of changes in the PZPR's legitimation, 
obliging it, for example, to rethink its own political strategy and 
institutional position.
There were key continuities in PZPR discourses during the 1988-90 
period, three of which, referred to in the previous section (Civil, Historical 
and Geopolitical) , were the most significant. Qualitatively new discourses 
emerged out of the existing structure of PZPR discourse, but key existing 
elements were also re-emphasised and the overall structure adapted, both 
in content and application, to meet new political demands. Discourses 
were altered during this period within a dialectic relationship between a 
set of evolving extraneous matrices: institutional, economic and political 
- that structured the political terrain within which the PZPR was obliged 
to operate, by narrowing certain political possibilities and widening 
others - and the pre-existing, predominantly ideological, discourse of 
Marxism-Leninism. These three areas are outlined below and preliminary 
propositions as to the types of continuities and discontinuities to be 
found are offered.
relatively autonomous role vis-a-vis Party and State institutions during
17
2.11 C ivil discourses 
(Public'Vs 'Private')
In its discourses referring direcdy and indirecdy to the State, the 
constitution, democratic participation, political accountability and 
decision-making, to the Catholic Church, trade unions and political 
opposition and to the working class, there are strong lines of continuity 
with the pattern of pre-existing PZPR discourse. The main 
discontinuities lie in the rejection of many of the pre-existing operative 
discursive methods for talking about them. There was a largely pragmatic 
recognition on the part of the PZPR elite that changing political realities 
necessitated revisions in the operative use of civil political discourse, 
which, in turn fed into changes in traditional, ideologically based, 
discourses. This, in turn, had effects on the PZPR’s position within the 
institutions themselves and on its relations with the groups about whom 
it was constructing new operative discourses.
18
2.1.ii. Historical discourses 
(Vast' Vs 1Present’)
The emergence of a qualitatively new kind of historical discourse and a 
revision and re-emphasis of elements of existing historical discourses, 
played a role of supplementing civil discourses during 1988-90. For 
example, there was a strong tendency toward re-emphasising the PZPR 
as a national party committed to a Polish Road to Socialismbut also 
emphasising the aggressive and determining role played by the USSR and 
the PZPR's historical weaknesses in relation to it, most significantly in 
1980-81. The key theme is the attempt to locate the 1989 changes in 
terms of a long line of continuity in both national political, but also 
socialist, culture.
19
2.1.iii. Geopolitical discourses 
(East' Vs 'West')
Revised geopolitical discourses were also selected to emphasise and de- 
emphasise key areas. This is clear, for example, in the ways in which the 
'European' as opposed to the 'Asiatic' version of Poland's national interest 
and its national and political culture was emphasised. It was also 
witnessed in the ways in which the PZPR's connections with Western- 
style socialism and social democracy, as opposed to the Eastern or Soviet 
version, were developed. At the same time, stress was placed on retaining 
the impression that the PZPR remained the only guarantor of Poland's 
geopolitical position. The USSR was thus constructed both negatively - 
as an historical threat and a model of what the PZPR was not - and 
positively, as a guarantor of continuity within Poland, in particular within 
the framework of Perestroika.
20
3. Locating the research: literature review
Any attempt to evaluate the PZPR's role in the transition period is 
stepping into a contested and politically charged area. Communism is still 
fresh in the collective memory and a source of significant post- 
Communist political conflict.21 On one side of the fence sit the majority 
of the post-Communist Solidarity groups and parties, many of which 
since 1997's parliamentary elections have grouped around the governing 
coalition of Solidarity Election Action (AWS) and its smaller partner, the 
Freedom Union (UW). There have been sporadic threats to implement 
'lustrafa' (de-Communisation) and significant sections of AWS talk of 
Communism in terms of ’crimes', 'guilt’ and ’punishment.' On the other side 
sit the ex-Communist groups, most notably the social democratic, SdRP 
- the PZPR's successor and largest party in the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD). Since 1990 they have sought to shield themselves from de- 
Communisation, while simultaneously constructing a power base within 
the State (during its period in government between 1993 and 1997) as 
well as significant support in society.22
A consensus as to what questions could and should be asked about the 
Polish Communist system has not yet been established in Polish public 
life and, in many areas, in Polish scholarly life. Some basic assumptions 
and ground rules are yet to be established (if they ever will be) since they 
remain politically and legally contested. There is, as Hausner suggests, "no 
hierarchy of explanatory variables."23 This is partly due to the ambiguity of the
^Karpinski, J., (1994); Michnik, A., (1996); Rakowski, M. R., (1990). All have struggled to explain the 
sources of the struggle in post-Communist Poland to come to terms with Communism. Each has, in different 
ways, become caught up in the contemporary political struggle to attribute blame and retribution for 
Communist ’crimes against the nation.’ See also Wprost, May 17th 1998.
^Zubek, v., (1994). op cit.
23 Hausner, J., (1992) op cit. p.12
21
PZPR's leading role within the Communist system, partly the 
ambivalence felt about the Communist system generally in Poland and 
partly the confusion of ends (Communism) and means (State Socialism) 
which were embedded in the Communist project, in Poland as elsewhere. 
It also reflects the strength of predominantly Catholic-based nationalism 
in post-Communist Poland and, in part, the failures of the post- 
Communist Solidarity parties to define a coherent legitimational 
framework and discourses of their own after 1990. A significant source 
of AWS's legitimation, for example, rests on the same foundations of 
those pre-1989: anti-Communist monism - a blanket critique of all that 
was associated with the PRL, including those parties that stem from it. 
However, there does exist a large body of academic literature on the 
Polish transition in both Poland and the Anglo-Saxon world. Within this 
literature, given the focus established in the preceding section of this 
work, three key gaps are discernible.
22
3 .1 . Gaps in the field o f1 discontinuities1
Many have argued since 1990 that, with the formal demise of 
Communist institutional and political structures in 1989-90, the PZPR’s 
modes of discursive legitimation also collapsed.24 There was either a 
functional or a causal connection - or both - between the two. Functional 
in that the two were treated as synonymous, causal in that the former 
necessarily led to the latter. Reform Communism and the discourses 
associated with it, from this perspective, was either a contradiction in 
terms ("fried snowballs"25) or merely a stage in the process of disintegration 
of Communism. Thus, as the structures of Communist power 
fragmented and became transformed in 1989, the language (discourse) of 
the leading party necessarily collapsed with them. This understanding of 
the Communist system shall be termed 'monistic. '26 As Walicki argues:
” Communist authoritarianism had to be aggressively ideological. It derived its 
legitimacy from a commitment to ideologically inspired action. Hence it could not 
survive the process of de-ideologisation"11
The monism of the anti-Communist opposition, in particular that of the 
Committee for the Defence of Worker's (KOR) 'New Evolutionism'28 is 
understandable for political reasons in a certain historical context. It 
bound a diverse coalition of oppositional intellectuals, workers and 
Catholic Church figures around a common set of 'negative' signifiers -
24Schull, J., (1992); Walker, R., (1989); Fukuyama, F., (1992)
2^Staniszkis, J., (1984) p. 150. Adapting the well-known remark of Leszek Kolakowski that real Communism 
was as feasible as frying snowballs, Staniszkis argued that there was an ontological impossibility of 
reforming Communism without ceasing to be Communist.
26Bamard, F. M., (1991) pp.56-73
22Walicki, A., (1991) op cit., p.94
2^Walicki, A., (1991) Ibid.; Michnik, A., (1976) op cit. Both talk of the need to define the enemy in absolute 
terms, of ’good’ and ’evil,’ *us’ and them.’
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for example, the unequivocal view of the PZPR as subservient to the 
USSR and hence, by extension, indivisibly associated with authoritarian 
rule and non-national interests. As common sense interpretations go, this 
one would appear on first reflection to be largely unquestionable. One, 
the PZPR was the party of power (wlad^cP). Two, it ceased to exist after 
January 1990 and its overt association with Marxism-Leninism, which did 
not outlive the PZPR's leading role in 1989, formally collapsed with it. 
As means of understanding the real dynamics of PZPR legitimation, 
however, a monistic interpretation is too narrow. It allows no room for 
variegation either in the structures themselves or in analysis of them.
A branch of rational choice theory which was developed after 1989 fits 
into this monistic type of analysis. Its proponents sought to explain the 
Communist system's collapse and, by extension, the PZPR's loss of 
power in 1989 (the above mentioned 'functional' approach) in terms of a 
combination of the longer term structural matrices of economic, social 
and political crises (which defined the rational structure within which the 
PZPR was obliged to operate) and short-term rational choices made 
within them.30 Discourse, if it had any analytical use, was merely a 
symptom, or effect, of these 'objective' realities to be observed, having 
no intrinsic or determining role to play of its own. The Party's loss of 
power in 1989 is thus explicable in terms of the prevailing power 
constraints and various extraneous 'shocks' which opened up certain 
political choices and closed others. The collapse of the institutional 
structure of the system itself meant the simultaneous collapse of the
^ T he Polish word 'wladza' is interesting. It means literally 'power,1 but was (and is) commonly used to refer 
to anything or anyone in or to do with authority. The State, regime, Party and police would all fall within this 
wide definition.
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dominant language of the system, embodying a complete rejection of the 
values and principles contained within it.
Schull and Walker represent the starkest proponents of this rational 
choice type of interpretation of the Polish transition period. Both equate 
the 'inevitable' changes in the political system with - in the words of 
Schull - "the collapse of the language of State Socialism,"31 thus collapsing the 
distinct concepts of system, systemic discourse (ideology) and Party into 
one unified, largely undifferentiated entity. Walker's analysis of Marxism- 
Leninism as a ritual and binding discursive formula without any authentic 
connection with what she (and others) have termed 'operative reality'32 is 
both interesting and useful. However, Walker, like Schull, is guilty of 
failing to account for the gaps that existed between the two spheres, 
between the ritual discourse and 'objective' political and institutional 
structure. Both Walker and Schull thus fail to recognise the variegated 
and interactive nature of political ideology and, in the case of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology, the ways in which Marxism-Leninism, treated as a 
discourse - regardless of its effects in terms of quantifiable outcomes - was, 
in fact, a real factor in the process of political legitimation. Ideology is 
treated as an undifferentiated reflection of the structures within which it 
acted, not to legitimate, but to impose order and limit alternatives.33 
Ideology in Communist societies, as a belief system was often perceived 
as all embracing and immutable and, as such, as Yan Sun argues, (was)
3®Mizrahi, S., (1995). This is a good example of the rational choice approach (and its shortcomings) in 
relation to Poland.
31Schull, J., (1992) op cit., p.738
3^Walker.R., (1989) op cit. The term ’operative reality’ (often used synonymously with ’social reality) is a 
term borrowed from Taras, R., (1984) op cit. It refers to those areas of ideology that deal with practical or 
policy issues - how an ideology is ’operationalised.’
33Holmes, L., (1993), op cit. pp. 17-20. The balance between coercive and consensual legitimation is a 
common theme in studies in legitimation on Poland.
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"either resistant to change or when it does change, changes totally"7* Schull suggests 
that:
"(reform Communism is unfeasible) and leaves two options open to a 
political actor in a Soviet-type system: either a conservative defence of ideology or 
a radical leap beyond it, an outright rejection of the official discourse's 
authoritativeness. "35
The leading party, from this view, merely reflected in its discourses the 
dominant, ideologically predetermined, power interests of the 
Communist elite: it mouthed a static and predetermined script. This 
poses questions to do with the relationship between political institutional 
structures and political language and between discourse and legitimation, 
which neither Schull nor Walker appear either interested in, or, within 
their terms and focus, capable of assessing with any clarity. It ignores the 
multiplicity of forms of legitimation, the ambiguity of ideology and the 
elements of continuity that shaped the Communist, transitional and post- 
Communist periods.
The central problem with this view is that by collapsing State structure 
and Party discourse into one another, these theories struggle to explain 
the specific development of PZPR discourse and thus also Solidarity 
discourse during the immediate transition period in 1989. Both on a 
theoretical and empirical level the way the problematic itself is framed 
from this perspective is questionable. Political languages do not simply 
reflect material conditions but have a meaning, significance and dynamic 
independent of them, which themselves effect changes. Alterations in
34Yan Sun (1995), p.325
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PZPR discourse during 1989 can only be fully understood without 
reference to the complexities and gradations in public discourses 
between significant groups within and outside Poland during the period 
leading up to, during and immediately after 1989.
35 Schull, J., (1992), op cit. p.735
27
3.2. Gaps in the field  o f1 continuities'
Others have concentrated on key elements of Communist institutional 
and normative structures that survived the overt collapse of Communism 
in Poland. A branch of elite theory, for example, has sought to explain 
the longevity of an 'elite class,' stemming from and exploiting its position 
within or contact with the State bureaucracy (nomenclature). Glasman36 for 
example, argues that a remoulded ownership class, stemming from the 
bureaucratic Communist apparatus, has emerged in post-Communist 
Poland. The transfer of socialised property into private hands benefited a 
small elite of Communist managers, he argues. Both Eyal37 and 
Frydman38 have also contributed to this area of continuity. However, the 
tendency here is towards two equally misleading extremes: either an 
under-determinism or an over-determinism, both of which limit 
'continuity'-type analyses as they stand to date. Either, as Tittenbrum 
argues,39 the post-Communist ownership class - which, in the absence of 
empirical verification of its size and political affiliations is (inductively) 
assumed to have Communist connections - was directly protected by the 
reforming PZPR and the post-Communist SdRP or, as Glasman argues, 
the process was 'automatic', as it was 'inherent' within the legalised 
transformation. The former view mirrors the monistic analyses and is 
thus problematic, while the latter is problematic in that it implies 
inevitability and relies too heavily on economic determinism.
Sociological and social-psychological continuities are another key area of 
post-Communist research. Sztompka, for example, addresses continuities
36Glasman, M„ (1994)
37Eyal,G., et al. (1998)
3^Frydman, R., et al. (1996)
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in social consciousness, what he calls, the "legag of Communist thinking"*® 
Post-Communist Polish society has tended, he argues, to idealise all that 
is non-Communist (for example, the ’West1 and 'Western-style 
democracy1) without fully understanding what these means in practise. 
Furthermore, society, he argues, retains a parallel, if semi-conscious, 
commitment to Communistic-type thinking in everyday life. The State, 
for example, he argues, is treated with disdain, but simultaneously 
expected to provide everything.
There is also a strand within the literature that continues to treat 
Solidarity as the only or true bearer of Western traditions and values.41 
Solidarity was automatically treated as a legitimate national entity, for 
historical reasons to do with its struggle against Communism and its 
retention of Catholic and national values. It represents the link between 
the nation - which was not sovereign between 1944-89 - and the State, 
which again became sovereign after 1989. Civil society and a democratic 
State are seen from this perspective as continuous and logical extensions 
of the Solidarity ethos. This is problematic for two reasons. One, it over 
idealises the Solidarity movement and fails to recognise its differentiated 
character. Two, it treats changes in Solidarity in isolation from the wider 
historical and political framework during 1989. Few have assessed 
continuities in PZPR discourses. The tendency has been to ignore or 
marginalise either the role of the PZPR or its use of discourse and 
techniques of legitimation.
39Tittenbrum, J., (1992)
^Sztompka, P., (1993). Sztompka analyses continuities in the consciousness of society, conceived of in the
form of binary oppositions within discourse, as the main hangover of Communism in Poland.
41Laba, R., (1991)
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3.3. Problems of'P Z P R ' literature
After 1993 various studies began to retrace the development of the post- 
Communist left in Poland more closely. This was principally in an often 
rushed and chaotic attempt to explain how and why the reformed 
Communist Party, the SdRP, had managed to return to power in 1993.42 
Explanations have tended to fall into one of two schools, mirroring the 
continuity/discontinuity problematic. Discontinuity explanations tend to 
locate the key causes of the SdRP's successes in purely post-Communist 
sources, ignoring or downplaying its political and/or ideological roots in 
the PZPR. This tendency is most clearly visible in the work of Hayden.43 
The SdRP, he argues, cannot be seen in the same terms as the PZPR. It 
is a radically different political entity with a fundamentally different 
ideological and political focus. It has built solid societal support within 
the post-Communist political environment via its overt disassociation 
from Communism, he suggests. One can, he argues, for example, locate 
the SLD’s electoral successes in specific analyses of each election. This 
view is difficult to sustain given the many obvious strands connecting 
SdRP and PZPR discourses, political strategy and organisation.
Continuity explanations, on the other hand, tend to draw on similarities 
in the covert and elitist motivations and strategies of both the PZPR and 
SdRP.44 Zubek, for example, stresses the lack of authentic SdRP 
commitments to democracy since 1989.45 His argument is indicative of a 
more pervasive feeling within Poland (illustrated in various opinion poll
^Lewis, P., (1994); Zubek, V., (1994) op cit. The SdRP was the largest party in the winning SLD electoral 
organisation at the 1993 Sejm elections. It governed between 1993 and 1997 in coalition with the PSL.
43Hayden. J., (1994)
42 Zubek, V., (1995) op cit.; Smolar, A., (1994)
43Zubek.V., (1994) op cit.
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surveys46 and elsewhere, in the popular press and anecdotally) that, 
somehow, the PZPR ’cheated,’ that it was merely the party of power, and 
when it lost power in 1989, resorted to any means at its disposal to regain 
it.47 Zubek stresses the continuities in anti-democratic culture within the 
reforming PZPR and the SdRP. The PZPR, from this perspective, can be 
viewed as an authentic Communist party forced to abandon 
Communism. It did not, his argument goes, hold any genuine social- 
democratic values or beliefs - social democracy was simply chosen during 
and after 1989 as a convenient public cover with which to seek legitimacy 
without adhering to the principles embedded within authentic social 
democratic thinking.48 Respect for the autonomy of the State, the 
impartiality of the law, pluralism of participation and tolerance of 
opposition are all either absent or marginal in the political profile of the 
SdRP, argues Zubek. The PZPR merely exploited divisions within 
Solidarity and the terms of the round table agreement to manoeuvre itself 
into social-democratic clothing without any substantive commitments to 
either the democratic process or parliamentary democracy. He takes the 
question of political tolerance as the key indicator of this and argues that 
anti-Church campaigns and disrespect for political opponents mark the 
SdRP's lack of genuine commitments to social democracy.
" Western European Marxism and social democracy on the one hand, and Eastern
European Eeninism, Stalinism and the subsequent post-Stalinist/neo-Stalinist
systems on the other, are two fundamentally different systems of thought. Their
46Gazeta Wyborcza, January 11th 1999. A CBOS opinion poll on Poles’ attitudes towards the PZPR showed 
over 65% of respondents agreeing that it should have been more harshly treated.
^Glasman, M., (1994) op cit; Kaczynski, J., (1991a), Smolar, A., (1994) op cit; Wandczyk, P. S., (1996).
4^Zubek, V., (1995) op cit.; Verdery, K., (1996) op cit. Social democracy, argues, Verdery, itself changed 
after the collapse of !State Socialism’ in 1989. The concept is problematic in that the analytical distinction 
that Zubek draws is less clear-cut than he suggests.
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apparent similarity was merely superficial and despite their use of the same concepts, 
these concepts carried entirely different meanings. Poland's left is rooted in leninism, 
Stalinism andpost-Stalinism. The vision of the future of Polish society that it espouses 
does not include fundamental contributions from Poland's right, its Church or the 
entrepreneurial milieu, nor does it fully accept the market. Poland's left is not a carrier 
of or an avenue for West European social democratic values, but rather the purveyor 
of traditional values of the Polish elite in general and the Polish and East European 
elites in particular:"49
Two things limit the value of Zubek's work. One, a lack of
understanding, or even acknowledgement, of the importance of
discourse - what was (and is) actually said, rather than what one 
interprets it as meaning within a pre-given set of assumptions, most of 
which are based on a limited conception of ideology in Communist 
political systems. His analyses are premised on a particularly instrumental 
version of political transition in Poland. Intentions and actions
determined by institutional structure underpin his analysis. He fails to 
provide an adequate definition of his terms - social democracy, legalism and 
political tolerance - and tends also to fall into the trap, previously touched 
upon, of equating Solidarity, both explicitly and implicitly, with all that is 
opposite of what he lays the SdRP out to be. He endows the leading 
party before 1989 with little or no discursive autonomy from the 
structures within which it operated politically and has conceptualised the 
post-Communist reformed party as having no real interest beyond the 
reacquisition and retention of political power. He also accuses the PZPR 
of various crimes that he never fully deals with, including theft,
49Zubek. V., (1995) Ibid., p.812
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embezzlement, and blackmail.50 Two - as with Schull and Walker - a 
failure to recognise the importance of the gap that existed between State 
and Party. His tendency to lump all State institutions, actors, their 
discourses as well as their private intentions into a notion of 'the 
authorities' or 'the power' (wlad%a) is misleading and inaccurate.
The transformation of the PZPR cannot be explained simply in terms of 
an open, rational pursuit of power for power's sake or as the result of 
inevitable or irreversible, clearly delineated processes, as Schull suggests 
and others imply.51 Without a conceptual understanding of its historical, 
political and ideological roots within the previous system and the ways in 
which the PZPR sought to transform itself during the period of system 
change, any analysis of the changing role of either the PZPR or SdRP is 
limited.52 The central focus cannot be solely on either the intentions of 
key actors, as Zubek suggests, or the political manoeuvrings of these key 
actors, as Przeworski (albeit in a qualified manner53) suggests. It cannot 
also assume that, if one rejects the more blatant determinism of, for 
example, Zubek, that one must also reject any notion of continuity.
50Wprost, May 17th 1998, op cit. The question of PZPR funds ($7.5 million) that allegedly ’disappeared’ in 
early 1990 has been raised at several points since 1990. The weekly Wprost, most recently, alleged that the 
PZPR had stolen State assets.
51 Kaminski, B., (1992)
Z^ubek, v., (1994) and (1995) op cit. This interpretation has been widely questioned within this field. 
Zubek has questioned both the extent to which Poland has achieved a lasting constitutional arrangement since 
1991 or is on course for a fully de-etatised economy. He also questions the commitment of the SdRP to either 
of these things.
^Przeworski, A., (1992). Przeworski deploys the most open rational choice methodology for explaining the 
transition. His ’prisoner’s dilemma’ represents a simplified model of the ways in which the negotiated transfer 
of power took place. Osiatynski, P., (Elster, J., ed. 1996) also shares, to a certain extent, the view that rational 
calculation can act as a way of conceptualising and explaining the so-called ’transition through transaction. ’
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3.4. W hat the thesis is not about
In focusing on the specific area of PZPR discourse this thesis does not 
direcdy deal with three other significant areas of the democratisation 
process in Poland. One, the State and its transformation, in particular the 
role played by the round table in its transformation. There is considerable 
literature on the changing institutional, political and cultural role of the 
State and on the pattern of State legitimation after 1989. Two, the 
emerging party-system in and after 1989. This has provided the focus for 
several key analyses and constitutes a well developed field within post- 
Communist studies.54 Three, the three other main agents in the socio­
political matrix of Communist and post-Communist Polish politics: 
Solidarity, the Catholic Church and USSR (and subsequendy the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and/or Russia). All three 
were necessary factors, however, in effecting changes in PZPR discourse. 
They defined the external parameters of a dialectic relation within which 
discourse changed. However, they are insufficient in themselves to 
explain the specific changes in discourse.
The round table talks in 1989 are treated in this work as one factor 
structuring the process of changing PZPR discourses. They 
institutionalised the evolutionary and negotiated characters of the 
transition away from one-party rule, defining the specific mechanism by 
which Poland extricated itself from the overt institutional structures of 
Communism. The role of the round table is well documented both in
54Hausner, J., and Klementewicz, T., (1992); Millard, F., (1994); Rychard, A., (1993); Sanford, G., (1992); 
McSweeney and Tempest, (1993). The development of the post-Communist party system is dealt with in 
Lewis, P., (1994), op cit.; Millard, F., (1994), Ibid.; Stokes, G., (ed.) (1991).
\Poland55 and many English sources exist. Kaminski,56 for example, 
focuses on the ways in which the round table agreements structured the 
subsequent phases in the de-Communisation process. He deals with the 
political and constitutional details of the transition, focusing specifically 
on the re-emergence of pluralism. Lewis deals directly with the round table 
and elections in June 1989.57 Osiatynski58 focuses on the internal 
mechanics of the round table, in particular the ways in which participants 
operated within the negotiating arena while also keeping lines of 
communication open to their respective leadership teams. All three 
works are useful and interesting in their own rights and provide plenty of 
material specifically related to the talks.
The focus of this work however is neither the relegitimation of the State, 
nor the institutionalisation of an opposition. It lies in the PZPR's 
construction of a series of discourses that sought to contain reforms 
within socialism - in other words reform that would retain the leading 
role of the party. The focus is thus on the ways in which the round table 
was constructed ’from the outside,’ in official and semi-official PZPR 
discourses. The round table talks are treated both as a part of the PZPR's 
evolving ''Public' discourses as well as one of the necessary variables that 
unhinged the PZPR from the State.
-’-’In Polish studies of the round table, documentary-type analyses are most common. See, for examples: 
Kowalski. L., (1993); Gebert, K., (1990); Porozumienia Okrqglego Stolu (1989); Smolenski, P., (1989).
Gebert’s work is perhaps the most interesting in that he writes from the perspective of a ’participant-observer.’ 
As a journalist covering the talks and a representative of the Solidarity negotiating team on the Media’ sub­
table, his study is written in a semi-intimate, semi-academic style, offering insights into the dynamics of the 
talks.
^Kaminski, B., (1992) op cit.
^7Lewis, P. (1990a).
-^Osiatynski, P., (Elster, J., 1996)
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The thesis does not set out explicidy to explore the role or discourses of 
the other three main actors within Communist and post-Communist 
Polish politics - Solidarity, the Catholic Church and the Soviet 
Union I  C IS/ Russia. These are well-trodden in contemporary literature on 
Poland and its post-Communist development and many of these works 
act as extraneous material in this thesis. They provide the key variables 
used to explain the process of PZPR legitimation - the contextual 
framework within which the PZPR was obliged to operate domestically 
and internationally. A fuller exploration of each is eschewed for reasons 
of theoretical and empirical focus.
The key to changing PZPR legitimations lies in the ways the party 
sought to alter discursive constructions of the above entities rather than 
how they themselves changed. This does not mean that PZPR discourses 
were neither obliged to recognise changes in both Solidarity and the 
USSR nor that changes in both variables did not actively structure the 
discourses of the PZPR, it is rather a question of theoretical focus and 
emphasis. Changes in the PZPR's discourse, political tactics and strategy 
can, of course, be understood in terms of changing Soviet foreign policy, 
alterations within the CPSU or the strategy adopted by Solidarity during 
1988-89. However, the focus is on the legitimational discourses of the 
PZPR in terms of their internal structure - their meaning within the 
terms of the discourse itself. Furthermore, the process of relegitimation 
rests on the premise that the PZPR had at least a certain degree of 
agency and that it was actively engaged in a process of adaptation to 
changing possibilities, structured by both the USSR and Solidarity. 
Briefly, this is explained below.
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One of the key extraneous factors that structured the process of PZPR 
legitimation during 1989 is the counter-discursive hegemony of the 
Solidarity opposition movement. The cultural and political matrix of 
trade union/intellectual/Catholic Church opposition within Polish 
society from, at least, 1976 onwards, defined the parameters of the 
PZPR’s domestic political weaknesses.59 Solidarity emerged in 1980 as an 
alliance of trade union, intellectual and Church groups. Its strength lay in 
its claim to national and religious legitimation. Its discourses were seen as 
legitimate often simply because they contradicted the dominant frame of 
discursive reference of the Party and State. Solidarity in fact adopted 
ostentatiously national, religious and historical symbols that challenged 
the dominant terms of reference of the PZPR. The Solidarity movement 
was in reality, however, an often cumbersome alliance of different 
ideological strands and traditions within Poland. It managed to bridge the 
gaps, between, for example, secularism and Catholicism and leftism and 
rightism, by articulating a simple, direct and very effective discourse of 
anti-Communism. When Communism disappeared after 1990 these 
strands began to unthread themselves.
The role of the USSR is still open to both conceptual and empirical 
dispute in relation to Poland and the other countries of the region.
^For analysis of the contradictions between Communistic and Catholic values in the discourses of Polish 
oppositional groups, see Holzer, J., (1984), Holzer, J. and Leski, (1990), Koralewicz, J., et al. (1987) and 
Lipski, J. J., (1985). Although strands within the Catholic opposition and between it and other parts of the 
opposition movement were discernible throughout the post-war years, the relative homogeneity of the various 
groups umbrellered under the Church is extraordinary. See A., Jerschina, J., The Catholic Church, the 
Communist State and the Polish people,’ pp.76-97 and Marody, M., ’Contradictions in the subconscious of 
Poles', pp.227-37 in Gomulka, S., and Polansky, A., (Eds.) (1990); Bernhard, M.H., (1993) op cit; Lipski, 
J.J., (1985) Ibid.; Lisicka, H., The role of the Catholic Church in the Political system of the PRL in the 
1980’s’, pp. 151-67 (Hausner, J., and Klementewicz, T., (Eds.) 1992) op cit. Solidarity literature is immense 
both before, during and after the 1989 transformations. The most influential are Ost, D., (1990), dealing with 
the Solidarity elite, Holzer, J. and Leski, J., (1990) Ibid.; Bernhard, M. H., (1993) op cit; Lipski ,J.J., (1985) 
Ibid; Sociological analyses: Holzer, J., (1984) Ibid.; journalistic accounts, Ash, T.G., (1983) op cit, ’grass­
roots’ accounts - Tourraine, A., (1982); Laba, R. (1991) op cit; ’cultural’ - Goldfarb, J.C., (1989); Kubik, J., 
(1994) op cit.
37
Without doubt the Soviet Union framed, for significant sections of 
society, almost everything the PZPR did and what it stood for. Various 
studies have set out explicitly to explain the Soviet factor in the 
democratisation process in Poland and elsewhere. The most insightful 
studies, in terms of the effects of changes in the international sphere on 
domestic developments in Poland and elsewhere in the region, are 
Pridham's and Pridham and Vanhanen's.60 Osiatynski, also touches upon 
the Soviet’s implicit role in the breakdown of Polish Communism at the 
round table. There is numerous literature on changing Soviet foreign 
policy, specifically in relation to this region, for example, Cziomer’s work. 
In relation to Poland, Hausner and Klementewicz's edited work 
represents a key source of empirical and theoretical insights. Official 
sources either in Poland or in Russia are less easy to find.
^Pridham, G., et al.(1994); Pridham, G., and Vanhanen, K., (1997); Cziomer, E., (1990); Osiatynski, K., 
(Elster, J., 1996) op cit; Hausner, J. and Klementewicz, T., (1992) op cit; Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit.
Chapter 2
Theory and Methods
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i. Introduction
This chapter sets out to achieve four objectives. One, to outline the key 
features of theories of legitimation and select elements which are 
applicable in terms of the focus outlined in the previous chapter, in 
particular on the legitimational functions of discourse. Two, to develop a 
model of the PZPR's discursive legitimation employing elements of the 
this discursive model of legitimation. Specifically, it examines the role of 
civil (Public/Private), historical (Past/Present) and geopolitical (East/West) 
PZPR discourses in the process of constructing and reconstructing types 
of political legitimation. This model is also located in the context of 
internal (Polish) and external (international) socio-political structures that 
both constrained and facilitated the deployment of specific discourses 
and thus structured the types of legitimation used. The model is analysed 
developmentally over two stages: the first 1948-1980, the second 1981- 
1988. Three, to outline a methodology with which to explore the period 
1988-90 in terms of the hypotheses outlined in chapter one. Four, to 
comment on some of the research questions raised, both methodological 
and epistemological, during the research process.
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2. legitim ation
The process of legitimation rather than the notion of legitimacy^  is central to 
all political activity. Legitimacy is an awkward concept. Theories built on 
the concept of legitimacy tend to assume too much, principally, that 
there are ontologically unproblematically pre-existing political objects 
(governments, States, regimes, parties, actors and so on) that are 
amenable to empirical, quantitative measurement, the criteria for which 
are themselves deduced from predetermined notions of legitimacy. It is 
problematic, however, to evaluate if a party, State or regime possesses 
legitimacy and how much it may possess. As an analytical instrument 
legitimacy does not provide adequate tools for exploring how these 
measures themselves are constructed and change, either quantitatively or 
qualitatively, over time.
It makes more sense then to assess the ways in which political actors seek 
to legitimate specific things - to see politics as an evolving process within 
which all political meaning and value is the product of continuous 
adaptation to changing realities, rather than in terms of rigid sets of 
outcomes or empirically 'prove' facts. Legitimation does not claim to 
determine whether or not something has legitimacy - and, if so, how 
much - rather, as a mode of enquiry and method of analysis it focuses on 
how the political entity, the object, itself is constructed in such a way as 
to endow it with what the legitimacy theorists would refer to as 
legitimacy - that is, appropriate types and degrees of political support in 
historically concrete situations.
Legitimation is a contingent and dynamic process of structured claims 
made within given, but themselves also dynamic social, political and
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economic structures that inform and are informed by them. The process 
of making claims and the ways the claims are mediated within these 
structures, actively constructs and reconstructs the thing being 
legitimated. Each political actor constructs and articulates a set of 
rationales or justifications for their various political activities and the 
structures within which action takes place within particular historical 
contexts. Each rationale is permanently contested within a matrix of 
existing values, institutions and practices. Thus a dialectic relation exists 
between what is said in order to legitimate something (the discourse) and 
the thing itself - neither can be known independent of each other in an a 
priori sense.
In Communist States and societies, as Di Palma61 argued, the temptation 
was either to dismiss all Party and State legitimation as artificial since the 
Communist State lacked popular support (and the leading party, from 
this perspective, simply reflected its institutionalised position within the 
State) or to treat Communist claims to legitimacy as sufficient on their 
own terms. Since, however, Communist claims predicated themselves on 
the notion of a superior truth (truth which cannot be falsified - "a declared 
cognitive infallibility”62) - Di Palma argued, it was easier either to dismiss or 
ignore the real political means by which Soviet-type political elites 
sustained and reproduced their power, in other words, how they 
legitimated themselves. Furthermore, the apparent synonymity and 
functional interdependence of Party and State made any evaluation of 
one without the other, or discrete aspects of either, difficult.
61Di Palma, L., (1991)
62Di Palma, L., (1991) Ibid. p.67
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It was widely argued during the 1970’s and 1980's within Western 
political science that any discussion about legitimation in Communist 
societies was limited to a discussion about the relative stability of the 
State or the governing party/regime or elite, each of which were often 
used interchangeably (Holmes63 and Rigby64). From this perspective, any 
understanding of the transformation of a Communist system could only 
be understood as the result of the instability of the Communist 
Party/regime. As Meyer argued, one only knew when a Communist State 
was illegitimate when it collapsed or was in danger of collapsing.65
Theories exploring the varied, and non-exclusively coercive, means by 
which elites in Communist societies legitimated their rule, however, were 
developed during the 1980's and some of them provide insights into the 
diverse ways in which the PZPR legitimated its rule in Poland. Markus's 
notion of covert and overt forms of legitimation, for example, is useful.66 
Taras also developed theories along the lines of differentiated patterns of 
official ideology.67 A variegated legitimational framework provides useful 
insights into the ways the PZPR managed to retain and reproduce its 
holding of power during the 1980’s. On one hand, the PZPR used 
ritualised, ideologically-based, discourses to legitimate its position within 
the State with those within it. On the other hand, it adapted other, less 
overtly ideological, discourses to seek legitimation with groups and actors 
in society.68
^Holmes, L., (1993) op cit, pp.8-27 
^Rigby, T. H. et al. (Eds.) (1982), op cit.
^Meyer, A., (Sinanian et al. 1972), p.45 
^Markus, M., (Rigby et al. 1982 op cit.)
^Taras, R., (1984) op cit.
^Feher, F., (Hausner, J., et al. (1992) op cit). Feher provides a wider analysis of overt/covert 
dichotoxnization of discourse in Communist States.
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Despite the apparent validity of Rychard's view that the post-Communist 
State is assumed to be "more legitimate"69 simply because it is not 
Communist, the ending of Communism in Poland has opened up many 
questions of legitimation - Solidarity's, the new State's, the democratic 
constitution's, the party system's and so on.70 In the case of the PZPR, 
both in Poland and in Western-Polish circles, questions of legitimation 
are central, although ambivalence and confusion continue to reign, 
concerning the adequacy of its application in the pre-democratic era. It 
was often more politically convenient for opponents of the regime to 
engage in symbolic stands against the authorities, rather than seek to 
understand what this 'authority' was actually composed of and how 
discourses, albeit in a partial sense, legitimated it. The moral 
dichotomisation of politics in Poland into, for example, those 'dirtied! by 
their association with the Communist regime and those 'clean' by their 
association with the crusade against the regime before 1989 is something 
that defines, even late in the 1990's, the key line of political contestation 
in Poland.71
The concerns of political scientists in the 1980's who sought to explain 
the relative longevity of Communist regimes in terms of theories of 
legitimation cannot simply be rejected, however, as has largely happened 
after 1989. Legitimational models in fact can and should be utilised with 
regards to the PZPR in 1989. In fact, without at least some 
understanding of the legitimational models of the 1980's and the role 
played by the PZPR within them, an understanding of both the transition 
period and post-Communism is diluted and weak. Many studies within
^Rychard, A., (1993) op cit. p.67
7®Rychard, A., (1993) Ibid.; Brzezinski, M., (1998); Higley, J., et al. (1998); Ost, D., (1990) op cit.
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the Comparative Communist field, which focused on the ways in which 
Communist elites legitimated their rule non-coercively72 have apparently 
lost their initial reason for existing, since the State has, in key respects 
been transformed. Taras has managed to shrug off many of the 
conceptual concerns of his earlier work, in particular work on the 
legitimational functions of ideology in Communist systems, and has 
developed a broader analysis of the post-Communist political system.73 
This is understandable (and in part necessary) given the obvious need to 
redefine and rethink the cognitive apparatus in relation to post- 
Communist States. However, the notion and methodological application 
of legitimation in relation to the political development of post- 
Communist parties is one area where there is still much room for more 
detailed research.
This work is an attempt to deploy the concept of discourses of 
legitimation in relation to the one sector of the Polish public scene where 
they appeared least applicable, to the PZPR. On first sight, it would 
appear that neither discourse nor legitimation could be very easily or 
satisfactorily applied. Discourse theories could be adequately applied, it
71Wildstein, B,. (1991)
77 See Holmes, L., (1993) op cit. pp.10-25 for an exploration of the different legitimation techniques adopted 
by the Communist elites. He proposes seven overlapping modes of legitimation: Old’ traditional, 
Charismatic, Goal-rational/teleological, Eudaemonic, Official nationalist, ’New’ traditional and Legal- 
Rational.
7^Rigby, T. H. et al. (Eds.) (1982) op cit; Taras, R., (1984 and 1995) op cit. These represent the key 
contributions of legitimation theory during the 1980’s to studies of Communist politics. Taras’s works span 
both the period in which Western political science was preoccupied with models of legitimation, i.e., the so- 
called 'Comparative Communism' of the late 1970’s and 1980’s and the apparent pre-occupation in the post- 
Communist period to eschew these models. Reading Taras’s 1995 work one is tempted to think it is written 
by a different author from that of 1984. The former is devoted to the role of political ideology and its use by 
the PZPR at official meetings, delegations, conferences and in Party publications, whereas the latter is 
located within a much ’harder’ field of study, that of issue preferences. It is as if he simply gave up the need 
for concerning himself with ideology when ideology appeared to disappear in 1989. His methodology and 
many of his insights and analyses into Communist discourse, however, provide insights into the period of 
transition and, in many ways, can be adopted and adapted for use within the post-Communist, democratic 
system in Poland.
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was widely argued,74 most successfully to those within the anti- 
Communist opposition. Most of these groups could only seek to build 
pockets of support within a monolithic Communist society via the use of 
often coded or covert discourse, given the absence of direct access to the 
institutions of State in any formal sense. KOR, for example, constructed 
a discourse which was not openly anti-Communist, but which adapted 
elements of the public Communist discourse (about, for example, human 
rights after 1976) into a critique of the Communist reality (on, amongst 
other things, human rights).75 KOR constructed itself discursively within 
a national and moral (Catholic-inspired) set of signifiers. A significant 
element of the Solidarity-Church opposition which developed in 1980 
was also grounded in discourses of Western-style legalism, with its 
association with democratic liberties and individual rights76
Analysis of discourse and legitimational discourses, in relation to the 
PZPR, was ignored or eschewed for often clearly defined historical and 
theoretical reasons, most notably the fact that it was difficult to 
conceptualise any Communist regime in terms of a conversation, either 
with itself, society or anyone else. This view is problematic for two main 
reasons. One, the notion that neither the Church nor Solidarity had any
^Schull, J., (1992) op cit; Walker, R., (1989) op cit. Discourse implies discussion and dialogue between a 
plurality of actors. Given Schull’s and Walker’s view that Communist ideology was merely an empty 
imitation of this type of pluralistic or democratic legitimation, both argue that discourse could only emerge 
outside of or after the collapse of this structure.
7^Michnik, A., (1976) op cit; Bernhard, M. H., (1993) op cit; Walicki, A., (1990) op cit. This example of 
Michnik’s work articulated the emerging discourse of an ’Opposition,’ as opposed to a ’dissident’ group. 
Bernhard argues that this switch from a discourse of fatalistic dissidence to one of oppositional hegemony 
was vital to the emergent force of the Solidarity movement in 1980. Walicki suggests, however, that the 
stress on the ’purity’ of the anti-Communist opposition in comparison with the ’power,’ blurred significant 
cracks in the opposition and undermined any attempts to focus on programmatic coherence. After 1990 this 
weakness was exposed as Solidarity split acrimoniously.
^Kemp-Welch, A., (ed.) (1991) op cit. The key, he argues, to Solidarity’s success lay in its appeal to both 
legal rights and social justice. The appeal to social justice adopted ’State Socialist’ discursive concepts, to do 
with ’class’ and ’historical rights,’ for example, but located them in a non-ideological discourse of Truman
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power during the 1980’s cannot be fully accepted, even in the most 
restricted (institutional) sense, given the semi-institutionalised role played 
by the Church and after 1980 and by the veto power of the Solidarity 
trade union movement.77 Two, because the PZPR was struggling 
throughout the 1980’s to redefine the sources of both its ideological and 
non-ideological legitimation in society.
Discourse analysis was thus a legitimate field of intellectual inquiry (if 
with a rather lop-sided application) and amenable to specific historical 
case study. Kubik,78 for example, addressed opposition 'discourse,1 not 
fully at the expense of concentrating on the PZPR or State discourses, 
but in analysing the latter, was prone to collapse the concepts of Party, 
State and ideology into one overriding concept. Analyses of Communist 
language, though widespread, tended not to use the term 'discourse,' but 
'ideology.' Semiotic content analyses of Party speeches, communiques 
and other discursive artefacts were deployed to analyse changes in the 
politics of Communist States, often as simple reflections of, amongst 
other things, alterations in the relative positions of competing factions.79 
Kubik's work, however, is influential in that it acknowledges the 
centrality of the political use of discourses in the process of legitimation
rights.’ The aim, however, was to confront the authorities with an alternative political agenda; to pose an 
alternative public discourse.
77Kaminski, B., (1992) op cit; Holzer, J., (1984) op cit. The Church was semi-institutionalised to the extent 
that the State was obliged, in times of socio-economic crisis, as in 1981-83, to seek political accommodation 
with it, as the only autonomous representative of society. The ’veto-power’ of Solidarity refers to the way in 
which underground Solidarity during the 1980’s was able to undermine the economic policies of the 
Jaruzelski regime through a strategy of passive resistance at the workplace and rejection of any form of 
political compromise within existing "socialist" structures.
7^Kubik, J., (1994) op cit.
7^Sanford, G., (1992) op cit. Sanford assessed the ways in which so-called ’Soviet-watchers’ in the West 
tended, given the lack of other sources of material or information from within the system, particularly in the 
Soviet Union, to focus on ’textual interpretation:’ ’Reading’ meanings into subtle changes in official ideology, 
which were treated as merely reflections of institutional and political changes in the State system. In relation 
to Poland, however, given the specific pattern of socialist development, this view is insufficiently flexible to
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in Polish politics. Kertzer deploys an anthropological understanding of 
the role played by symbolic discourses and rituals in the construction and 
reconstruction of political identity in relation to the Italian Communist 
Party during the period of the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The importance he attaches to historical discourses is influential 
in this work.80 Sztompka has contributed sociological analyses of the 
ways in which discourses have developed within Polish society since 
1989.81 The social models he has developed are used here in relation to 
the discourses used by the PZPR.
deal with the ways in which discourse was more varied and how it functioned to legitimate aspects of the 
system, the Party and the transition.
80Kertzer, P., (1996)
8 * Sztompka, P., (1993) op cit.
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2.1. Discourse and legitimation
The primary assumption underpinning this thesis is that types o f 
political legitimation are reflected in and simultaneously altered via 
discourse. Discourse is both a product of, and can effect changes in, 
the structure o f legitimation. Discourse is therefore central as both a 
causal factor - in affecting and defining changing modes of legitimation 
and as a methodological ’signpost* for evaluating the rate or pattern of 
changing modes of legitimation. Adopting Giddens' notion of 
'structuration] discourses are both "dependent and determining,”82 of the 
institutional structures within which they rise and the agency of those 
within them.
Discourses - conceptual linguistic frameworks that structure and order 
complexity - are deployed by contenders for power in specific historical 
situations to legitimate or delegitimate aspects of their holding or 
potential holding of power. These elements are arranged and rearranged 
to provide rationales for actions or positions publicly taken. They are, 
"the arguments used’ to justify themselves and their activities.83 As Kubik 
suggests, discourse is a "form of order which determines the inclusion or exclusion 
of statements.”84 Discourses thus define the terrain, the terms and the 
parameters upon which political activity takes place. They determine 
which arguments will be used in the first place and bind political actors 
to given hierarchies of power and structures of authority through "displays 
of solidarity, identity and unity...demarcating group boundaries,"85
^Giddens, A., (Kubik, J., 1994 op cit, p.97)
^^Rigby, T.H., et al. (1982) op cit., p.26
84Kubik, J., (1990) op cit. p.13
8^Kertzer, P., (1996), op cit. p.91
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Discourse, in this conception, has two main functions: 'subjectification' and 
1qualification,' both terms adopted from Therborn’s analysis of ideology.86 
Subjectification is related to the processes through which an individual or 
group realises itself as a subject. Individuals or groups must define what 
it means to be them and not something or someone else. Qualification is 
related to the specific institutional mechanisms by which these 
individuals or groups are trained and endowed with skills to operate 
within the hierarchy within which they have identified themselves. 
Discourse thus constructed "interpellates and constructs subjects. It addresses or 
hails individuals in a certain way, thereby bestowing a position and an identity on 
them. '*7 Discourse acts to construct and define both individual and group 
identities within structures and systems of power.
"It (discourse) serves the function of reproducing the social order by 
symbolically representing it as a unity in which the individual subject has a 
place, and at the same time the symbols operate to generate a sense of 
identification and commitment. Hence the individual is hailed or constructed as 
a subject within a symbolic discourse and it is these symbolic discourses which 
constitute ideological or imaginary communities."88
Discourses, thus conceived, define political relations and political identity 
by defining boundaries between and within groups. They define who 
"we" are and who "they" are. As Thompson argues:
^^Therbom, G., (1980), pp.73-80
^7Larrain, J., (1994) op cit. pp.73-84; Therbom, G., (1980) Ibid.; Taras, R., (1984) op cit. The notion of 
Interpellation’ as a form of political socialisation, comes originally from Althusser and was adopted by Hall 
and Laclau. In this work Therbom’s interpretation is the main source of reference. The word Interpellation’ is, 
however, not found in most dictionaries and is absent in most other related works (with the exception of 
Taras).
^Durkheim, E., (Thompson, K., 1986, op cit. p.24)
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"They act as boundaiy maintainers through which ideological communities 
preserve their unity by defining deviance from normative behaviour and 
mobilising negative sanctions against such behaviour. "89
2.2. Grades of discourse
Taras has suggested that one should define ideology in Communist States 
in terms of a relationship between a core ('diachronic) structure and an 
operative (Jsynchronic) structure.90 The former defined the overall 
structure of the discourse and what was central to the value system, the 
latter the actual use of these structures in everyday official language. The 
former were, according to Taras, less (although not completely in-) 
flexible, not generally changing over time, the latter contingent to a much 
greater extent, on 'social reality.' Operative discourses, thus conceived, 
change in a dialectical relationship with the reality they must operate 
within and in another dialectical relationship with the governing 
principles of the discourse. Thus there is an indirect relationship between 
social reality and the diachronic sphere of discourse - what is usually 
referred to as 'ideology.' Both discursive spheres legitimate (via the 
process of interpellation) in different ways (via different interpellatory 
signifiers) to different groups from whom support or a political or socio­
economic agreement is necessary.91 Doctrinal ideology in this case 
functioned to gel a particular coalition of State and PZPR groups,
^Thompson, K., (1980) Ibid. pp.24-5.
^Ojaras, R., (1984) op cit. The notion of ’operative ideology’ is useful, in that claims to rule within ostensible
ideologically legitimated societies require operationalisation in concrete situations via speech acts which 
necessitate both some kind of interpretation and discussion within and without the community that articulates 
the ideology. Hence it can be described as at least partially "discursive" in the sense being deployed in this 
analysis.
91Holmes, L., (1993), op cit. pp.23-26
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defining limits to collective action and institutional change. Operative 
discourse was used to retain a semblance of continuity, in, for example, 
national and cultural traditions. It constructed the 'outer* community - the 
'them' (of society) rather than the 'us' of the elite. Both spheres socialised 
politically, the former in an inclusive, the latter in an exclusive sense.92 
The PZPR, particularly after 1981 operated within a narrow sphere of 
ideological references. The symbolic function of ideology, thus 
conceived, was to provide a picture of the future within which all present 
actions could be made legitimate, even if, in private many of these overt 
claims were discarded or downgraded.
92Holmes, L., (1993) Ibid. pp. 16-17
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2.3. Types of legitimational discourses
One can identify various ideal-type forms of legitimation and locate 
discourses within them. To a certain they overlap, although each has 
certain specific characteristics. This typology is simplified, for the 
purposes of clarity, along an continuum, between Tradition as a claim to 
legitimation at one end and ljegal-Kational claims at the other.
2.3.i. T r a d i t i o n a l  legitimation
Traditional legitimation is based on what Holmes defines as "an established 
belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising 
authority under them.”93 In ideologically-defined political systems, the "force 
of history" and "vanguard' status of the leading party assume the role 
previously played by, for example, a monarch or 'strong-man' leader. 
Other forms of legitimation feed off and into this dominant mode. 
Legitimation may, for example, rely, at times, on coercion - based either 
on the use of force to resolve conflicts or the fear of its use. Goal-rational 
(teleological or eudaemonic) devices also shape aspects of this type of 
legitimation. Those holding office within this political system validate 
themselves in terms either of 'the final goal' (Communism) or medium- 
term targets, for example production targets - eudaemonic legitimation - the 
promise of satisfying material expectations.94 Social-contractual legitimation - 
in which groups in society are selectively rewarded with the intention of 
inducing either societal support or to drive divisions between groups in 
society - may also be a feature of this traditional mode.
^Holmes, L., (1993) op cit. p. 13
94Holmes, L., (1993) Ibid., p.13-15
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2.3.ii. L e g a l - R a t i o n a l  legitimation
A legal-rational form of political legitimation is closest to that prevalent 
in modern democratic States. It is based on "a belief in the legality of patterns 
of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands."95 Rules and procedures are objective and impersonal and 
obedience is given to codified and consensual norms rather than persons.
95Holmes, L., (1993) Ibid. p.15
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2.4. Discursive signifiers
Three core discourse are selected, outlined and analysed in terms of the 
model of legitimation developed. The intention of this section is to 
outline the essential features of these discourses of legitimation. It is not 
intended as a fully comprehensive historical, but rather a schematic (and 
inevitably partial) representation of the discourses themselves. Below are 
outlined three sets of binary opposites which marked and ordered the 
cultural-symbolic domain within which legitimation was sought. They are 
selected from various deduced ideal-type discourses, the most important 
of which stem from Sztompka's96 seven binary opposites from his work 
on the post-Communist uses of discourse. It is important to understand 
this typology as a simplified model within which some discourses may fit 
into two or all categories. The Catholic Church, for example, can be 
treated as both a West jE ast and a Public/Private signifier.
^^Sztompka, P., (1993) op cit; Alexander, J. C., (1991) op cit. Sztompka’s work is specifically addressed to 
exploring the pattern of democratic discourse within post-Communist Polish society. His methodology is one 
that can, however, be used to explore the democratic discourses of the PZPR.
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Figure l) A  schematic representation of the hinaiy opposites in PZPR  
discourse:
Private Vs. 
Public
West Vs. East Past Vs. Present
Traditional
M arxism -Leninism
1. Party:
The 'leading role' principle 
and 'democratic centralism.'
2.Class
Party as constitutive o f  
working class interests; 
3.State/Constitution 
As 'private' domain o f  the 
PZPR.
4. Opposition/Church 
Former as a corollary to the 
State, with participation 
limited. The latter as 
instrument for defusing social 
unrest. Marginal respect for, 
or references to, either.
Operative
'Socialist constitutionalism ' 
and 'Socialist democracy'
Degree o f legality and 
impartiality, in application
Traditional
International socialist 
alliances
1. 'East:
Socialism as an essentially 
Eastern European product. 
The USSR treated as 
guarantor, for example, o f  
Polish national sovereignty.
2. West'
Negatively signified, in 
terms o f  capitalism, 
exploitation and colonialism. 
'Real' socialism contrasted 
with ‘bourgeois’ socialism o f  
Western Europe. The 
Catholic Church as a 
Western, bourgeois, 
institution.
Operative
'Polish Road to Socialism'
Symbols o f Moscow  
underplayed, ambivalent 
forms o f  nationalism and 
the concept o f  the ‘lesser 
evil.’
Traditional
'Glorious' socialist and 
national past
Ignored or marginalised: 
-National independence 
-WW2, Katyn and the role o f  
the USSR
-PPS (Socialist party)
-1968 and 1970 
-1970, 76, 80-81 downplayed 
or treated as ‘counter­
revolutionary’ or ‘anti- 
constitutional’
Operative
'1956'
Only significant discursive 
marker o f  autonomy from 
Moscow.
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2.41 ‘Private’versus Public’
The 'Public' versus 'Private' binary opposition concerns the construction 
of PZPR discourse in relation to the State, Constitution and societal 
opposition (including the Catholic Church). 'Public' discourses represent 
the open and fully democratic - legal-rational - end of a continuum and 
'Private,' the closed, non-democratic -traditional - end. This extract from 
Sztompka's analysis illustrates the tendency towards 'Private' and 'Public' 
bifurcation in Poland:
"The discourse appears in a number of guises: 'society versus the authorities,' 
'the nation versus the State,' 'the people versus the rulers' and 'us versus them. ’ 
The private sphere is the domain of the good, of virtue, dignity, and pride; 
whereas the public sphere is the domain of vice, disdain, and shame. Power 
centres are perceived as alien and hostile. The government is seen as the arena of 
conspiray, deceit, cynicism, or at least stupidity and inefficieny."91
All political parties seek to locate themselves discursively somewhere 
between these opposites. The PZPR's ideological discourses were more 
closely associated with a 'Private' conception of the State: the State as the 
'property' of the Party overseeing a largely disenfranchised society. "People 
believe they have no say in the running of public affairs, no opportunity to influence 
their own well being. Therefore they are reluctant to engage themselves in public life, 
because they do not see any realistic way in which it could change anything."98 'Public' 
discourses reflect a more open conception of State-society relations. The 
State is not necessarily 'owned' or 'occupied' by any 'given' group, but
^Sztompka, P., (1993), op cit. p.512 
^Sztompka, P., (1993) Ibid, p.513
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operates according to established rules and principles - in other words, it 
connotes a legal rational-type of legitimation. Three areas are outlined in 
terms of their function of discursive legitimation.
2.4.1.a. 'The Party'/ 'parties'
The 'leading role of the (Communist) party' principle remained, 
throughout its existence, the PZPR's key traditional - private - signifier. It 
acted as the key interpellatory mechanism in the process of reproducing 
loyalty within the State. It defined and demarcated, discursively - simply 
and clearly, the terms of State-society relations: who was allowed to 
participate, on what terms and limits to what they could say and do. The 
PZPR spoke of itself as the highest expression and arbiter of working 
class interests. Class was central to the discourse, combined with a 
rejection of other parties and other sources of political representation 
(with the exception of the PZPR's coalition parties, the Democratic 
Party, SD and United Peasants Party, ZSL, none of which had any real 
power).
2.4.1.b. The State and constitution
Democratic centralism - the governing principle of the centralised 
bureaucratic exercise of decision making - was central to the PZPR's 
construction of its political role within the State. Top-down decision­
making and controlled integration of selected non-PZPR representatives 
is central to this aspect of the discourse. The State was treated as an 
'object' of Party intent, with some, although highly limited, constitutional 
autonomy, in the form, for example, of the Constitutional Tribunal.
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2.4.i.c. Opposition
The precise discursive definition of an 'opposition' had important 
legitimational effects for the PZPR. The term 'opposition' implied all forms 
of disagreement with or hostility to the regime, whereas the notion of a 
'constructive opposition'"  (which arose in 1988) implied an opposition that 
was prepared to submit to the existing rules of the political game. These 
discursive constructions reflected wider conceptions of the type of 
political legitimation. Within the original, monistic, conception, the 
political hegemony of the Communist Party was unquestioned and the 
recognition of other social or political sources of power was deemed 
incompatible with the Party's leading role.100 The role of the Catholic 
Church complicates the notion of opposition and raises questions of 
'symbolic' opposition, for example.
^^Ionescu, I., (1967), pp.2-3. See the discussion concerning the distinction made between "opposition" and 
"political opposition."
100Bamard, F. M., (1991), op cit. p. 134. Barnard suggests that within the Communist tradition three 
conceptions of ’opposition’ vied for domination. The first was the traditional Marxist-Leninist (or ’monistic’) 
conception. Any opposition to the regime was treated as opposition to the system itself since the system was 
an ’objective’ factor in the historical progression towards Communism. Within the second, intermediate or 
’quasi-pluralistic’ conception of ’opposition’ multiple interests were recognised, but did not impair the leading 
role of the Communist Party. Pluralism was confined to the social infrastructure, in which interests vied for 
public acknowledgement. Thus the Communist Party was made out to be the ultimate arbiter in the resolution 
of sectional conflicts. The third, or ’truly’ pluralistic conception recognised diversity in the social realm, but 
extended this to the political.
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2.4.ii. ‘West* Versus 'East*
The 'Wes? versus 'East' binary opposition concerns the ways in which the 
USSR and the Socialist bloc (and the values and institutions associated 
with them) and Western nations (and the values and institutions 
associated with them) were constructed and represented in discourse. 
'East' signified ideological orthodoxy and therefore political certainty and 
legitimation within the prevailing geopolitical model, whereas 'West' 
signified uncertainty: destructive capitalism, class conflict, inequality and 
potential loss of national sovereignty.
The ways in which the 'East' and the 'West' tended to be constructed in 
official PZPR discourse was most strikingly at odds with the ways in 
which society constructed them. As Sztompka suggests there was (and is) 
a strong tendency within Polish society to construct an uncritically 
positive vision of the 'West!
"There is an uncritical glorification of the Western way of life, economic and 
political arrangements, consumer patterns, products, and artistic 
achievements." m
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2.4.11.a. 'The East'
The external parameters of the domestic model of legitimation within 
which the PZPR found itself was one of a primary association, reflected 
in various discursive references, with the USSR. The ’USSR1 signified 
geopolitical security, centralised power structures and coercive rule. 
Ideological (Marxism-Leninist and Socialist Internationalist) discourses 
most clearly signified a public attachment to this Hastem version of 
socialism. For example May Day, the reverence reserved for Soviet 
leaders within official discourse and the explicit support for most, if not 
all, the ideas and/ or institutions within the Soviet bloc signified 
commitments to the USSR and thus commitments to the existing pattern 
of domestic political decision-making and State organisation.
2.4.11.b. 'The West'
’West' references were largely negative - to the divisive and unstable 
nature of capitalism and, for example, the relationship between 
capitalism and colonialism. The ’authentic' values of socialism were 
'essentially' Eastern European, to be contrasted with the 'bourgeois' 
socialism of Western Europe (including, for example, the French and 
Italian Communist Parties experiments with 'Eurocommunism'). Church 
discourses and discursive references to religion were also significant. The 
Church was constructed as an institution of the West. There is some 
obvious ambiguity in that the PZPR, after 1956, legitimated itself within 
discourses of a 'Polish Road to Socialism,' which was self-justified neither as 
fully Eastern' nor as fully 'Western,' but unique to Poland
lOlSztompka, P., (1993) op cit. p.513
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2.4.iii. 'Past' Versus 'Present'
If the narrative of the future (communism) was constructed for reasons 
of socialisation and intra-elite unity - having little, if any, connection with 
the sphere of activity in any other real sense - the picture of the past had 
to correspond, to a large extent, with the same story since its function 
within the narrative was to provide a sense of linear progress. In other 
words, there had to be discursive continuity. Historical discourses 
legitimated the role of whatever political antecedents best sanctioned 
contemporary political strategy. References were not merely 'floating* or 
accidental, rather they acted to link ideological and other discourses into 
a coherent whole, supporting ideological or other types of discourse by 
furnishing them with examples, antecedents and illustrations. The 
discursive construction and representation of 'history' as Kertzer argues, 
provides:
"a link between how people see themselves and are seen by others to be linked to 
larger, symbolically constructed entities." (How) "we make sense of ourselves by 
constructing a narrative of our pasts. A ll parties are actively engaged in a 
constant'autobiographicalv revision...We fit the pieces, as we confront them, into 
a framework of our already formed narrative...and when it becomes difficult to 
fi t  the pieces into the story, we change the narrative." 102
Polish history is open to wide and often fundamental disagreement and 
groups competing for political power within Poland have always 
developed competing versions of the past.103 It thus provides a rich and
^K ertzer, (1996) op cit. p. 123
^Q^wprost, 19th April 1998. Wprost asked various figures on both sides of the political divide to state when, 
in their view, Poland had become independent: Walesa - 28 October 1992 (the date when the last Soviet 
soldiers left Polish soil), Mazowiecki - 12 August 1989 (the date of the inauguration of the first non­
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valuable insight into the changing political-legitimational discourses of 
the transitional PZPR. The role played by 'history* in Polish politics 
represents a significant and determining variable within the changing 
discourses of the PZPR for two main reasons. One, Polish Communists 
could not achieve any real degree of political stability and popular 
support largely because they were seen popularly as stooges of the Soviet 
Union. If the PZPR could disentangle its role in the post-war period 
from that of the Soviet Union it could redefine its position in relation to 
society. Two, the economic failures of the 1980's must be understood 
within the context of a self-organised, historically aware and explicitly 
anti-Soviet society. Solidarity, for example, placed alongside its demands 
for political and trade union reforms during 1980/81 a demand for 
official historical truth, about Katyn amongst other things. 
'Underground' literature during the 1980's, furthermore, devoted itself to 
developing discourses of 'real' Polish history.104 KOR's 'Flying University,' 
for example, was developed during the 1976-80 period with the explicit 
intention of challenging the Communist discourses of history.105 Many 
oppositional intellectuals retained a strong sense that historical truths 
needed to act as the cornerstone of any ethical and political opposition to 
the Communist regime. The strategy of 'New Evolutionism' (developed in 
both Poland and Czechoslovakia after 1976 by Havel and Michnik 
following the Helsinki conventions on human rights to which both 
regimes signed) to stand morally above the Communist regime, offer a
Communist government), Jaruzelski and Rakowski- 2nd April 1997 (the date of the new constitution), 
Suchocka - 4 June 1989 (the date of the semi-open parliamentary elections), Buzek (Premier 1997- ) - 11 
November 1918 (the date of Polish independence), Krzaklewski (head of AWS coalition, post-1997) - 9th 
December 1990 (the date of the first fully open elections, to the Presidency).
104Bemhard, M.H., (1993) op cit.
105Bemhard, M. H., (1993) Ibid.. For a wider exploration of the role played by KOR in the anti-Communist 
underground movement and Michnik, A., (1988b) and (1976c).
62
’clean space'106 and sense of political integrity, is linked to the 
Communist’s legitimational problems. As Gerrits argues:
"The historical consciousness of the Poles was an amalgam of truths, myths and 
miracles, nourished by a seemingly endless series of rituals, commemorations and 
publications. The nucleus was the struggle for national sovereignty, narrowed 
down to conflict with Russia. The uprisings against Tsarist occupation, the Z d 
Republic, 1919-21 war, 1939, Katyn, the Warsaw uprising. These were the 
classic themes of uncensored history. The past was an issue of the highest 
political order and a permanent challenge to the regime.”107
The 'Past' versus 'Present' binary opposite concerns the ways in which 
certain versions of the past were constructed for contemporary 
legitimational use. In this case, the continuum is marked on one hand by 
a certain type of closed - traditional - historical discourse and on the other 
by a more open/pluralistic - legal-rational - ’national’ (in the sense of 
articulating the national experience) discourse. As Sztompka observes:
"The phrase 'before the war' has always signified the best in all domains of life. 
A nd when it came to the oppositional struggle and anti-Communist revolution, 
their main theme was the return to institutions and traditions of the past, rather 
than shaping newformsfor the future."108
The intention of this section is not a comprehensive historical 
exploration of each element of the history in its own right, rather it is an 
overview of the main points of contention and why and how they were
106 The notion of ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’, those associated with the Communist regime and those not continues 
into the post-Communist environment.
1 ^ Gerrits, A.,(1990) op cit. p.64
^ S z to m p k a , (1993) op cit. p.518
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politically significant within the model of PZPR legitimation. Inevitably, 
therefore, this selection is cursory. It is concerned with explaining history 
in terms of the specific legitimational-political functions of a regulated 
and uniform official discourse of power, which was random and not 
necessarily rational in any sense other than its binding normative - 
interpellatory - function in the production of shared meanings and identity. 
Below are outlined the areas of special significance in terms of the 
PZPR's historical discourses and the broad counter-narratives of history 
as developed by key representatives of Polish society.
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2.4.111.a. National independence (1918) and 1918-39
The celebration of national independence (November 1918) and the 
period up to 1939 marked a profound ambivalence on behalf of the 
PZPR. On the one hand it sought to locate itself within a discourse of 
'nationalism,' while on the other hand Polish nationhood (in its modern 
form) was defined largely by it anti-Russian, anti-German (and also anti- 
Semitic) flavour.109 In seeking nationalism as a discourse of domestic 
legitimation, the PZPR was obliged to tailor its overt references to the 
period of independence (1918-39) to fit in with its new found external 
ideological commitments. '"Piisudski' and 'national independence' discursive 
references were thus, if not completely rejected, used very selectively to 
underpin the essentially socialist basis of Poland's national sovereignty. 
The inter-war period was, for example, constructed as a necessary 
(bourgeois) stage in the historical materialist process towards socialism 
and communism.
2.4.111.b. World W ar T m / Katyn
Atrocities committed by the Soviets in Poland during WWII play a 
fundamental role in the post-war failures of the PZPR to develop deep- 
rooted societal support. The PZPR never fully dealt with Katyn, for 
example, nor the question of deportations of Poles (1939-41), nor the 
significant (non-)role played by the Red Army in the destruction of 
Warsaw by the Nazis in 1944, following the non-Communist resistance-
lO^Davies, N., (1997a). The creation of a Polish State in 1918 is only explicable within the context of 
Russian internal political weaknesses following the revolution in 1917. The possibilities afforded by Russian 
weakness were exploited by a newly formed Polish army, headed by General Piisudski, which advanced deep 
into Russian territory before being pushed back in 1920 to the outskirts of Warsaw. Polish battalions, thus, in 
the aftermath of WWII, were seen, in Soviet terms, as having fought on the ’wrong’ (that is ’white’) side 
during the Russian civil war (1917-20)
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led Warsaw uprising. Katyn110 was the cornerstone of the PZPR's 
domestic political weakness. The Party could not openly question the 
official Soviet position, which remained until April 1990 officially 
unresolved. It was simply unacceptable to equate Katyn with the USSR, 
although few Polish or Western scholars doubt Soviet responsibility for 
the crime.111 The Party, however, was never able openly to address the 
events of Katyn and this failure underscored its weakness in Polish 
society.
2.4iii.c. PPS-Polish Socialist Party
In traditional PZPR discourse the role of the PPS was underplayed or 
selectively ignored. The role of the PPS in the immediate aftermath of 
WWII is significant in that it had greater popular support than the 
Workers' Party (PPR) and, largely for this reason, was mistrusted by the 
Soviet elite (for being too close to non-revolutionary or peasant and 
trade union movements). The PPS contained a large proportion of those 
who had been sympathetic to the Popular Front organisations of the 
1930's. It also contained some of the brightest intellectuals of the period 
and a advocated a more sophisticated understanding of socialism. The 
PZPR's search for solutions to existing crises in 1956, 1970 and 1980-81 
can be seen in terms of a partial resurrection of the PPS line within the
* ^ Davies, N., (1997a) Ibid, p.1004 & p.l 188. The issue of Katyn centres on the murder o f 14,000 officers of 
the Polish Army and police taken prisoner by the USSR occupying Poland’s eastern territories. The prisoners 
were held in three camps; Kozelsk (near Smolensk), Starobesk (Ukraine) and Ostaszkov (Kalinin). All traces 
of the men were lost in the spring of 1940, one year before the Germans invaded the USSR. In 1943 the 
Germans found a mass grave in the forest near Katyn containing the bodies of 4,143 men who had been 
interned in Kozelsk. Each had his hands tied behind his back and had been shot in the back of the head at 
close range. The official date of the massacre was marked as 1941, a year after the German invasion of 
Russia: the Soviet Union thus held the Nazis responsible. However, all evidence suggests that the NKVD, 
Soviet secret police, committed the massacre in September 1940, two weeks after the start of the war.
Garrett, T. and Garrett, F., (1987), and Davies, N., (1988). Editor of Nowe Drogi, Ludwik Krasucki 
referred to Katyn on various occasions in, for example, The Sunday Times, May 31st 1987, although never 
fully within the journal of which he was the editor.
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Communist elite - limited constitutional democracy, industrial democracy 
and mixed market economics.
2.4.111.d. 1968 ( ’Marked') and 1970 ("Grud^ien")
The events of 'Marked (March 1968) and 'Grudged (December 1970) 
remain subject to bitter dispute at many levels of Polish society.112 The 
significance of a discourse (or lack of one) about 'Marked lies in the 
weakness of the more liberal Communists within the PZPR to stem the 
arbitrary manipulation of a discourse of Polish nationalism to further 
hard-line interests within the State. In 1968 Gomulka played a key role in 
equating so-called ’anti-social forces’ (mainly demonstrating students) 
with Zionism and in initiating the last wave of Polish-Jewish 
emigration.113
December 1970's events, during which the local civil militia shot and 
killed dozens of striking dock workers in Gdynia, was never fully 
resolved, at any level, discursive, legal or otherwise. The PZPR continued 
to downplay the struggle within which the events took place and tended 
to stress the 'anti-social activities' of the strikers. Its significance, like that 
of ’Mar^ec,' lies in the hard-liners' success in mobilising the repressive 
force of the State against 'opposition' within society.
2.4.111.e. 1981-83 (Martial Lair)
The imposition of a state of martial law in December 1981 (lifted in 
1983) both reaffirmed the PZPR's traditional ideological discourse and 
its discourses of historical continuity. At the same time, it symbolised the
U 2 Wprost, 31st March 1998
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gulf that had emerged between Party and society. Opposition leaders in 
the struggles of 1980-81, such as Walesa and Michnik, were excluded 
from official discourse after 1982 and that of socialist legalism and socialist 
constitutionalism imposed from above. Martial law is still a bone of 
considerable contention in Poland.
l^Heller, q  s., (1969) and Checinski, M., (1982) op cit.
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3. The PZPR  in historicalperspective
3.1. 1948-80
The PZPR was created in 1948 in a merger of the long-established PPS 
(Polish Socialist Party - set up in Paris in 1882) and the newly established 
PPR (Polish Workers’ Party - set up in Soviet Russia in 1942114). The 
merger, in effect, shunted together two political parties with different 
ideological origins within socialism (and thus different conceptions of 
'revolution,' 'democracy,' and 'legality*),115 relations with the Soviet Union 
and relations with Polish society. The PPR was the immediate successor 
to the disbanded pre-war Polish Communist Party (KPP), although with 
almost no personnel and very few of the ideas inherited from the KPP. It 
was explicitly set up for the purposes of providing the Soviets with a 
political foothold in Poland at a time when socialists and various pre-war 
nationalist and peasant parties dominated the Home Army (AK) 
resistance to the Nazis. After the war it provided Moscow with a 
compliant partner in Warsaw. The PPR articulated a rather crude 
discourse defined by Stalin's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and was 
seen by many within the PPS leadership, from the moment of its 
inception, as a Soviet puppet.
114Regula, J. A., (1994) The pre-war Polish Communist Party (KPP) was disbanded in 1938 on the orders of 
Stalin, officially because it had become "disengaged" from the Comintern. Stalin was already attempting to 
reduce internal Polish potential obstacles to potential Soviet rule in the eastern territories of Poland annexed 
to the USSR in 1940. The PPS, on the other hand was grounded in the trade union and independence 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
1 ^Bernhard, M. H., (1993) op cit. p.219. See the declaration of Poland’s underground parliament, the 
Council of National Unity (RJN), which was dominated by PPS activists, of 15th March 1944, entitled "O co 
walczy nardd Polski?' (What is the Polish nation fighting for?). It called for thorough industrial and 
agricultural reform, local self-government and parliamentary democracy. This was something, according to 
Bernhard, "considerably more radical than the proposals which the Polish Communists were making at that 
time."
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Post-war political struggle within the PZPR - between factions loosely 
based around the pre-existing PPS and old PPR blocs within the new 
party - concerned, for example, the definition and role of non-PZPR 
actors in society and the means by which interests should be defined, 
represented and mediated within the political system. Periodically, after a 
cycle of social unrest followed by political crisis and changes in 
leadership (1956,1970 and 1980-81), the new leadership group within the 
PZPR opened up the doctrinal language of Marxism-Leninism to 
versions of limited social, economic and political pluralism within the 
State and society and toyed with notions of internal Party democracy.116 
However, the ideologically more liberal-Communist wings of the PZPR, 
remnants of the PPS, on each occasion found themselves either the 
target of elite purges or isolated and outmanoeuvred by a combination of 
military and bureaucratic sections of the Party and State.117
The PZPR was thus an historical peculiarity. It was Communist Party in 
all but name: obliged to name itself a Workers' party because the term 
"Communistf evoked outright hostility among large sections of Polish 
society. Stalin also wanted to demonstrate that the People’s Democracies 
of Central and Eastern Europe were of a lower order than the USSR 
(with the exception of the Czech Communist Party). The Party operated 
within the Soviet sphere of influence and therefore in a supposedly 
socialist society, although in a society that had forcibly and
H^Hahn, \y., (1987) op cit; de Weyenthal, J.B., (1986); Dziewanowski, M.K., (1976) and Eysymontt, J., and 
Maciejewski, P., (1985). Hahn’s work provides a thorough analysis of the democratisation process 
("horizontalism") that took place within the PZPR during 1980-81.
117de Weyenthal, J.B., (1986) Ibid.; Dziewanowski, M.K., (1976) Ibid.; Sanford, G., (1983) and (1984) op 
cit. For analysis of the specific role played by anti-Semitism in the dynamics of leadership purges within the 
Communist party, in particular its role during the purges of 1968, see, Heller, C.S., (1969) op cit. and 
Checinski, M., (1982) op cit.
70
unambiguously rejected Soviet-type Communism in 1920.118 Poland was 
also a society that retained strong radical traditions of insurrection and 
republicanism and held an historical attachment to the values of 
collectivism and egalitarianism. It was a party that thus functioned 
politically within a very limited set of possibilities, its room for political 
manoeuvre conditioned by its precarious balancing position between a 
hostile society and an external 'ally,’ the USSR, which was, at times, 
openly hostile vis-a-vis the leading (Communist) Parties in the Soviet 
bloc. Within the PZPR, furthermore, from its beginning, there was 
ambivalence and ambiguity concerning the meaning and political 
application of socialism. As Starski explains:
"The only possible legitimation of the ruling elite after W W II was the claim 
that it was furthering the application of Marxist revolutionary theory to push 
society from a capitalist to a socialist phase of development. But it is clear that 
no such revolution was in sight\ as the only tradition of militant struggle in 
Poland always took independence as its first priority. There was, of course, a 
more vivid tradition of more general social struggle, but in Poland it was 
represented by a socialist movement favouring co-operatives and non­
revolutionary measures, very much like Western social democracy, not by the 
Communist Party, which had never been too popular due to its indecisive, non­
nationalist, pro-Soviet stance."119
Throughout the 1948-80 period the PZPR operated within a society 
dominated by a cultural value system marked by its historically
l^D avies, N., (1997) op cit. The Polish-Soviet war of 1919-20 is of central importance in the emerging
identity of the newly formed independent Polish State and also in terms of the collective social equation in 
Poland of Communism with anti-Polishness. The defence of Poland against Russia, became, as Davies 
explains, both a defence against "barbarianism" and "bolshevism," often used interchangeably. See, also, 
Checinski, K., (1982) for analysis o f the peculiar dilemma faced by the Polish Communist Party (KPP).
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pronounced anti-Soviet, nationalist and Catholic contours.120 Within this 
context, the leading party in the post-war period could never claim any 
sustained domestic support. By this is meant that the PZPR held formal 
power but, since it was endowed with little or very weak societal support, 
was largely unable to achieve many of the objectives defined by the 
dominant ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This was most clearly 
witnessed in the failures to collectivise the peasantry and curb the powers 
of the Catholic Church in the early 1950's. The power of the symbolic 
association of the Church with the nation is illustrated in the following 
extract from the 1981 Solidarity Congress:
"Because it was Christianity that brought us into our wider motherland 
PLurope, because for a thousand years Christianity has shaped our culture, since 
in the most tragic moments of our nation it was the Church that was our main 
support, since our ethics are predominantly Christian, since, finally, Catholicism 
is the living faith of the majority of Poles, we deem it necessary that an honest 
presentation of the role of the Church in the history of Poland have an 
appropriate place "m
Between 1948 and 1956, the Communist system in Poland was marked 
by the presence of Soviet military advisors within the highest echelons of 
the PZPR and State and by the leading position of Polish Stalinists.122 
The PZPR adopted a traditional-type ideological discourse. That is, the 
Party believed itself to be enjoying popular legitimation by virtue of its 
historical status as a vehicle of the socialist project in Poland, which was
119Starski, S., (1982) op cit. p. 132
^^Gomulka, S and Polansky, A., (1990) op cit; Bernhard, M. H., (1993), op cit.
1 ^ 1 World Affairs 145, summer 1982
^K ersten, k ., (1986) and Toranska, T.,(1989) op cit.
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based on 'scientific* laws of historical development.123 It was traditional in 
the sense that it based its claim to rule on the ideologically derived notion 
that it had a necessary historical role to play. This form of traditional 
legitimation124 bypasses the need for independent State or civic 
institutions, relying instead on an organic or implicit relationship between 
rulers and ruled. It is the clearest example of a closed, non-constitutional 
and anti-democratic, 'Private,' discourse.
A peculiar form of mixed legitimation emerged, most clearly after 1956, 
marked along three main discursive cleavages: 'Public'/  'Private/
1East7 'West' and 'Past'I 'Present.' On one hand the PZPR was obliged to 
honour its 'Eastern' commitments and, on the other, to construct more 
national and less-confrontational domestic (but still socialist) discourses 
in relation to Polish society. The aim was not to crush the indigenous 
'culture,' which continued to take, as it's dominant focus of reference, 
Catholicism and national independence, but to adapt elements of it and 
fuse them into a socialist discourse. 'Public' discourses, of 
constitutionalism, for example, emerged and were submerged at regular 
intervals, each time legitimated retrospectively125 by a core discursive 
commitment to traditional 'Eastern' signifiers and a limited discursive 
construction of history. The limits imposed on national historical 
discourses were clearly designed to reduce any discursive possibilities of 
refocusing the Party's commitments to the 'Eastern' discourse i.e. Soviet 
interests and Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The discourse of Statist
^B urton, F., and Carlen, P., (1979) op cit; Carew-Hunt R.N., (1963) op cit.
^M arkus. M., Overt and Covert Modes of Legitimation in Eastern European Societies,’ (Rigby, T.H., et 
al. 1982), op cit.
^ T aras, R., (1986), op cit.. Taras observed the pattern of official justifications of crises within socialist 
Poland. Each was retrospectively analysed as resulting from mistaken policies (a failure of interpretation) 
and/or leadership failures rather than a crisis of the system itself.
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prerogatives and ideological consistency, for example, articulated in 1968 
by a hard-line (beton: literally meaning 'concrete1) group within the PZPR 
(centred around General Moczar's so-called Partisans) and in 1981, in a 
revised form (by General Jaruzelski), most clearly sent appropriate signals 
to Moscow that Polish Communism remained within the Soviet camp, 
while discourse in relation to Polish society was often deliberately devoid 
of overt ideological elements, particularly during the 1980's.
(Thus)..."//fo natural reaction of any community confronted with such a 
paradox was to keep its collective head below the parapet; react conservatively, 
since the safest course of action was to follow the Leninist Party line"™
The Poznan demonstrations of 1956 which lead, indirectly, to the 
reinstatement of Gomulka as First secretary of the PZPR, anticipated the 
events of Hungary later that year and echoed many similar demands: 
genuine independence from Moscow and political, legal, media and other 
freedoms. They represented the first reformist openings within the 
Soviet bloc after the war and precipitated a departure from the language 
of Stalinism. Socialism could, for example, include a degree of worker 
self-management, political decentralisation and national autonomy from 
Moscow. 1956 witnessed the birth of a discursive notion of a Polish Road 
to Socialism.' Gomulka (First Secretary of the PZPR, 1956-70) promised a 
renewal of many of the reforms advocated by the PPS. However, during 
the 1960's, the more the Gomulka regime struggled to resist the 
monopolising tendencies inherent within 'reaF socialism, the more it 
became politically compromised by the distance that had emerged 
between Party and society. During the mid-1960's, culminating in the
126Walker, R., (1989), op cit, p.13
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infamous "March events" of 1968, Gomulka's power base within the Party 
began to factionalise and a hard-line/reformist cleavage opened. Gierek 
manoeuvred within the Party elite to undermine the ascension of hard­
liners such as Moczar between 1968 and 1970127 and rose to power in 
1970 following strikes and political unrest in the TriCity area (Gdansk, 
Gdynia and Sopot).
The Gierek years (1970-80) were characterised by a combination of 
relative economic liberalisation and the continued search of the 
Communist elite to constitutionalise its leading role within the State. The 
Party relinquished many of its traditional discourses of national self- 
sufficiency and closed borders to the West. At the same time, however, a 
hard-core reaction of many within the Party and State to this relative 
liberalisation was expressed in two ways. One, in the search for a 
formalisation of the PZPR's leading role within the 1952 (Stalinist) 
constitution, witnessed most clearly in 1976.128 Two, in the increasingly 
capitalistic style with which many within the Party and State 
administration sought to manage socialised industry. The emergence of a 
dichotomised discourse of 'eudaemonism' in relation to society and a 
further attempt to institutionalise the role of the PZPR within the State 
thus most clearly marked the 1970's. Eudaemonic discourse 
reconstructed the traditional ideological stress on equality and the 
dominance of production over consumption. Pay differentials, individual 
bonuses and material incentives were stressed. The legitimational 
significance lies in the implicit abandonment of Marxist-Leninist 
discourses used by the PZPR to seek legitimation with society.
^^Checinski, M (1982), op cit.
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The combination of relative economic liberalisation, Western capital 
investment and the increasingly entrenched and obstructive role of the 
Communist nomenclature, however, meant that, while in the short term 
Polish State Socialism appeared to be experiencing an economic boom of 
unprecedented proportions within the Eastern bloc, in reality, a massive 
debt burden was being heaped onto a national economy which was 
unable to sustain it in the longer term.129 The relative political and civic 
freedoms allowed under the Gierek regime, furthermore, fostered the 
growth of a better organised and ideologically distinct opposition, in the 
form of KOR and ROPCiO in 1976, both of which were to play 
significant roles in the forthcoming crisis of 1980 and thus for the 
contorted development of PZPR discourses thereafter.
128Bemhard, M.H., (1993), op cit, p.202
129Slay, B., (1994)
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3.2. 1981-88
The post-December 1981 (the imposition of martial law) model of PZPR 
legitimation was characterised by an intensification of the existing pattern 
of bifurcated discourses. On one hand, there was a reaffirmation of 
ideological discourses, a return to traditional types of legitimation, which 
were clearly designed to assuage the Soviet Union and reaffirm intra- 
Party-State commitments to retaining power. On the other hand, there 
was a more pronounced emphasis on legal-rational' eudaemonic and social 
contractual elements within discourses aimed at society.
The legitimational function of Marxism-Leninism discourses for the 
PZPR after 1981 was largely one of placating the USSR - while exploiting 
fear of the USSR in Polish society - to reimpose its domestic policies and 
reinforce intra-Party and State socialisation and control. By stressing the 
centrality of 'historical materialism' (including the leading role of the 
Communist Party and democratic centralism), powerful and punitive 
sanctions could be brought to bear on non-adherents ('outsiders’). This 
discourse stressed a set of core political principles concerning, for 
example, the relationship between parties and the State and the 
possibilities for public discourse in most spheres of civic and public life.
This separation of 'operative' legitimational discourses and 'doctrinal" 
Marxism-Leninism and the specific usage of each to legitimate aspects of 
system, Party and regime led to a peculiar situation. Official ideology was 
transformed into a kind of verbal ritual,130 serving partly the function of 
self-legitimation of the regime and partly the repressive function of
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monopolisation of 'public discourse.' Ideology, thus conceived, became, 
as Pakulski observed, a series of:
"Ritual messages and signals meant to be only formally respected. One is not 
expected to believe in the correctness of the contents of ideological postulates, but 
simply to respect them outwardly."131
In public, doctrinal references were rare, in private they signalled loyalty. 
Marxism Leninism became a form of "political ideological hermeneutics 
practised by specialists,"132 Marxism-Leninism provided the more hard-line 
elements within the Party with a definite rationale for a particular type of 
rule. As Buchowski133 argues, at PZPR Plenary sessions of the Central 
Committee goals to be fulfilled were postulated, based on the 
assumption that the previously postulated goals had been met, without 
any authentic evaluation of whether or not they had. Reality, he suggests, 
was thus constructed via the "means of the power of words"134 Marxism- 
Leninism thus committed its adherents to specific types of public 
behaviour by defining boundaries to acceptable action. Its use, as 
Schopflin argues,135 also had a simple censorship function. It kept 
unsanctioned ideas away from public debate and prevented the 
expression of alternatives. That, in turn, he suggests, played a central
^Brunner, G., ’Legitimacy Doctrines and Legitimation Procedures in East European Systems’, (Rigby, 
T.H., et al. (Eds.) 1982 op cit.)
l^lpakulski, J., Poland: Ideology, Legitimacy and Political Domination,’ (Abercrombie, N., et al. 1990, 
p.39). Pakulski identified three important elements to the doctrine: references to the logic of history, the 
Leninist principle of democratic centralism and the notion of the unity of the Socialist camp. A strong 
reaffirmation of Marxism-Leninism is found in the declarations of the Central Committee in 1984: X) co 
walczymy, dokqd zmierzamy: Deklaracja Ideowo-programowo komitetu centralnego' (What we are fighting 
for, where are we heading: Ideological-Programmatic declarations of the Central Committee, Trybuna Ludu, 
21st March 1984.
!32pakulski, J., (Abercrombie, N. Et al. 1990,) Ibid., p.39
133Buchowski, (1992), p. 13
1 ^ Buchowski, M., (1992) Ibid. p.37 
135Schopflin, G., (1993)
78
political role in the legitimation process by reducing and/or marginalising 
potential opposition in society and reinforcing the power of the central 
command structures. Ideology thus acted in Communist Poland to 
”disseminate the belief in the inevitability of Communism and to persuade people to 
accept its irreversibility."™
There is little doubt, however, that there remained very little normative 
commitment within the PZPR itself after 1981 to the principles of the 
dominant ideology.137 The PZPR retained its position simply because it 
was the only party acceptable to the USSR. Shorn of revolutionary 
legitimacy, lacking genuine contacts and sympathies within the working 
class or elsewhere in society, lacking popular support, embedded in its 
structurally defined ’leading role' and underwritten by the dual presence 
of a Soviet threat and internal military forces, it simply existed because 
there was no real alternative. In the place of overt discursive references 
of a Marxist-Leninist character directly in relation to society, the 
Jaruzelski ’pragmatic centre' located the Party within a discourse of 'better 
the devil you know'™ (Soviet covert references), nationalism and 
eudaemonism (specific production targets, for example). In the absence 
of a legally autonomous civil sphere within society and without the 
political and institutional structures to bridge the gap that existed 
between the dominant ideological claims of the Communist elite and the 
social reality it was obliged to confront, the Party attached itself to a 
mono-organisational type of strategy of control and tinkered with various 
reform discourses. Instead of 'revolutionary' legitimacy, there emerged
^ K o la k o w s k i, l #> (1968) op cit. pp.50-62
^Czarzasty, M., Gieorgica, J.P., Gilejko, L., and Nowacki, G., 'Partia-Reforma-Rzeczywistosc' (The Party- 
Reform-Reality), (Hausner, J., & Klementewicz, T., 1992 op cit. pp.75-85).
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1'State-nationalism, ’ which, in effect, reduced the teleological aspects of the 
ideology to the profane level: everything the Party did, by definition, was 
in the interests of both the working class and the nation, since the Party 
embodied both. The PZPR's refusal to sanction even official usage of the 
word 'opposition,’ for example, throughout the 1980's and its 
commitments to maintaining the pretence that none existed (and by 
implication that none needed to exist) marked the central plank of its 
wider legitimational strategy. Existing structures, both within the State 
and at local and enterprise levels would be able to express and 
incorporate any aspirations and discontent arising from specific policies. 
Everything the PZPR did, however, had to be processed through the 
existing discourse, although the discourse was, with ever greater 
regularity, ceasing to correspond to real operations and policies.
The emergence of the Solidarity trade union in Gdansk in 1980, as an 
alliance between KOR intellectuals, figures from the Catholic Church 
and trade union activists put the political feasibility of this discursive 
balancing act to the test. The PZPR retreated during the summer of 1980 
on Solidarity's so-called "21 Gdansk demands"™ It underwent conversion, 
not only at a cosmetic level, to greater openness in the media and internal 
Party democracy. It recognised the right of self-organised, independent 
trade unions to exist, that the social legitimacy of the Party itself rested, 
at least to a certain extent, upon the acquiescence and support of society 
- and implicitly therefore - that centralism and one-party rule were 
neither historically inevitable nor politically indispensable.
%
l^Gerrits, A., (1990), op cit, p.163
l-^Toranska, T., (1989); op cit; Kemp-Welch, D., (1991) op cit. The demands included, most importantly, a 
reduction in the role of the PZPR at the workplace and the right of self-organised trade unions to exist.
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Between mid 1980 and the end of 1981 it appeared that the PZPR would 
be able to transform itself, its position within the Communist system and 
continue a process of political and economic reform of the Communist 
system without either a Soviet intervention or a conservative counter­
reaction within the State. During the 16 months between the upsurge in 
trade union activity in Gdansk in August 1980 and the imposition of 
martial law on 13th December 1981, the notion of 'horizontalism' (the 
notion that decisions could be made at the grass-roots level, i.e. workers' 
self-management)140 entered official Party discourse at various levels, 
undermining the Leninist principle of the leading role of the party.
1'Horizontalism' compromised the established ideological notion that the 
Communist Party would remain dominant at all levels of the State and in 
society. It implied that non-Party agents could operate legally within the 
sphere of a 'civil society' (a notion in itself that was neither fully 
explained nor publicly sanctioned officially). The Party's role in the State 
and the powers of the State in all areas of civil and economic life would 
have been reduced beyond a point where the term 'Communist Party' 
would have had any meaning, however.
Many reformers within the PZPR, such as Fiszbach in Gdansk, saw in 
the Solidarity movement a means of radicalising the stagnant socialist 
structures of power and introducing a new model of democratic 
accountability into socialism.141 However, the weakness of the reformist 
sections of the PZPR, combined with the relative solidity of the security
Millard, F., (1994b). Horizontalism, Millard argues, was a tool of self-management and grass-roots 
participation and a response to the PZPR’s new ’democratisation;’ horizontalism itself refers to the creation of 
direct, unmediated sideways links between primary party organisations (POPs) and was designed to check the 
power of the apparat, with its exclusively vertical, hierarchical linkages.
141Wlodka, Z. (1992)
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forces and military, buttressed by Soviet support, undercut any nascent 
reformist agenda.142 During 1981 the military wings of the State 
apparatus manoeuvred to marginalise centres of reformism within the 
Party and prepared for a return to a more concerted and hard-line model 
of political authority.143 In December 1981, following the dismissal of 
PZPR First Secretary Kania and the ascension of General Jaruzelski to 
office of First Secretary, the conservative counter-attack manifested itself 
in the imposition of a state of martial law. Reformers within the Party 
were demoted or sacked, Party membership was purged at all levels144 and 
key figures within the Solidarity opposition movement were interned and 
their demands ignored. A new centre of military power within the State 
(attached via KOK145 to the PZPR elite) rapidly consolidated its political 
power base within the Party. Its agenda was clear: to re-impose the 
authority of the State in society and that of the Party within the State. 
Above all, its aim was to reassert (or be seen to reassert) the power of the 
dominant ideological discourses of Marxism-Leninism. Thus what one 
sees is a pronounced rejection of the various 'hori^ ontalist' discourses that 
had marked 1980-81 and a return to a harder ideological language.
Between 1982 and 1986, however, the PZPR embarked on a policy of 
selective reforms of the political system, constitution and an economic 
reform programme designed to introduce limited marketisation into the 
Polish economy (so-called odnowcr. "renewal"146). What emerged during
^Sanford, G., (1983) op cit.
143Backer, R., (1990)
144Kolankiewicz, G., (1981a) and Sanford, G., (1984) op cit.
14  ^Sanford, G., Poland: Communism’s weakest link-democratic capitalism’s greatest challenge,’ (Pridham, 
G., et al. (Eds.), 1994 op cit.)
Odnowa ("renewal") was adopted in 1982 by the PZPR elite. It emphasised the need for reform within 
socialism, in particular market-type reforms, with some limited constitutional liberalisation.
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the 1980’s was thus a curious mixture of the re imposition of a top-down 
('vertical) model of political decision-making and a set of discourses that 
were ostensibly located within a legal-rational sphere and which 
overlapped in style and content with many of the original Gdansk 
discourses of the Solidarity movement.
The Party elite, in this context, did nothing more than fall back on the 
legitimational strategy that had marked all PZPR discourse from 1948 - a 
selective dichotomisation of political discourse between traditional 
ideological references for Party-State and Soviet consumption and 
eudaemonic, combined with national discourses for societal 
consumption. In the absence of any real alternative, the Party's internal 
discourses were marked, increasingly by a reversion to a narrower 
language of conservative, dogmatic ideology. The PZPR defined itself in 
relation to society in a paternalistic, nationalistic way, arguing that it 
represented the only possible alternative to Soviet intervention or social 
anarchy and would not recognise that Solidarity existed.
"In the history of Poland it has been necessary more than once not to choose 
between the good and the evil, but between a greater and a lesser evil. We have 
made this choice.”147
The position of the Party within Polish society was thus both extremely 
weak (lacking popular support148) and extremely strong (its position could 
not be challenged by virtue of the strong-arm role of the military). The 
Party elite around Jaruzelski was clearly committed to some form of
147Jaruzelski, (1983) p.40
^ K o la n k ie w ic z , g #j (1981) op cit; Lewis, P., (1988); Sadowski, Z., (1991) op cit.
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legalistic and democratic reform (within socialism), particularly after 
1986's 10th PZPR Central Committee Congress,149 at which the broad 
outlines of odnowa were re-emphasised, but it could not achieve this since 
any movement towards it weakened its position both in relation to the 
Soviet Union and - paradoxically - Polish society.150 What it was 
committed to delivering in its discourses in relation to society it was 
largely unable to achieve by virtue of its political commitments to a type 
of external security arrangement and domestic administrative model that 
inhibited any impulses towards making possible such commitments. 
Behind the dominant ideological discourses one can discern a pattern of 
schisms and cleavages within the Polish Communist elite, between hard­
liners and reformers. Reformers tended to be located within academic 
milieux connected to the Party and most notably supported by academic 
empirical sociology. Two examples of this reformism, and their failure to 
become adopted by the Politburo, illustrate the parameters of reformist 
debate within the PZPR during the 1980fs.
The Kubiak report was commissioned by Jaruzelski in 1982 to outline 
the causes of the 1980-1 crisis and offer prognoses for the reform of the 
political system. It reported a "socio-economic contradiction originating in 
mistaken policies of successive leaders and gap between the advanced social 
consciousness of society and ossified institutions of interest representation.1,151 The 
first part, therefore corresponded to the traditional view that specific 
leadership errors could explain crises within socialism. The second part,
*49Trybuna Ludu, October 14th 1986: "O zwi^kszenie efektywnosci gospodowanie i poprawie warunk6w 
zycia, o pogl?bia socjalistycznej demokracji, o umocnienia mi^dzynarodowej pozycji Polski" (On increasing 
the economic effects and corrections in the conditions of life, deepening socialist democracy and 
strengthening Poland’s international position).
^ O s t ,  Dt) (1990) op cit; Rachwald, W., (1990) op cit. Both Ost and Rachwald argued that there were 
moments in 1980’s when it seemed that some form of corporatism would emerge.
84
however, (that institutions needed changing to meet societal 
consciousness), implied that, one, an autonomous societal consciousness 
existed, and two, that the institutions of the State needed to meet it, 
rather than vice versa.
Another reformist strand within the PZPR centred around the so-called 
DiP (experience and the Future) group.152 Sociologist, Slawomir Wiatr, a 
member of the group, wrote extensively of the alienation of government 
and an opposition between government and governed, which could only 
be overcome by a limited opening of the political process to social 
groups other than the Party. He thus recognised a distinction between 
the State and civil society. Marxism, he argued, was about the end of the 
State not its reification. State administration was the antithesis of 
rationality and society had to have mechanisms to stop the State "running 
amok."153 Trade unions, professional associations and religious 
institutions, for example - "a contemporary Socialist civil society"154 - needed to 
be able to organise their own affairs. Wiatr referred to the Gramscian 
notion of hegemony and the autonomy of civil society as a break on 
bureaucratisation. Both Wiatr's and Kubiak's prescriptions were 
selectively ignored throughout the 1980's, although several notions, in 
particular that of a 'socialist civil society,' and 'socialist constitutionalism' 
were key features of the odnowa discourse.
151Lab?dz, L., (1982) and Celt, E., (1984)
l^ D ip  (Doswiadczenia i Przyszlosd), 1978, ('Experience and the Future', Discussion group) found in, 
Armonk, T., (1981)
153Wiatr, S., (1985), p.52
154Wiatr, S., (1985). Ibid. p. 53
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3.3. Discursive contenders within the P Z P R ,  1982-89
3.3.i. Inner community (’p r a g m a t i c  c e n t r e ’,)
The highest elite within the PZPR was composed of a combination of 
military and civilian individuals and groups closely tied to or part of the 
core of Party and State executive bodies, principally located in KOK (the 
National Defence Committee), the Politburo and First Secretary of the 
PZPR (after 1981, General Jaruzelski). It is referred to throughout this 
work as the 'pragmatic centrefor reasons elaborated below. At the next 
level within the hierarchy sat the PZPR’s Central Committee and the 
Central Committee’s Secretariat, with both the executive (the Council of 
Ministers and the government) and the legislative branches of 
government remained largely subservient to decisions emanating from 
them.
This so-called 'pragmatic centre' was pragmatic in the sense that its 
decisions were made and implemented often without agreement from all 
the branches of the State. The PZPR elite, in effect, used the State 
apparatus to implement any decisions it had arrived at, without 
parliamentary or often even executive approval. Pragmatism thus defined 
the lack of legal-rational rules and procedures and the absence of a rule- 
based code independent of the leading party. The relative balance of 
power within the highest echelons of the Party was ambiguously shared 
between various overt, semi-overt and covert groupings and bodies 
within the Communist elite networks. Constitutionally, the powers and 
autonomy of the State - as opposed to those of the PZPR - were 
enhanced during the 1980’s, with, for example the setting up of a 
Constitutional Tribunal, Parliamentary Ombudsman, and various
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parliamentary commissions. However, the power to appoint and dismiss 
government figures, the powers related to initiation and control over 
decision-making and the control over all appointments remained the 
prerogative of key figures within KOK, a body without a clearly or 
openly defined relationship to the PZPR.
3.3.U. Reformers versus hard-liners
Reformers within the elite did not play a decisive role in the PZPR's core 
decision-making centres after 1981 and did not re-emerge (many having 
left the Party altogether in 1980-81) until 1988. Hard-line factions co­
opted various reform proposals into the official discourse of 'odnowa,' but 
failed to loosen the grip of military and industrial interests within the 
elite.
3.3.iii. Reformism within the PZPR
The reformist bloc within the PZPR which emerged in 1988-89 was split 
between two main groups, here categorised for the sake of convenience 
as Globalist and ’Populists Both emerged publicly at the Party's 10th 
Plenum in December 1988, January 1989. They articulated two 
competing diagnoses and prognoses for the situation in which State 
Socialism found itself in 1988. Globalists are named such because they 
tended to locate the causes of the Polish crisis in global economic and 
political terms. The Polish crisis was a product of structural problems of 
economic management and lack of participatory democracy. Any 
solution would have to increase the role and powers of a government
155staniszkis, J., (1991) The terms Globalist and Populist are borrowed here directly from Staniszkis’s work. 
They are convenient ideal-types for the two main stools within the PZPR reformist wings, although other 
labels could quite as easily have been applied.
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endowed with greater autonomy from the PZPR, thus reducing the 
Party’s role to that of 'guidance.' They envisaged a thorough liberalisation 
of the political system and the legalisation of an independent opposition. 
For this reason, many were vociferous in their support for the round table. 
Populists tended to stress the contingent failures of socialism in a 
combination of specific leadership faults or mistakes and temporary 
economic weaknesses. The relationship between these two groups and 
their joint struggle with the more conservative bureaucratic groups within 
the Party and State defined the main lines of debate within the PZPR 
during the period 1988-90. Both began to consolidate their positions 
within the Politburo after the promotion of Rakowski to Prime Minister 
in October 1988.
3.3.iii.a. 'Globdlism'
A section of the PZPR located around its Sejm Club of Deputies, in the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and within the Politburo articulated a 
reformist line within the PZPR leading up to, during and after the 10th 
Plenum. At the Party's 3rd All-National Theoretical Conference in 
February 1989, the most fully developed version of the line is found. The 
PZPR, they proposed, must seek to distance itself from the State and 
redefine the legal basis of non-Party participation in State structures, in 
particular in the Sejm. Above all, Globalists argued that the PZPR itself 
must seek new sources of political legitimation, defined by a new type of 
democratic relationship with society. They stressed the need to integrate 
openly contested democratic elections into socialism.
Globalists argued that traditional forms of legitimation had become 
exhausted. They proposed a new set of legal guarantees between State
and society. The basic features of socialism would be given up (leading 
role and collective ownership) in order to accomplish this task. The 
segment of the Party committed to this view tended to be associated with 
various professional milieux (in the fields of foreign trade policy, counter 
intelligence and various scientific institutions). The faction had weaker 
links than others within the Party at the grass-roots level and within the 
Communist State. Globalists also proposed the withdrawal of the PZPR 
from the enterprise level and the establishment of two parties of the left - 
one 'reformist,' the other 'revolutionary.'
3.3.iii.b. 'Populism'
Populist reformism recognised the need to engage in some form of 
negotiated agreement with Solidarity, but saw this as temporary and 
contingent upon the needs of the PZPR. Populism found strong centres 
of support within the All-National Trade Union (OPZZ) leadership. 
Populists tended to pay more attention than Globalists to leadership crises 
and domestic constraints imposed by the 'leading role' principle. They 
treated political reforms as independent of genuine power-sharing with 
non-Party actors and regarded privatisation as a temporary manoeuvre 
that would allow socialism to renew itself. They emphasised the need for 
a reformed Communist Party, but one that retained its class roots at the 
enterprise level.
T h e  fA u xilia iyf c o m m u n i t y
Within the wider Party-State apparatus, the PZPR's two coalition parties 
in parliament, ZSL (Peasant Party) and SD (Democratic Party) provided 
a democratic veneer to the non-democratic decision-making process. 
While apparently autonomous and active in parliament, their real 
influence and autonomy was, at best, negligible. The auxiliary community 
(or 'supporting elite1) was made up of those groups either at lower levels 
within the State structures or on the fringes of the existing power 
apparatus of the Party and the State: government ministries, the 
bureaucracy of the State and OPZZ.
An assortment of associations and organisations in society attached to 
the Party, as well as local PZPR units (POPs) constitute what may be 
referred to as a 'wider PZPR community.' This group was made up of 
anything between two to three million people, depending on the criteria 
used. The Party provided many with 'positions.' Compliance and support 
for the elite, however, as 1989 illustrated, was heavily contingent on 
concrete benefits.
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4. Methodology
This section outlines the methods used to analyse PZPR discourse 
between 1988 and 1990. Discourses are broken up along selected sets of 
binary opposites and each element is treated as a sign with a specific 
legitimational function. This section explains how the three selected 
discourses discussed in the previous sections are evaluated and analysed.
Key PZPR texts are outlined and analysed on the basis of their specific 
wording, their prioritisation and stress on key themes. Between June 
1988 and January 1990 ten Central Committee plenary sessions, one 
Ideological Conference, one National Delegates Conference and other, 
lower level, expressions of the Party elite's discourse took place, most of 
which have been accessible to the interested (if also the determined) 
researcher. The Party's official newspaper, Trybuna Ludu and its monthly 
journal, Nom Drogi, represent the key sources related to PZPR discourse 
and analysis of them acts as the central empirical basis of the thesis.
A more variegated methodology, combining interviews with participants 
and other non-explicitly discursive spheres - an attempt to build a wider 
picture of discourse/intentions/outcomes - is eschewed for both 
practical and epistemological reasons. Practical reasons are related to the 
absence of or unwillingness of many within the old PZPR to talk about 
the period, combined with a lack of detailed material related to internal 
Party motivation and decision-making. Epistemological reasons are to do 
with the specific theoretical problematic at hand, specifically the role of 
discourses in defining political identity, community and action.
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A ideal-type approach to discourses is useful in this case study in that it 
provides benchmarks against which historically definable changes in 
discourse can be evaluated over time. Each chapter is constructed as a 
definite stage in the process of a transforming type of political 
legitimational. The period between 1988 and January 1990 is broken 
down into four stages whose apparendy arbitrary chronological 
parameters have been selected as a method of outlining and explaining 
the important historical pattern of continuity within the transformation.
The first, June to December 1988, illustrates the weakness of the 
traditional discourses of legitimation. It shows how qualitatively new 
discourses were emerging within the gaps vacated by the withdrawal of 
traditional discourse. It focuses on the ways in which the discourses of 
compromise, democratic legitimation, Westernism and markets opened 
up divisions within the Party-State bloc that defined the PZPR elite's 
power base and how, albeit temporarily, the Party, after October, 
reverted to a traditional discourse with the aim of stemming these 
divisions. The second, December 1988 to January 1989, illustrates the 
pattern of internal Party-State legitimation. The revision of traditional 
discourses at the 10th Plenum both laid the ground for a round table set of 
talks and manoeuvred the PZPR elite away from its overt commitments 
to its internal ideological community. The third illustrates how the PZPR 
sought to sustain its increasingly fragile position within the State during 
and after the round table talks. The key switch from doctrinal to operative 
discourse is discernible during this phase. The fourth, from August 1989 
to January 1990 illustrates a process of consolidation. The PZPR 
integrated many aspects of the operative sphere into its central 
discourses.
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5. Sources and non-sources
Primary material related to Solidarity and the Church is numerous in 
English and Polish in both the Anglo-Saxon world and in Poland. Key 
protagonists from the Solidarity-opposition side remain keen to talk and 
there is much literature related to the post-Communist period and 
elements of the transitional period (for example, on the round table talks), 
in both Polish and English. However, the core material related to the 
PZPR’s role within the transition process is marked by its absence. Partly 
this is because of the legal and constitutional limitations on State 
material, in particular those regulating the release of documents of this 
type until 30 years after the event, and pardy due to the fact that PZPR 
internal documents and many State documents related to the activity of 
the PZPR within the State disappeared in or after 1989. Operationalising 
a methodology thus relies on a combination of using that which is 
available in print, deductions from this and reflections on actions and/or 
positions taken analysed in tandem with material from the opposition’s 
and, where possible, Church's sources. However, given the theoretical 
focus on public discourse, these problems are largely overcome since the 
question of the motivations of key actors is, at least in significant 
measure, a product of how discourses were constructed and articulated 
publicly.
The key material on the discourses of the PZPR come from several key 
works: Perzkowski's work in the Tajne Dokumenty (Secret Documents) 
series, published in London by Aneks; the official daily newspaper, 
Trybuna Ludu and official monthly journal, Nom  Drogi (principally in 
relation to Central Committee plenary and other sessions), which are
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accessible at the London University, School of Slavonic and Eastern 
European Studies' library, Radio Free Europe reports, Uncensored Roland 
reports and the Podstamm Dokumenty i Materiaty (Basic Documents and 
material) series of publications published by Ksi^zka i Wiedza in Warsaw. 
Original PZPR documents have proved elusive and attempts to locate 
their whereabouts has tended to be treated with a combination of 
amusement and bewilderment, that anyone even contemplates reading 
such material, paradoxically because it is both so apparendy worthless, 
but also because of its politically delicate and secretive nature.
During a 6-month research field trip in Krakow, at the Jagiellonian 
University, between 1994-5, most material related to the public 
discourses of the PZPR was accessed at the university library. Various 
interviews, most notably with Professors Jan Kubiak at the Sociology 
faculty of the Jagiellonian University and author of the 1982 'Kubiak 
Report,' (while a member of the Party Politburo) and Jan Janowski, then 
head of Krakow's Mining Academy and ex-leader of the Democratic 
Party, also proved useful in pointing towards potentially interesting and 
unseen aspects of PZPR discourse. Visits during 1997 and 1998 to the 
Senate's archives in Warsaw and to Akt Nowych (State archives) also in 
Warsaw provided some useful background material. Interviews and 
meetings with Professor Sobocinski and Dr. Leszczynska at the 
University of Gdansk and Inka Slodkowska at the Political Science 
Institute of the University of Warsaw offered some prescriptions for 
research and facilitated an opening up of the university libraries 
(something that cannot be taken for granted, for various reasons).
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Chapter 3 
The Re-emergence of History 
May-December 1988
i. Introduction
This period began with a series of nation-wide strikes - the first since 
1981 - loosely organised by the banned Solidarity trade union as well as 
the OPZZ156 - in response to price rises in early 1988. It ended in 
preparations for the PZPR’s Central Committee 10th Plenum at which 
the political and discursive seeds of a round table discussion were firmly 
established. The period is marked by both a continuation of the key 
elements of the existing {traditional) type of PZPR legitimation, but also 
by alterations in the three sets of PZPR discourse outlined in the 
previous chapters. Existing PZPR discourses, within the terms defined 
by odnowa, offered competing possibilities; of more substantive 
(institutional and legal) reform on one hand and an abandonment of 
reform on the other. The former sphere marked a return to a more 
1Private' interpretation of socialism (and State-society relations within it), 
the latter closer to the 'Public' end of the same civil discursive continuum. 
The latter, however, had no concrete forms of application. This inherent 
conflict within the existing, odnowa, discourse, between established 
ideological discourses on one side and the reality of attempting to 
implement ideology in practise on the other, became increasingly acute as
^  Many of the strikes were not directly organised by either Solidarity or the OPZZ, but by a new 
generation of strikers (many of whom had no experience of the 1980-81 strike period) who never the less 
demanded Solidarity’s relegalisation.
95
the character of the socio-economic and political crises became clear 
during 1988.
The PZPR did seek to widen the terms of its legitimational strategy vis-a- 
vis groups in society, the Church and elements of the Solidarity trade 
union and intellectual-based opposition, both in response to the 
immediate and longer-term failures of the existing form of legitimation. 
Its failure to construct a workable concept of a 'constructive opposition' (one 
that pleased the mutually exclusive interests of both 'inner' (OPZZ) and 
'outer' (Solidarity) interests, however, led to a re-submersion of this term 
and a return to a familiar pattern of eudaemonic and traditional ('Private) 
discourses. At the same time, the emergence at key levels in the official 
and Party discourse of re-emphasised historical discourses signified an 
attempt to fill the gap in various non-traditional ways, by repositioning 
the PZPR within Polish national and socialist history. Although at this 
stage this revision of history was fragmented and at a low level of official 
articulation, it represents an initial acknowledgement that some form of 
new national discourse (in the absence of national dialogue) was 
necessary and that the situation had changed with regards the use of 
force. Added to this one sees a discursive re-emphasis of more 'Western' 
signifiers. In particular, after the reversal of a 'Public' discourse, a more 
openly 'Western' (markets as 'goal-oriented' - rather than as an end in 
themselves) type of economic discourse became discernible and a shift 
(although still within Perestroika) towards a less internationalist (read 
Soviet-type) form of socialism, signifying a move away from traditional 
'Eastern' signifiers.
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2. Public V s Private
From late 1987 the pragmatic centre of the PZPR elite, centred around 
General Jaruzelski, began - both in private and in various public 
discursive references - to accept that in order to reinvigorate the national 
economy, a different type of political legitimation was necessary.157 This 
was most clearly seen in the letter drafted by key figures within the higher 
echelons of the Party, including Urban, Pozoga and Ciosek, which 
suggested that a series of constitutional reforms would be necessary to 
augment and underpin the so-called ’second stage’ economic reforms 
then being undertaken by the Messner government. A fragment of the 
letter read:
"The situation is worse than at any time since 13th December 1981 (the 
declaration of martial law). This has been made worse by the increased 
expectations of society, parked by the 'Gorbachev effect, ' a reduced fear of the 
Soviet Union and impatient youth who have no experience of the first Solidarity. 
We propose a referendum on the presideng, free elections to the council of 
ministers and the creation of a second parliamentary chamber (a senate).”158
The Messner government - backed by Jaruzelski - was tied inextricably to 
the ’second stage’ economic reforms, however and chose not to adopt 
this political route, refocusing instead on a purely economic solution. It 
was not until May 1988 that any overtly political reasoning entered Party 
discourse. The need to redefine the State and its relations with society (as
157perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit., pp.51-3. These ’private’ intentions are, of course, notoriously problematic 
to evaluate on an epistemological level. However, it is clear from the minutes of several Politburo meetings 
that Jaruzelski and others were clearly beginning to alter their thinking as regards a solution to the strikes and
to search for a conceptual framework within odnowa that would extend the terms of participation of society 
within State decision-making structures.
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a prerequisite of successful economic reform) was made obvious by the 
re-catalysation of the Solidarity-Church alliance during strikes in 
February-April 1988159 and the unavoidable weaknesses of the Messner 
administration in implementing economic reform without any political 
changes. These marked the first stage in the process of a changing Party 
conception and discursive representation of 'opposition.' Without any 
effective open methods for mediating between the State and society 
(other than via the official union, OPZZ, which lacked widespread 
popular support due its perceived sycophancy in the face of the 
authorities) industrial discontent sparked by the Messner government's 
decision to raise selected prices in February,160 was channelled into strike 
action, at first spontaneous and sporadic and later co-ordinated nation­
wide by Solidarity activists. The strikers' original demands for a 
rescindication of the price rises were combined with demands for the re­
legalisation of Solidarity and the reinstatement of all workers sacked for 
belonging to Solidarity or engaging in trade union activity since 1981. 
Adding to the weakness of the government at this stage was the fact that 
both the official union, OPZZ, as well as Solidarity, supported the pay 
claims of the strikers. The OPZZ leader Miodowicz told Trybutta Ludu in 
early March:
Radio Free Europe, Progress Report, November 27th, 1987 
^Perzkowski, S., (1994) Ibid. pp. 13-27 'Chronologia strajk6w.' (A chronology of the strikes); Rakowski, 
M.R., (1992), pp.109-110; Kaminski, B., (1991) op cit. p. 87. Kaminski notes that the first strike-wave of 
1988 was organised by only 5 enterprises where a so-called "Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee" (MZKS) was 
active, as compared to 1980, when over 700 were active.
160siay, B., (1994) op cit. pp.69-71: The Messner government decided to phase in 110% increases in food 
prices over three years and increases of 140-200% in rent, heating and fuel costs. The official trade union, 
OPZZ, led by Alfred Miodowicz, as well as the bulk of Solidarity leaders, demanded pay rises as 
compensation for the price increases of 6,000 rather than 1,670 zlotys as offered. 167 factories nationally 
went on strike in the weeks that followed. See also Radio Free Europe Progress Report, 15th February 1988.
98
"We have no choice. What is harmful to workers is harmful to socialism and 
therefore harmful to the Party. I f  we don't come out in ympathy we will lose face 
and any connection with the workers. Is that what they want?"m
Despite the role being played by the OPZZ, however, a rapidly re­
forming set of local and skeletal nationwide Solidarity structures acquired 
a leadership presence in all but two of the striking enterprises, readily 
tapping the deep-seated anti-Communist sentiment within Polish society. 
The Gdansk strike committee, the organisational heart of the nation­
wide strike action and symbolic centre of anti-Communist resistance 
since 1980, outlined in a simple communique published in the daily 
newspaper, Tygodnik Ma^ows^e, its motives and demands, reflecting the 
position it clearly ascribed to itself as the bearer and representative of the 
nation:
"This is the second 'Sierpien’ (August 1980). The gates are again decorated 
with the figure o f'Our virgin M ay’ and a portrait of Our Pope. We ask for 
nothing more and nothing less than the legalisation of Solidarity. Only then can 
other issues be resolved. ”162
It was becoming increasingly clear that the PZPR's existing strategy of 
odnowa was not able - within the limits set by its terms of 'opposition' and 
'legality' - to achieve the economic aims set out under the terms of the 
second stage of its economic reform strategy. The rapidity with which 
unofficial (Solidarity-led) strike committees were set up and spread 
during February and March certainly caught both the Politburo and the
161 Try buna Ludu, March 7th 1988
l^^Tygodnik Mazowsze April 11th 1988
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Messner government by surprise.163 Neither had a pre-prepared plan and 
in the vacuum that appeared between the formal ideological discourses 
of odnowa and the reality of implementing it, the Party was obliged to use 
whatever socio-political instruments were at its disposal in the short 
term. Having tried and failed to negotiate direcdy with selected strike 
committees on purely economic grounds (Messner did in fact annul the 
price rises), the pragmatic centre within the Politburo invited 
representatives of the Church to mediate in talks between the two sides, 
representatives of the government and of individual (Solidarity) strike 
committees in Gdansk. Church officials, priests Orszulik and D^browski, 
and members of the original lay Catholic intelligentsia wing of Solidarity, 
Mazowiecki and Stelmachowski, in this way, became mediators between 
representatives of the PZPR, Sekula and Czyrek, and representatives, 
including Walesa, of one significant centre of strike action.
The Catholic Church thus acquired a central role in the Party elite’s 
search for new methods of dealing with the industrial unrest that had 
arisen during early 1988. It provided the Party with a means of talking to 
and negotiating with the strikers. It offered a space within which the two 
sides could communicate. As Kaminski suggests, "the Church provided the 
only channel through which the government could influence the activities of the 
opposition. It was only through the Church that any views could be discussed with the 
authorities. Thus the Church became an institutionalplatform for quasipluralism 
In return for Church mediation, the Party began to re-appraise its 
traditional antipathies and discursive marginalisation of Catholicism 
within its official discourse and made clear signals that it was prepared to
163perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. p.46
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open up a new relationship with the Catholic hierarchy in Poland. This 
was clearly illustrated in the series of articles in Trybuna Ludu165 marking 
Primate Glemp's visit to Russia and found further expression also at the 
PZPR Central Committee's 7th Plenum, held between the 13th and 14th 
June, where Jaruzelski made an explicit connection between a more 
liberal attitude toward the Church and an end to industrial unrest.
"The needs are clear. What society demands we can give, but only by working closely 
in tune with the Catholic Church...Catholicism in Poland has deep and profound 
roots, which we cannot ignore. "166
At this early stage, however, the Party was seeking any mechanism that it 
could use to stop the spread of the strikes. Czyrek's May article in 
Tiybuna Tudu illustrates the emerging role within PZPR discourse being 
played by the Church. Authentic 1Public' discourses - to do with a forum 
for wider political and legal discussion with an opposition and changes to 
the political structures - however, remained discursively marginal at this 
stage:
" We do not accept trade union pluralism in such an understanding. We will not 
accept the creation of opposition parties. In relation to the Church we want, 
however, a fu ll and constructive dialogue. A n  important element was the visit of 
(Cardinal) Glemp to the USSR. The Church will, of course, not give up its 
influence in Poland. Experience tells us that the worst results arise when we try 
to fight the Church in a primitive way."ul
^K am inski, B., (1992) op cit p.123
165 Trybuna Ludu May 23rd 1988
166 Trybuna Ludu, June 15th 1988 
167Trybuna Ludu June 15th 1988. Ibid.
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A series of reconciliatory gestures made by the Polish government 
towards the Vatican after the ending of the strikes in May further 
underlined the Party’s commitments to redefining the role of the Church 
in Polish society and it's own discursive construction of Catholicism. The 
Church could, it was hoped, be used as a device for illustrating the 
capacity of odnowa legitimation to meet society's needs and expectations. 
It would act, in this way, as a substitute for more authentic 'Public' 
discourses and actions. Archbishop Francesco Colasuonno (Papal 
Nuncio for special assignments and head of the Vatican Team for 
Working Contacts with Poland) met General Jaruzelski following the 7th 
Plenum with a view to re-establishing diplomatic relations between 
Poland and the Vatican. At the same time, the government made no 
effort to restrict Cardinal Glemp's visit to Russia on June 1st to celebrate 
a thousand years of Russian Orthodox Christianity. Meetings between 
Politburo member, S^dowski, and Cardinal Glemp in May (about the 
strikes) and a meeting between Jaruzelski and Glemp in October 
represent the clearest indication that the Party was altering its ambiguous 
indifference with regards the Church. Church officials, D^browski as well 
as leading lay Catholic intellectuals, grouped in KIK (Stelmachowski, 
amongst others), who were "invited” to mediate during the first strike 
wave, would not sanction any deal without Solidarity, however. Thus the 
political stalemate continued. The PZPR's discourses remained tighdy 
defined by an inner commitment to ideological signifiers, while 'Public' 
solutions could be sanctioned, at this stage, only within a very slighdy 
loosened version of odnowa.
In the weeks between the uneasy resolution of the first strike wave and 
the Central Committee's 7th Plenum in June, both the Politburo and
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Messner government accelerated their discursive stress on the odnowa 
principles of 'socialist democracy' and 'socialist pluralism.' The struggle, 
between the PZPR, its own interpellated community and Solidarity, to 
control the naming of the dialogue that was to take place throughout the 
rest of the period 1988-90 had begun. As far as the PZPR was 
concerned, 'socialism,' as the following interview with Czyrek in Trybuna 
Ljidu on 30th June illustrates, was to remain the language within which 
this dialogue was to take place:
" What we are seeking to do is to create a Polish, humane and democratic model 
of socialism. I  say Polish because it should take account of the pluralistic nature 
of Polish society, its long standing tradition in Poland. I  say humane because 
man and his inner richness, man as the supreme value, has already been the 
central point of our work. I  say democratic because in firmly rejecting the 
centralised command system as a relic of Stalinism, we have recognised self- 
management in its broadest sense as the heart of the idea of people's democraty. 
We do not approve of the rules of bourgeois pluralism with its elements of 
confrontation and contest. Our line is that of dialogue and national conciliation. 
This offers an extensive opportunity for all social groups which recognise and are 
deeply concerned about the well-being of the nation and strength of the state."168
At this stage it was not clear the extent to which the Party’s commitment 
to a discourse of pluralism would be extended to action. How would 
pluralism manifest itself in relations between government and strikers 
and government and Solidarity, for example? Nevertheless the discourse 
of pluralism, that had been a feature of the odnowa rhetoric from 1986 
onwards, began to correspond to real actions in a way that it had not
103
done before. Not since 1981 had the PZPR been faced with open 
societal resistance of any overt kind. Its strategy of odnowa was premised 
on the understanding that existing institutional channels of interest 
bargaining would provide the elite with a means of resolving conflicts at 
the workplace. Odnowa had not, however, been tested in practise - in 
relation to a self-organised society - and it remained unclear whether or 
not it had either the terms of reference to define if not also to facilitate 
the construction of genuine and autonomous channels of negotiation. 
The debate during May and June within the official (that is Party 
controlled) press and within the Politburo of the PZPR centred around 
the precise definition of 'socialist-pluralism! June's edition of No we Drogi, 
for example, was exclusively devoted to defining what this meant in 
practise. Politburo member, Klimczak, argued:
"The word pluralism is not synonymous with anti-socialism. It is not, however, an 
idea that has the same meaning in theory as it may have in practise. The debate goes 
on. We must, in order to deepen the odnowa reforms, recognise pluralism as a vital 
Marxist concept. It plays a key role in fulfilling the basic Marxist concept of meeting 
the needs (both material and spiritual) of society. It is not a panacea for all pain, but 
a means of moving towards real socialism. On the terrain of socialism, society is 
learning the art of dialogue and co-operation. "169
The debate was conducted via academic journals, between leading Party 
and opposition academics. The notion of a 'constructive opposition' entered 
the operative discourse of the Party in the May issue of Konfrontacja. 
Gulczynski referred to the opposition as:
m Trybuna Ludu, June 30th 1988 
l^ N ow e Drogi, June 1988
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"as an objective fact...experience tells us that the opposition accepts the 
framework of the constitution and the best solution is its legalisation. "170
Czyrek called in the same issue for a "pro-reformatory coalition of forces." At 
the 7th Plenum Jaruzelski subsequendy adopted this term. The task of 
defining and constructing this concept in practise fell within the 
Politburo on minister of the interior, General Kiszczak, who was "invitee?' 
by General Jaruzelski to "seek a broadening of the reformatory forces in society." m 
A key Solidarity figure, Geremek, had called, in the same issue of 
Konfrontaga, for an "anti-crisispact." This idea had in fact arisen earlier, 
Geremek stating the case for it following the referendum on economic 
reform in December 1987.172 Such a ’’pact” implied, however, both that 
the situation was critical (something the Party could or would not accept 
in public) and that it would be an agreement between equals, both of 
whom would have equal access to the negotiation process. Quite clearly 
this was unacceptable language for the ruling Party and the Jaruzelski 
leadership rejected the semantics (if not much of the actual content of 
the proposals) out of hand. "We cannot and we do not accept crisis solutions," 
Jaruzelski told a Party meeting in June.173 The significance of Geremek's 
statement, however, lies not solely in the content but in the fact that it 
was allowed to appear at all. A public debate thus existed in embryonic 
form and references to 'Solidarity' were reappearing within PZPR 
discourses, although at this stage they represented merely a last ditch 
attempt to calm a volatile industrial situation.
Konfrontacja, May 1988
171Trybuna Ludu July 1st 1988
17^Perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. pp.4-5
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The debate, both within the Politburo and between the PZPR and the 
selected representatives of the Church and lay-Catholic intelligentsia, 
centred on the precise terminology to be used to define an opposition. 
Was it to be an 'opposition' in a formalised and institutionalised sense? 
Would it have the right to exist as an autonomous legal entity with an 
authentic political role or was it to be a selected few 
'oppositionists'/ 'opponents' with limited legal autonomy and no real 
institutionalised role? The Solidarity side's wording implied a non­
institutionalised agreement between government and workers - the 
government, in a 'pact' with the workers, would offer re-legalisation of 
Solidarity in return for an end to strikes. Any political discussions 
thereafter, Geremek argued, should take the form of a round table meeting 
between 'equal! partners. The PZPR's notion of 'coalition,1 however, 
implied the limited incorporation of opposition figures (not necessarily 
from Solidarity) into a broadened national commission of understanding 
(Consultative Council or PRON). This was not to be in return for the 
legalisation of Solidarity but in return for an ending of strike action and a 
promise not to re-engage in strike action for a specified period of time. 
The term 're-legalisation' could not be sanctioned since it implied that 
Solidarity had existed before - something the PZPR would not recognise. 
In the period immediately before the 7th Plenum, the notion of a round 
table, one of the negotiating tools used by Kiszczak and Ciosek to bargain 
an end to the previous strike wave, was discussed in several Politburo 
meetings and met with conditional acceptance.174 Walesa - set up as a 
symbolic figurehead - argued Ciosek, could be used to dampen society's
173Trybuna Ludu June 13-14 1988
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demands and, along with other selected oppositionists, would be allowed 
to enter a slightly widened legislative elite:
"We invite Solidarity people, but not Solidarity...conceming what is best for 
Poland'.™
At the 7th Plenum Jaruzelski initiated the Central Committee debate on 
the question of legalising an opposition and the notion of setting up a 
round table. He signalled the Politburo's recognition of a worsening of the 
social situation and demanded a speeding up of the awaited effects of the 
economic reforms. Jaruzelski told the Plenum that:
"The Party is weak. It is not seen as strong but as an 
irrelevance.. ^ Authoritarian, anti-democratic, dictatorial rule is 'sluggish'.”™
A wider coalition of 'pro-reformatory forces,' Jaruzelski argued, would 
"overcome the fundamental differences between Party and society on basic 
questions.”™ Anti-reform reactions within the PZPR were vociferous, 
however. The notion of a coalition implied a compromise with an 
opposition and 'opposition' still evoked wide passions and disagreements 
within the wider Party-State. This internal opposition was articulated in 
various speeches at the 7th Plenum and found a keen group of supporters 
within the Politburo, many of whom were subsequently demoted at the 
Plenum.178
17^Perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. pp.34-49
175Dubinski, K., (1990), p.42
17^Rakowski, M. R., (1992) op cit. p.112
177Rakowski, M. R., (1992) Ibid. p.113
17^Rakowski, M.R., (1992) Ibid. p.114. Wdzniak was demoted from the Politburo - for reasons of "ill health" 
- although, according to Rakowski, he was seen "insufficiently effective." Baka took his place as Economic 
Secretary. Glowczyk replaced Baryla as Secretary of Information and Propaganda. Mokrzyszek was also 
demoted, Hupalowski was promoted as head of Highest Court (Prezes Nay wyzszej Izby Kontroli), although a
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Although a coercive approach to industrial unrest had been broached 
and rejected within the Politburo in April ("During the 1 9 8 0 'sRakowski 
said "Kis^c^ak and his service were seen all too often...It is today necessary to reject 
the option of force. "m), the possibility of using force arose in debate during 
the 7th Plenary session. Gmurka, for example, argued:
"In today's Plenum we must clearly say: no to the demolition of ourfatherland\ 
no to the lowering of the standards of living of the working class, no to 
Solidarity. We cannot take the view that the opposition are also patriots who 
merely think differently to us and that after 7-8 years they have changed. We 
must take a stronger line. "180
Embryonic reformist discourses also emerged at the 7th Plenum, 
however, although they tended to follow the Jaruzelski line: an 
opposition could and should be restricted to hand picked, 'constructive' 
opponents who would respect the constitutional terms of debate (in 
other words, within socialism). These people would not represent any 
formal political entity, would be obliged to "honour and respect the 
constitution," but would have no real power and their role would be to 
illustrate, argued Orzechowski, amongst others, the democratic 
legitimacy of the State.181 They would also be easily controlled and open 
to political manipulation. As Wiatr told the Plenum:
majority of delegates voted against his promotion. Por^bski and Ciosek lost Secretariat positions, 
Orzechowski was effectively promoted, from Minister Foreign affairs to Ideology Secretary.
179Rakowski, M.R., (1992) Ibid. p . l l l
m Trybuna Ludu, June 13-14* 1988
181 Trybuna Ludu 13-14* June 1988. Ibid.
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"Tensions will be milder and easier to prevent in a context of broader consensus 
than one of continuing divisions and barricades of mistrust and non­
communication. "182
The Party should, Wiatr argued, set up various extra-governmental 
institutions, widen PRON and create other similar structures, within 
which to achieve this consensus. It could, according to this view, at the 
same time, attempt to manoeuvre itself in symbolic terms away from its 
primary association in the collective perception with 'non-Polish' or 
'Russian' influences and closer to society - thus being seen more clearly to 
represent society.
The final resolution of the 7th Plenum located odnowa as a defiantly 'Public' 
discourse:
"We intend to strengthen the democratic character of our democratic system so as 
to ensure the fulfilment of the public's expectations."183
The use of a notion of 'coalition1 marked a tacit acknowledgement of 
limits on the existing exercise of power. Jaruzelski's final address at the 
7th Plenum is also illustrative of the change in the Party's discursive tone:
"Many people do not agree with us in various, often basic questions and the 
opposition has come to be seen as a patriotic movement...The stereotypical view of 
the opposition has changed. There is now a need for pluralistic thinking. I  call
182 Wiatr, J. J., (Kaminski, B., 1992 Ibid. p. 197)
*8  ^Radio Free Europe Progress Report, June 30th 1988
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for a wide patriotic reform coalition-not as a tactic, but as a part of the overall 
strategy of the Party. "184
The Plenum also formally endorsed the odnowa discourses, its "political will 
to continue socialist odnowa in all areas of public life."185 Furthermore, it 
reaffirmed its support for the Politburo's economic and political policies. 
Politburo member Czyrek, for example, stated:
"Pxspect for the political consequences of the diversity of interests, views and 
orientations in society is central...but the Party will not accept confrontational 
pluralism, that is the public's independence from official control. "186
The Central Committee resolutions adopted at the 7th Plenum also 
aroused sharp anti-reformist sentiments within the wider PZPR, 
however. During June the OPZZ, which had been vociferous in its 
condemnation of the Messner government's economic strategy, called 
openly for a clampdown on the rising tide of "unofficial!' (read: Solidarity) 
strikes.
The central dynamic of changing discourses of legitimation, thus, clearly 
lay in the Party's changing perception, conception and discursive 
construction of an 'opposition.' By moving towards a deal with any form of 
opposition, the Party was obliged to acknowledge that such a thing 
existed, recognise that it had valid reasons for existing and by implication 
that it (the Party) was not the sole representative of the working class or 
society. This is highly significant in that any recognition of alternative
184Trybuna Ludu 13-14^ June 1988. op cit
185Radio Free Europe Progress Report, June 30th 1988
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, August 30th 1988
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sources or centres of political power represents, within the narrow terms 
of the dominant ideology of Marxism-Leninism, a shift away from the 
central canons of the leading party and democratic centralism. The dialogues 
that took place between the PZPR and selected members of this 
opposition began to shift the focus of Party debate towards a less static 
and dogmatic attachment to existing ideological and historical discourses.
However, before the collapse of the idea of a round table in October, the 
PZPR moved towards establishing closer contacts with the Church and 
members of Solidarity. In August the decision was made within the 
higher echelons of the Party to formalise the existing ad-hoc series of 
dialogues between representatives of the State and society at a so-called 
"round table" set of discussions.187 Partly this decision was catalysed by a 
renewal in industrial unrest (a second wave of strikes took place in 
August). Pardy it can be read as a genuine attempt to address the 
questions raised at the 7th Plenum. Between August 31st and November 
9th, discussions took place at a villa owned by the Interior Ministry 
(MSW) in the suburbs of Warsaw, called Magdalenka, between key Party 
and non-Party representatives.188 The talks were not widely covered in 
the official press, nor openly recognised by the Party in any formal or 
direct way. They were, however, the first (semi-formalised and semi- 
publicly acknowledged) meetings to take place between Solidarity and the 
PZPR since 1981. Continuing its cautious acceptance of the need to talk 
with members of the so-called 'constructive opposition/  representatives of
l ^ D u b i n s k i ,  k ., (1990) op cit. p.20
i^Dubinski, k ., (1990) Ibid. p.7. "Magdalenlca’s" composition (15-16th September, 1988) included on the 
government side: General Kiszczak, Ciosek, several OPZZ representatives (Krajewski, Matuszewski, 
Sosnowski and Wisniewski), Janowski (leader o f SD) and on the opposition side: Walesa, Stelmachowski, 
Frasyniuk, L. Kaczynski, Liwak, Mazowiecki, Merkel, Pietrzyk, Radziewicz, Sienkiewicz;. The Church was 
represented by Father Orszulik, Dembowski (academic priest).
I l l
the Party, led by General Kiszczak, spoke of an "invitation” made by the 
Party to 'constructive' guests and of the talks as "non-official chats between 
private citizens. "189
The PZPR's discourses of 'opposition' that were emerging within the 
PZPR did so both to fulfil internal Party legitimational functions (to 
retain the interpellatory function of Marxism-Leninism) but also in 
response to the reality of the opposition as it was actually developing 
during 1988.190 The first element, that of the role of the discursive 
construction rather than the thing itself is significant in terms of the 
Party's representation of the matrix of threats/opportunities as it sought 
to strengthen its own position within the Party. It was not, however, 
necessarily closely related to the reality of the opposition as it was 
developing. The Solidarity opposition that re-emerged in 1988 was less 
cohesive, less organised and less idealistic than that which had been 
crushed in 1981-3.191 A diverse and often radicalised version of Solidarity 
had grown up in various extreme groups, for example, the PPS-RD 
(Polish Socialist Party-Revolutionary) and trade union based radical 
groups, such as Solidarity '80 and Fighting Solidarity.192 Within these 
groups there certainly did exist those who sought violent insurrection 
against the regime. On the nationalist right, the KPN (Confederation of 
an Independent Poland), for example, rejected any compromise or even 
discussion with the PZPR. However, a core of individuals and groups 
that had developed in the 1970's and been active in the underground
189Dubinski, K,. (1990) Ibid. p.9
^M odzelewski, K., (1991) and Balcerowicz, L., (1993)
191Holzer and Leski, (1990), pp. 159-61. See for example Tygodnik Mazowszex June 1st 1989. Walesa was 
faced with criticism from a more radical opposition within Solidarity, which included "Fighting Solidarity",
"Solidarity ’80", "KPN". See also Dziadul (1989).
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Solidarity structures of the 1980's (such as ROPCiO and KOR), on the 
ideological moderate left and lay Catholic Christian democrats, such as 
Stelmachowski and Mazowiecki re-emerged in 1988 to lend their support 
to the on-going process of negotiation and mediation. Walesa, for 
example, told Le Monde in May:
"Neither the government nor Solidarity can be winners or losers. What we want 
is a national resolution to the crisis and we are prepared to relinquish some, 
though not all, of our 1980-81 demands
The Party could, however, as it did during October and November, 
simply define an opposition within its public discourses as those who 
sought to overthrow the socialist system. They simply narrowed the 
definition to exclude individuals or groups they didn't want to negotiate 
with. Partly this was designed to drive a wedge into existing divisions 
within Solidarity and partly because many Party leaders were simply 
apprehensive about engaging in real negotiations with such formidable 
members of the independent intelligentsia as Michnik and Kuron, for 
example. The discourses being used before the collapse of the idea of a 
round table in September did, however, represent something qualitatively 
new.
The role of the OPZZ and the emergence of an anti-reform alliance 
within the Party are vital in an understanding of the dynamics of 
changing PZPR discourse after September 1988. The Party was obliged 
by Solidarity organised strike action to sanction alterations to its
192walicki, A., (1991) op cit. 
l^Dubinski, K., (1989) op cit. p.6
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traditional discourse, but could not move too far towards institutionalising 
this alteration (and thus the role of Solidarity and/or other non- 
Communist trade unions and associations). At the final meeting of the 
Magdalenka teams on 16th August, before the collapse of the idea of a first 
round table, a fierce discussion took place. It found no place in official 
discourse or within the official press, although its form is illustrative of 
the emerging struggle between the OPZZ and Solidarity and the key 
question of Solidarity's (re)legalisation. Jarlinski, OPZZ representative 
spoke of his union's concern for the 'national interest':
"Lech, what interests us is the interest of the enterprise and not high politics. I  
know how "Solidarity" creates divisions within the workforce. It upsets the 
normalisation process. The OPZZ is open. New structures can be set up, but 
not in enterprises. "194
Pietrzyk, Solidarity's mining representative responded:
"Where have you been for the last 7years, because I  haven't seen you at the pit. 
The miners want pluralism and Solidarity as a guarantee of its interests. A s a 
worker I  don't want to be arrested and detained by the Security Police (SB)."195
At the Central Committee's 8th Plenum, held between the 27th and 28th 
August - and immediately following it - vociferous anti-opposition 
rhetoric re-appeared within Party discourse at lower levels (outside the 
Politburo) and following the collapse of the round table idea at 
Magdalenka and the dismissal of the Messner government, it became 
relocated at the centre of the Party's discourses. This internal
194Dubiriski, K., (1990) Ibid. pp.26-27
195Dubinski, K., (1990) Ibid. p.28
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opposition to an 'opposition’ can be seen as a central contributive 
factor in the subsequent decision of General Jaruzelski to sanction a 
change in government. Messner was obliged to resign and Rakowski, 
with a mandate to accelerate the existing eudaemonic legitimational 
strategy became Premier. Rakowski immediately adopted a crudely anti- 
Solidarity stance, illustrated on 19th October in an Orzechowski article 
that appeared in Pravda:
"The initiative remains unalterably in our hands. The Party completely controls 
the situation. Organised and responsible political forces are controlling the course 
of events...The Party leadership has defined the limits of compromise...there can 
be no return to Solidarity in the form and character it had until the imposition 
of martial law on 13 th December 1981. "m
The OPZZ and, in particular, its leader, Miodowicz, played a significant 
role in destabilising and forcing the Messner government to resign in 
September 1988197 and in pushing the Party elite away from its fragile 
discourse of negotiation and trade union reform. In practice this meant 
the adoption of the principle: one trade union organisation per enterprise 
and the reduction of discussions at the round table to one question: 
Solidarity's legalisation. PZPR discourse thus reacquired a harder, 'class- 
drive' edge. 'Class' references at this time signified a hardening of the 
traditional discourse of 1Private, ’ ideologically based, 1traditional' 
legitimation. The so-called 'Secret Letter, 'm  sent in the aftermath of the 8th 
Plenum by Jaruzelski to all regional Central Committee delegates,
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 7th 1988
Trybuna Ludu, August 25th 1988. August 20th OPZZ called for the dissolution of parliament. August 23rd 
Miodowicz threatened to resign.
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 20th 1988
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illustrates the way in which this type of discourse was being used by the 
pragmatic centre to seek to retain unity within its wider interpellated 
community. A key extract read:
"The struggle for the Party's organisational, ideological and political unity is of 
primary importance. We must defend and strengthen the Party and ensure that 
Party activists have a clear view of the leadership's intentions. A  compromise, a 
withdrawal is not a matter of goodwill but a function of the balance of power.
We are doing all we can to change this balance to our advantage. We are not 
going to depart from the basic principles of our system: social ownership, the 
place of the working class, the role of the Communist Party, our international 
and class alliances, the equality of opportunities and socialist humanism. "m
The new premier, Rakowski, also played a decisive role in derailing the 
first set of round table talks which had been planned to take place in mid- 
October, following on from the preparatory talks at Magdalenka. He 
openly blamed Solidarity for doing so by making unrealistic demands. He 
refused, for example, to sanction the inclusion of Michnik and Kuron in 
any negotiation (the regime's so-called ’betes noires'm) and proceeded to 
alternate between attacking and ignoring Solidarity, while secretly making 
contacts with key Church and Solidarity figures with the aim of forging 
splits within the opposition. For example, he sought to winkle Walesa 
away from other Solidarity leaders. Walesa was a "decent and patriotic 
Pole, "201 unlike (presumably) others, suggested Rakowski.
199Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 20th 1988. Ibid. 
200jaruzelski, General., (1992)
201 Trybuna Ludu, September 13th 1988
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The Wal^sa-Miodowicz live TV debate on 30th October underlined the 
PZPR's hope that a trade union solution to the industrial unrest could be 
reached and that any political deals could be avoided. The appearance of 
Walesa on national television for the first time in 7 years was treated by 
many within the Party as a signal that the Rakowski strategy of breaking 
up the opposition could work. It was a tactic, however, that backfired, 
Walesa resolutely sticking to the original political preconditions 
(Solidarity's legalisation) of an end to strike action.
During October and November, the talks at Magdalenka became derailed 
and at the public level, the word 'Solidarity' disappeared from Party public 
discourse, having only very recently re-appeared. For example, on 8th 
November, Ciosek ruled out use of the word 'Solidarity' although he was 
still prepared to acknowledge that "room had to be foundfor an opposition. '^02 
The previous openness to notions of pluralism and democracy was thus 
submerged under the weight of a fierce discursive and propaganda 
campaign to discredit any form of opposition. For example, during 
October, Jaruzelski told a Party meeting that the leadership would not 
"hesitate to use force should attempts emerge to de-stabilise the socialist State. "203 He 
told his audience that any move towards trade union pluralism would 
take place within the 'confines of existing law' (i.e. that it would not be 
possible). By early November, both Rakowski and Urban had moved 
away from acknowledgement that, even for purely political reasons, they
Economist, December 3rd 1988
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 25th 1988. Rakowski was reported to have told U.S. 
Congressmen that the PZPR objected to any "politicisation of the factories and that Solidarity would have to 
accept not only the constitutional system but also the leading role of the party within it." However, Walesa 
was publicly paraded as a "private individual" with whom "the Party could do business." For example, in the 
September issue of Konfrontacja, in an October copy of Tygodnik Powszechny a full text interview with 
Wal?sa, which had already been published in Le Figaro, appeared in Trybuna Ludu.
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needed to recognise Solidarity. On October 5th Rakowski told local Party 
officials, for example, that:
"The Party has always had a directing role and we have never lost it because we 
have had the army, the security and the nomenclature and when it was needed, 
we have used other means.. ^ Although we have lost the hearts and minds of the 
people we will regain them. "204
The Rakowski government, at the same time as attacking Solidarity, 
began to accelerate the usage of another discourse, aiming to locate the 
PZPR within a symbolic sphere traditionally appropriated by Solidarity, 
that of the nation’s only true saviour; the PZPR as the only non­
sectional, genuinely national party and as the only real representative of 
the national interest.205 During November, Rakowski invited various 
public figures into PRON and left four places open to Solidarity in his 
Cabinet. By offering the prospect of limited and largely cosmetic power 
sharing to small, hand picked and elite groups, the Rakowski leadership 
group sought to play on and extenuate existing divisions within the 
opposition movement and, at the same time, by co-opting opposition 
figureheads, reassure international opinion of the regime’s reformist 
credentials.
At the same time as evoking nationalism as a discourse of legitimation, 
the Rakowski period was marked by a definite attempt to breath new life 
into the eudaemonic discourses which had become weakened during the
204Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 25th 1988
2^5Trybuna Ludu, October 30th 1988. Jaruzelski’s meeting with Cardinal Glemp on October 26th, during 
which he apologised for past ’sins’ committed during the 1950’s (referring obliquely to the treatment of 
Cardinal Wyszynski).
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preceding six months. ’Markets’ and ’competition’ dominated operative 
(policy-related) Party discourses. As Zubek notes,206 the Party began 
quietly to abandon Marxian economics all together. Rakowski told a local 
Party meeting in Warsaw, for example, that:
"If socialism fails to show that it is economically viable, then it loses in the 
historical confrontation with its rivals... The economic well being of the people is 
the important criteria of this government. I  haven't heard of anybody who has 
managed to feed the masses on ideology. Why should people be happy if the 
economy doesn't work and the fruits of their labourfail to give them the benefits 
they expect?”7®'1
Rakowski’s discursive references to ’efficiency’ and 'rationality' 
underpinned the Party’s economic discourses. Clearly Rakowski and Baka 
sought a type of reform that de-linked the political and economic spheres 
by introducing market principles without, however, genuine pluralisation 
of the political sphere. This required a curious combination of 
'Public/Private' discourses, however. One part was designed to legitimate 
the economic agency of individuals within a nominally free market, 
endowing them with a private identity and legal status, the other 
employing the traditional notions of one party rule. The failure of the 
PZPR to construct an ’opposition’ in such a way as to undermine such an 
entity's unity while at the same time integrate selected 'constructive 
oppositionists' into the State undermined this discourse and hard-line 
reactions from within the PZPR, at the local and national levels, 
furthermore, obliged a reassertion of more traditional discourse. The
206zubek, V., (1990) op cit. pp.4-5 
207Trybuna Ludu, November 30th 1988
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'Secret letted is again illustrative of the confusion in the Party's ideological 
discourses:
"A  greater stress should be put on defending the Party's identity, on arguments 
in support of the system and national interest. Attempts to set up of illegal 
structures must be resolutely opposed. The working class trade unions (OPZZ) 
must be actively supported, particularly on the shop floor. Close bonds with the 
working class and all our political allies, the Democratic Party and the United 
Peasants' Party, must be maintained. We are aware of our allies' wavering. Yet 
the main real danger is the rebirth of Solidarity structures as they existed in 
1981, that is as a party of strikes and confrontation. This is what we must all 
focus our attention on."2m
To underpin his economic reforms, Rakowski brought into his cabinet 
representatives of industry. Wilczek became Minister of Industry and 
Jastrz^bski, Minister for External Economic Co-operation. These moves, 
combined with a comparatively radical set of economic proposals,209 set 
the tone for a campaign to breathe renewed life into the Polish economy. 
On 26th November Wilczek called for the closure of the hundred least 
profitable enterprises in Poland and proposed the setting up of 
thousands of small enterprises. "The best," he said, "must be encouraged and
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, December 1st 1988
^O^zubek, V., (1991) op cit.; Slay, B., (1994) op cit. On November 2nd an economic consolidation plan was 
announced. It included a re-prioritisation of state resources from heavy industry and defence to consumer 
markets, the legal equality for all types of enterprise (private, socialised and co-operative), uniform legal 
principles, a dissolution of the Planning Commission to be replaced by economic advisory board, 
independence of the banking system, currency convertibility within 5-7 years (486 out of 734 regulations 
concerning industrial production eliminated, 300 on agricultural production).
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the worst pushed down to die.”2™ However, Wilczek also framed this 
ostensibly capitalist discourse in one of a different - a-historical - kind.
" We now recognise that Western countries have achieved high living standards 
using certain methods It is just a matter of coincidence that these methods are 
called capitalist."211
The emphasis on markets and economic efficiency was clearly designed 
to by-pass the need for discussions with Solidarity, which could - at the 
same time - be portrayed discursively as an obstacle to progress towards 
a modern, market economy. Rakowski articulated the view on several 
occasions that Solidarity was an unnecessary burden that society could 
not afford to bear:
"In history some movements have their beginning and their end. Solidarity has 
had its end. The future of Poland will not be decided by these people."2™
The decision, announced in October, to close the Lenin shipyards in 
Gdansk is significant in terms of Rakowski's legitimational strategy after 
the Messner resignation for two reasons. One, it fitted neatly into the 
emerging discourse of the market: efficient enterprises survive because 
they are efficient, weak enterprises represent a drain on the national 
economy. Two, because it represented a direct attack on one significant 
centre and source of Solidarity's power base. The decision must be seen 
within the political context of the breakdown in dialogue between the 
Party and Solidarity after August. The PZPR elite, however, was still
210Radio Free Europe Progress Report, November 11th 1988 
^^The Economist, December 3rd 1988 
^^The Economist, December 3rd 1988. Ibid
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divided on the issue of the re-legalisation of Solidarity and the 
announcement can be seen in terms of a concession to the more hard­
line elements within the Party-State apparatus. The decision was, 
furthermore made public during the visit to Poland of the British Prime 
Minister Thatcher and in the context of IMF deliberations concerning 
Poland’s external debt repayments. It both illustrated to a sceptical 
capitalist world that economic reforms within Communist Poland were 
based on solid, economically rational foundations and, perhaps also, to 
use Thatcher’s experience of anti-trade union strategy in Britain to 
undercut any public relations victory Solidarity might have hoped to have 
gained out of her visit.213
However, Rakowski's anti-Solidarity discourse was tempered, to a certain 
extent, by his recognition that obstacles to economic reform existed 
within the Party-State also. The conservative character of the top 
administration, Rakowski argued, was high on the list of barriers facing 
his government:
” They have completely lost the ability to take risks and progress means taking risks 
and at the same time, they have the conviction that they are always right,"214
^^The Thatcher visit was postponed on two occasions during September, ostensibly because of instability 
during the change of government, but largely to do with the Party’s attempts to derail the round table talks. 
Clearly the party did not want the Thatcher visit to be seen to lend external support to Solidarity which would 
be able to exert greater pressure on the government. See Rakowski, M. R., (1992), pp.109-111
214Ibid.
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3. E ast Vs West
This largely eudaemonic form of legitimation was underpinned by a 
continuation, in various elements of Party discourse, of talk of 'foreign 
interference.' The 'West,' it was frequently suggested, was financing 
subversion and 'anti-socialist' forces within Poland (referring to money 
sent to Solidarity during the 1980's).215 The Party was clearly ambivalent 
about the precise geopolitical discursive tone it wished to take, however. 
Any talk of 'Western' influences in economic discourses indicated that its 
strategy of non-compromise in the political sphere might have to be 
revised. The possible effects of an opening of the Polish economy to 
foreign competition, furthermore, thrust deeper into the existing 
conflicts between the OPZZ and Solidarity and played on the cleavages 
between, for example, the neo-liberal intellectual elite within Solidarity 
and the working class trade union based groups.
Furthermore, any Western financial re-negotiation, for example with the 
IMF (after October), would inevitably be conditioned - at most - on the 
PZPR's opening up of the existing political system and - at least - on a 
revision of the existing trade union legislation (i.e. the re-legalisation of 
Solidarity). This ambivalence was reflected in a series of speeches made 
by senior government officials during the period. Baka, for example, 
during the brief opening of the possibility of an round table in August, told 
Western journalists that trade union pluralism was imminent and that 
Solidarity would ("probably") be legalised, although only at the level of 
individual enterprises.216 Malinowski (the leader of the ZSL), likewise,
^^Trybuna Ludu, October 17th 1988
216Washington Post, September 1st 1988; New York Times, September 1st 1988
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told Western journalists that he saw no reason why the opposition 
should not be offered the ministries of health, education or housing.217 
However, there emerged no obvious change in IMF policy in relation to 
Poland.218 Rakowski stated, defiandy, in late October, that (if the West 
was looking for concrete proof that Poland was serious in its reform 
initiatives), "we m il give it to them...its our only chance and we don't have much 
time."219
The Soviet Union, furthermore, was softening its hardline in relation to 
its traditional bloc allies. On September 7th Soviet foreign minister, 
Shishlin, for example, told Le Monde that the CPSU had no power of veto 
over Poland and that he supported the proposed round table negotiations. 
On October 19th an Orzechowski article appeared in Pravda in which he 
wrote of "the Party's absolute control, its role in defining the limits to talks."220 
Rakowski soon after visited Moscow for talks with the Russian Prime 
Minister Rzyhkov as well as Gorbachev.
^^The Baltimore Sun, September 7th 1988 
^^Trybuna Ludu, September 17th-18th 1988 
^^The Financial Times, October 31st 1988
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4. Past Vs Present
On the one hand the PZPR had began to scrap key ideological 
discourses in the economic sphere (the formal equalisation of the private 
and State sectors, for example), on the other hand it has not been able or 
willing to engage in real political reform. Within this interim context, the 
PZPR began to search for convenient new discourses to legitimate itself 
and its democratic credentials without offering any institutional or 
constitutional mechanisms for real democratic articulation. Most 
importantly for both relations with Polish society and the Soviet Union, a 
'Katyn' discourse began to emerge.
During this period, the PZPR was seeking to locate itself within two 
discourses simultaneously. One, traditional', the PZPR as the only 
authentic defender of the (socialist) faith and vanguard of reformism 
within it. This was located within the traditional (realist) conception of 
the role played by the USSR in domestic Polish affairs and, in particular, 
of the PZPR's self-appointed role as appeaser of the Soviet's 
international intentions. The language of socialism, specifically Marxism- 
Leninism, signified an implicit understanding of geopolitical reality. Two, 
as a national party, not tied into a closed version of the past. However, 
many elements of the past that were closed had become closed because 
they did not fit into the traditional conception. In other words, a national 
party would be obliged to adopt, at least to a certain extent, various 
historical references that (albeit indirectly) criticised the USSR. The 
delicate balance between these two elements at this stage in the process 
of changing legitimation lies at the centre of the emerging reformist
220 Trybuna Ludu, October 24th, 1988. An extract from the original Pravda interview was reproduced.
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discourse previously outlined in this chapter. One of Jaruzelski's key note 
speeches during the Gorbachev visit in early July illustrates this:
"This meeting illustrates that we can talk calmly about history, although our 
discussions must not impinge on the work of the 1historical commission. ' Economic 
matters are the key. Political demoralisation demands equal commitment. These m il 
help us to build a better mood particularly at a time when economic solutions are still 
sought. We see three years as an adequate time period to fully introduce our reforms. 
We continue to count on the USSR. The West continues to make economic solutions 
difficult. We have introduced economic reform, but the reaction of the West could either 
be one of revenge, pushing us closer to the USSR or one of enforcing concessions." 221
To the dismay of PZPR leaders, both reformist and hardline, however, 
Gorbachev made no references to Katyn during his visit to Poland. This 
clearly angered many within the PZPR elite who had believed that Katyn 
would be addressed publicly. Politburo member Krol, for example, said 
at a meeting held between Gorbachev and Polish intellectuals attached to 
the Party, that "many facts (in Polish-Soviet relations,) need no further research. 
The facts are there. J ill we need is to talk about them publicly. "222
The PZPR’s public references to various so-called " blank-spots"22i (those 
being dealt with by the Joint Polish-Soviet Historical Commission) 
during 1988, however, were deployed by the PZPR to distance the Party 
in popular perception from the Soviet Union and locate it within a more 
national version of socialism within Poland. Subjects that were once 
taboo, including Katyn, were fitted, often obliquely, into Party
221perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. p.35 
222perzkowski, S., (1994) Ibid. p.8
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discourses. The process of opening up national historical discourses, 
however, quickly acquired a political dynamic beyond the Party's own 
limited discourse of legitimation, feeding, for example, into the wider 
struggle for societal legitimacy between the State and civil groups, most 
notably the Church and Solidarity, in society.
During May and June the first public pronouncements of the Historical 
Commission were published. On May 28th the Soviet press, principally in 
Pravda, expressed the need for Katyn to be included in the Commission's 
work. This was clearly taken as a sign by the Jaruzelski team that the 
Soviets might be prepared to admit responsibility for Katyn. Trybuna 
Ljidu confidently reported the Pravda reports in full and Jaruzelski 
prepared to discuss Katyn with Gorbachev. However, on June 7th Soviet 
radio stated that recent disclosures about Katyn had been "hijacked' for 
" Western propaganda purposes" and that there was no reason for "jumping to 
conclusionsZ'224
During Gorbachev's visit,225 it is clear that the PZPR was pushing the 
Soviet delegation to make some kind of statement about Katyn and 
became angered by the refusal to acknowledge even the barest of 
historical facts. On July 12th, for example, deputy chairman of State, 
Barcikowski told a press conference that Katyn would be explained soon, 
thus both indicating to the Soviets that the Polish Party wanted some 
kind of announcement on the matter, but also that it remained
223Szayna, T. S., (1988)
22^Radio Free Europe Progress Report, July 2nd 1988. June 29th Professor Maciszewki, Polish co-chairman 
of Blank-spots’ commission stated that an agreement had been reached about the 1919-20 Russo-Polish war 
and that the "tragedy of the KPP in 1938" was being prepared. New material "has come to light" about these, 
he said. But the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, W.W.II and Katyn "will have to wait."
223Radio Europe Progress Report, October 27th 1988. July 11th Gorbachev visited Poland. He spoke of the
"joint tragedy of Stalinism," but said nothing about Katyn.
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deferential to the needs of the Soviet Party. Simultaneously, a public 
clamour for a sign that the Soviets were prepared to admit culpability was 
being expressed. For example, on July 15th Lech Walesa stated that:
"Katyn is connected with the legitimacy and birth certificate of Communist rule.
I f  he (Gorbachev) had said anything about it, it would have been a real
revolution. "226
The PZPR was, however, signalling that it recognised the importance of 
Katyn for Poles and thus its desire to reclaim some kind of societal 
legitimacy. On July 17th a Polish army chaplain took mass at Katyn 
cemetery and two days later the PZPR's press spokesman, Urban, stated 
that the USSR was not withdrawing (contrary to what appeared to be the 
case) from 'painful historical points.' Later in July a more straightforward 
and open series of references emerged within sections of the official 
Polish press regarding responsibility for Katyn. On July 30th Pnfeglqd 
Tygodniony described the Katyn massacre as a "crime of genocide" and called 
for the punishment of its perpetrators.227
Alongside the struggle to feed Katyn into its legitimational discourses, 
the PZPR also allowed the publication of a series of historical reports 
that had been hidden for 30 years in the State's archives. The sanctioning 
of a Polityka serialisation of 'secret reports' from the 1950's which 
identified the Soviet Union as the main culprit of crimes committed 
within Poland during the 1948-56 period can, for example, be seen as 
part of this evolving historical discourse. On July 27th the daily
226Radio Free Europe Progress Report, July 26th 1988 
227przeglqd Tygodniowy, 30th July 1988
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newspaper Polityka's publication of Kruszczev's 1956 speech (denouncing 
Stalin) further illustrated this. This was the first time it had appeared in 
the Communist press in Poland. This 'unravelling1 of the past as a mode 
of discursive legitimation continued up to the 10th Plenum. The Party, for 
example, adopted a more open appraisal of the role of the PPS in the 
post-war merger of PPR and PPS within the Party journal, Nowe Drogi.228 
The PZPR was seeking to locate itself as the "heir to the best socialist 
traditions in Poland."229 On December 15th, for example, the former 
Chairman of the State Council, Jablonski delivered an address in which 
he said that:
"Anyone who strengthened the revolutionary force in Russia served, objectively 
speaking, the cause of the liberation of Poland. Therefore, while we must not 
forget all the faults of the SdKil, we should also remember this fact among its 
achievements."230
After October, a discourse of blaming 9the remnants of Stalinismr for the 
current plight of socialism also emerged much more clearly. On 
December 4th Rakowski also talked of August 1980 as a precedent for 
1989, but also blamed anti-socialist forces inside and outside Poland on 
the problems of the 1980's. He failed, significantly, however, in the 
course of a lengthy speech, to mention the word 'Solidarity.'231 National 
independence in 1918 was celebrated with full military honours for the 
first time in the post-war period on November 11th and General
22^Kochariski, L., (1988). In October three articles in the same edition of Nowe Drogi illustrate this: 
Albrecht, A., (1988), Latyszew, J., (1988) and Firs6w, P., (1988)
229Albrecht, A., (1988) Ibid.
22^Radio Free Europe Situation Report, November 25th 1988
2^Trybuna Ludu, 6th December 1988
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Pilsudski, a figure traditionally ignored in Communist discourse, was 
officially rehabilitated as a national hero.232
One significant effect of this historical discourse, was to undermine the 
more conservative sections of the PZPR which had been suggesting a 
return to martial law and a clampdown on civil unrest. A national version 
of the past necessitated a critique of the USSR, the key external guarantor 
of the hard-line position of the PZPR within the State.233 Following 
Gorbachev's visit, the issue of Katyn remained officially closed as far as 
the Soviets were concerned. CPSU spokesman, Rzheshevsky, cited three 
previous attempts to pin the blame for Katyn on the USSR. The first, he 
argued, was at the Nuremberg trials, the second was by the US in the 
early 1950's and the third, was by Solidarity in 1980.234 Polish Stalinist 
groups within the PZPR, led by Bednarski, (a leading figure in the right- 
wing 'Grunwald' Patriotic Movement, an organisation close to various 
extreme anti-Semitic and virulently nationalistic milieux within the 
PZPR) was unable to locate a response within anything other than a 
discourse of anti-Russianism, which would undermine both the PZPR's 
bargaining position in relation to Polish society and the hardliner's 
position within the Party.
232 Jakubowska, H., (1990) for analysis of the use of national symbols to legitimate the regime in late 1988.
233jjausner, J. and Klementewicz, T., (Eds.) (1992) op cit. p. 167. June 28th - July 1st 19th The CPSU 
Conference concluded that any improvement in the economic system could not be dissociated from a 
thorough reconstruction of systems of exercising power.
234Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, November 5th 1988
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5. Conclusions
The PZPR moved during 1988 from a predominantiy 'Private' towards a 
more 'Public' and back to a 'Private' type of discourse. Its 'Public' 
discourses at this stage, however, were heavily contingent on the 
outcomes they were able to generate, in particular in stemming industrial 
unrest and fragmenting the emerging Solidarity-Church opposition. They 
combined the symbolism of national dialogue (without any formal public 
dialogue), with a loosened commitment to overt ideological 
pronouncements, seeking to bridge two traditionally antagonistic spheres.
A series of discursive changes did, however, take place. One, the notion 
‘opposition* entered the core Te^a (Thesis') of the PZPR Central 
Committee Plenums. The introduction of the notion of an 'opposition' is 
of interest in that it reflected the Party's recognition that Solidarity 
actually existed and thus that the Party's attempt (during the 1980's) to 
delete it, both ritually (via discourses) and actually (by banning and 
hounding its members) had failed. In doing so, the PZPR shifted its 
discourses of State, Party and constitution. It weakened the discursive 
symbiosis between Party and State and questioned the 'class' character of 
the Party by opening the question of Solidarity's re-legalisation.
As the 'Public' discourses relapsed into 'Private' after October, the PZPR 
delved into the past in search of signifiers that could camouflage the 
emptiness of its real democratic intentions. 'Katyn' became recognised as 
a key discourse both in the PZPR's attempt to alter its existing 
relationship with the Soviet Union and as a means of strengthening its 
appeal to Polish society, by linking itself to a key national sentiment. The
131
revised notion of the past, in relation to the Polish socialism is also 
important. By re-emphasising the humanistic version of Polish socialism, 
the PZPR was registering both that existing socialism was faulty 
(although was being fixed) and that a wider interpretation of its own 
interpellated community would be necessary within a more democratic 
environment. The PZPR developed a coded geopolitical critique of the 
'Eastern' version of socialism (in a Stalinist form), but remained caught in 
the trap of needing on the one hand to appease the Soviet Union (to 
retain an external threat with which to underpin its bargaining position 
with Solidarity) and on the other to be seen to a party of the nation, 
which necessitated a rejection of any real taint of Soviet connections. 
This was a state of affairs that could not be sustained for very long.
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Chapter 4 
Changing Course 
December 1988-January 1989
i. Introduction
The end of 1988, start of 1989 marked a radical turning point in the 
PZPR's discourses. The politically fraught character of the Party's 
previous strategy of seeking to impose economic reform 'from above,' 
while reconstructing what were apparently 'symbolic' discourses (in 
relation to history, for example), snapped. Traditional ideological 
discourses became more clearly disengaged from both internal PZPR 
debate and its operative language vis-a-vis Solidarity and the Church. The 
Party's public discourses became much more clearly defined within a 
‘Public* sphere. Discursive contestation within the Party also emerged at a 
much more public level within the Politburo's Plenum Te%a and at the 
Plenum itself. These debates took place on two levels. One, pragmatic 
questions of political tactics in the short term. In the context of internal 
(Party-State) resistance to reform at the opening stage of the 10th Plenum 
and the formation of Solidarity’s Citizen’s Committees (OKs) on 17th 
December 1988, the PZPR’s discourse was obliged to acquire a much 
more immediate significance. Two, ideological questions to do with the 
role of the leading party within the State and the identity and purpose of 
socialism. In several ways the latter discourses began to mirror the 
former - something that had not been a feature of the previous period. 
The pragmatic centre, grouped around Jaruzelski and Rakowski, for
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example, by making overt contacts with members of the Catholic 
hierarchy and opposition, while simultaneously purging significant 
internal opposition to the new line within the PZPR broader elite (in the 
Central Committee), narrowed the doctrinal possibilities inherent within 
the discourse of odnowa. The rejection of the traditional signifiers of ‘non- 
Solidarity’ and ‘non-compromise' discourses is central to the process of 
changing PZPR identity and the process of its legitimational 
transformation.
Party discourses at both the 10th Plenum and All-National Ideological- 
Theoretical Conference represented the most open attempts, within the 
terms of odnowa, to cope with the difficult questions - of short-term 
tactics and longer-term ideological identity - that had arisen during 1988. 
These internal debates and the Party’s official discourses that set the 
initial terms of reference for debate, illustrated both the rapid 
delegitimation, within the pragmatic centre, of the existing type of 
legitimation as well as the internal obstacles to reform from within the 
Party-State. They marked the opening up of new forms and methods of 
debate, confrontation and public discourse both within the Party and 
between State and society and the explicit rejection of many traditional 
elements in official discourses.
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2. Public Vs Private
The opening 10th Central Committee Plenum Te^a delivered in late 
December 1988 by the Politburo, upon which the Jaruzelski-Rakowski 
pragmatic centre hung its key programmatic and ideological discourses, 
can be read on many planes. For the Party's reformist elites it was a 
definite victory, representing its successful manoeuvring within the elite. 
For the pragmatic centre it was a political necessity but also a 
continuation of odnowa. For the Solidarity opposition, it was a 
confirmation of the increasingly weak position of the Party within the 
existing system.
The specific wording of key discursive Party texts is important in that it 
structured the perceptions and subsequent actions of key groups, inside 
and outside the PZPR. It redefined the lines of 'Public' and 'Private' 
confrontation and the terms of the Party-opposition dialogue and shifted 
both elite's (the PZPR's and Solidarity's) relations with their own 
respective political and wider socio-organisational communities. O f key 
significance, the Party moved away from its commitments to an a-priori 
belief in its organisationally inscribed leading role within the State and 
society and towards what Staniszkis refers to as "the language of pragmatic 
control."235 The discourse recognised, at times unintentionally, the 
historical contingency of the leading party; its political as opposed to 
organisational role in the building of socialism.
2-^Staniszkis, J.,(1992) op cit. p. 158
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Rakowski clearly thought that the PZPR could exploit the apparent 
divisions within Solidarity at the end of 1988.236 The Solidarity 'of 
negotiation' (so-called 'constructive opposition*), according to Rakowski, 
could be split from that of 'non-negotiation.'237 The split would render 
the latter impotent (lacking leadership and direction) and the former 
would have no real choice other than to fit quietly into the existing 
structures of representation, thus legitimating and widening them.
Furthermore, the Rakowski government was accelerating its economic 
reform policies during late December, sending, for example, a series of 
key marketisation measures to the Sejm (freeing fuel prices and interest 
rates). In order to relieve the social pressure on the government and 
force this ideologically sensitive legislation (to many sections of the 
Party-State directly effected by it) through the Sejm,238 Rakowski needed 
to convince the Party centres of power (most notably the KOK elites of 
Generals Jaruzelski, Siwicki and Pozoga) of the need to reopen the 
notion of a round table, and seek a wider coalition of interests to legitimate 
and protect the reforms. A highly conditional and limited round table, thus 
constructed, was to act as a device for legitimating Rakowski's reforms. 
This version of reform fitted neatly into the on-going strategy of the 
Rakowski government. A 'deal' (not a legalisation) with the unofficial 
trade unions (Solidarity), combined with limited reforms of the law on
^^Holzer, j  an(j Leski, J., (1990). The struggle within Solidarity concerned the extent to which the 
leadership group (centred around the Catholic, nationalist and trade union trio of Walesa, Kaczyriski,
Stelmachowski on one side and the secular, leftist trio of Geremek, Michnik and Kurori on the other) could 
harness support for its strategy of compromise from within the rank and file of the movement, in the face of 
fierce criticism from more radical groups and a rising tide of industrial disquiet and antipathy towards any 
form of compromise with the authorities.
2^7Rakowski’s reckoning is found in his own words, Rakowski, M.R., (1992) op cit. p.78; Perzkowski, S., 
(1994) op cit. p.98. This is also corroborated in documented discussions within the Politburo.
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the autonomy of civic organisations and a widening of the legislative 
chamber (Sejm), which would integrate selected members of a 'constructive 
opposition,' would stem societal opposition (and undercut the sources of 
industrial unrest) and, at the same time, provide the necessary political 
space within which economic reforms could be accelerated during 1989, 
without the PZPR losing power.
Rakowski clearly continued to believe that a version of the eudaemonic 
legitimation initiated after November 1988 would, given the Party's 
regulation of talks with an opposition (and deals with the Church), act, in 
the medium term, to re-legitimate the existing socialist system and thus 
the Party. Hints that 'full' 'socialist parliamentary democracy' would 
become a reality within a given period of time - for example - references 
to fully open elections in 1991 (May 3rd) - illustrate this.239 Rakowski's 
confidence was reinforced by a December CBOS (opinion poll) survey 
which showed a marked rise in society's acceptance of (although, 
significandy, not support for and certainly not support for the Party's 
role in initiating) economic reform.240
The period is marked by a series of debates within the PZPR elite, both 
within the Politburo and Central Committee, concerning the extent to 
which the PZPR could or should sanction the legalisation of Solidarity
^^The Financial Times, 22nd December 1988. Baka called on the OPZZ to support a prices and incomes 
accord. 24th December Sejm set in motion bills aimed at de monopolising the banking system and introducing 
new laws on foreign investment, aimed at encouraging Western capital to Poland.
239Trybuna Ludu, 10th January 1989. Rakowski wrote of a "fully open democracy" in 4 years, to be legally 
enforced on the 200th anniversary of the original Polish constitution of May 3rd 1791
240Taras, R., (1995) op cit. chapter 4. CBOS "Opinie o rzqdzie Mieczyslawa Rakowskiego" (Opinion o f the 
Rakowski government), BD/329/88 (December 1988).
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and on what terms.241 The question revolved around the role of Solidarity 
at both the local level (and consequently the role of the OPZZ) and at 
the national level.242 The question of the legalisation (or re-legalisation) of 
Solidarity thus continued to be central to the reform debates within the 
Party and had immediate ramifications for sections of the Party's lower 
level community, most specifically the OPZZ. What would be the Party's 
'leading role' at all if it was prepared to relinquish its role at the level of 
its so-called 'class base'? Furthermore, if Solidarity could operate as a free 
association, what would stop it operating as a political movement?243 The 
Party's debates about socialist pluralism are thus not only interesting in 
terms of an evolving notion of legal-rational legitimation, but are also 
central to the practical details of the process of legalisation and reform 
more widely. Any changes in the Politburo's Te%a adopted at the Central 
Committee Plenum revealed a great deal about the pragmatic centres' 
political position in relation to both its own party and the non- 
Communist opposition movement.
At the first part of the 10th Plenum between 20th and 22nd December, 
many within the Central Committee and the wider Party apparatus 
reacted against the proposed new line. Miodowicz, for example, argued 
that any arrangement with Solidarity would produce "an agreement between 
elites, the elite of 1the authorities' and the elite of the opposition."244 Several 
speeches at the Plenum accused the leadership of adopting "capitalist
241perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. pp.45-74
242Perzkowski, S., (1994) Ibid. pp.225-229.
243Perzkowski, S., (1994) Ibid., pp.213-220, Tezy do oceny i prognozy sytuacji spoleczno-politycznej’
(Thesis to do with opinions and prognoses of the social-political situation).
24477ie Economist, January 21st 1989
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models" and permitting "the development of a new bourgeoisie ."245 The OPZZ 
became a mouthpiece of anti-reformist rhetoric. Its leaders, most 
prominently Miodowicz, realising that the position of the OPZZ at the 
enterprise level would be challenged, despite assurances to the contrary, 
began to talk openly of and engage in pressure for a rise in wages during 
late January. This directly threatened the Rakowski economic reforms 
and, given Baka's call for a centrally agreed and set incomes policy with 
the OPZZ, represented a significant obstacle to the setting up of a round 
table, as the Te%a proposed.
The reluctance of the Central Committee, furthermore, to endorse the 
Politburo Te%a during the second part of the 10th Plenum in January, 
(following a significant purge of anti-reformists from leading positions 
within the Party), illustrated the gap that had already emerged within the 
wider PZPR elite on questions of both immediate and longer-term 
discursive strategy. The effect of this opposition within the PZPR, 
however, was to push Politburo reformers closer to so-called 'moderates’ 
within Solidarity, a reversal of what had happened in October of the 
previous year. The Rakowski government had spent the previous three 
months attacking and belittling Solidarity and trying to cajole and 
persuade intransigent interests within the Party-State system that 
economic reforms required a restructuring of the Party's role within the 
State and economy, but could be achieved without the need to concede 
any real political initiative to Solidarity. What this had meant in practise, 
however, was the Rakowski government assuaging conservative demands
Trybuna Ludu, December 21st - 22nd, 1988
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for a non-relinquishment of the Party's prerogative position.246 As the 
blanket discourse of Party-centred, Party-controlled reform weakened 
during December in the face of the two sided assault from both inside 
and outside the PZPR, cracks emerged, as Schopflin puts it, "in the surface 
unanimity"247 of the discourse. Intra-PZPR struggle during the 10th 
Plenum opened up various questions and catalysed factions within the 
Party around different analyses of the existing crisis in socialism, in ways 
of dealing with it the short term and longer term questions of the 
political and ideological identity and purpose of the PZPR.
Many hard-liners within the Party sought to deny that the changes 
proposed to Weal! socialism were necessary. Instead they claimed that they 
represented a counter-revolutionary trend and were temporary and 
avoidable. This fundamentalism represented an extreme version of a 
more pervasive feeling within the Central Committee and more broadly 
within the Party, as witnessed, for example, during the opening debates 
at the Plenum. One local Party secretary connected with nationalist 
groups in the Party told the Plenum that the defence of socialism was 
synonymous both with the defence of Poland as a sovereign nation-state 
and the working class, in whose name the Party led. Socialism, he argued, 
could not be abandoned, since, after all, it represented the only real 
legitimation available to the PZPR: it defined its values and identity and 
its role within the State.248 This discourse was stoically ideological in 
form, while at the same time apparently practical - common-sensical -
246Trybuna Ludu, January 21st-22nd 1989. The position of the OPZZ and its leader Miodowicz at the 
International Labour Organisation in Geneva in October and his speech at the 10th Plenum indicated the 
official trade unions opposition to any form of trade union pluralism.
^ Schop flin , G., (1993) op cit. p.67
248Trybuna Ludu, 29th December, 1988
140
related, for example, to "the living standards of the majority of Voles" and "the 
interests of the working class ,"249 Central Committee delegate Borys for 
example argued that the present economic policies were out of tune with 
11the ideals of socialjustice" and that the Party was being "elbowed aside. rt25°
This hard-line discourse - if it had any basis other than a simple concern 
to retain power - lay in the traditional Marxist-Leninist notion of telos. 
" We, no-one else, are building socialism in Poland and no-one m il can divert us from 
this path. We have historicalforces on our side," one delegate said.251 Supporters 
of this line tended to be grouped in the lower Party apparatus, full time 
Party workers, institutional interest groups located predominantly within 
the military and heavy industry sections of the State.
Jaruzelski demoted the main representatives of this strand of Party 
discourse in the first half of the Plenum in December 1988, ridding the 
Politburo of any real opposition to the changes subsequently outlined in 
the Te%a.252 This had the effect of reducing conflict within the Central 
Committee, but it also meant that disaffected anti-reformers thereafter 
sat in the ranks of the wider Party, sowing seeds of discontent. Given 
that much of the dogmatic language being used in these circles was not 
dissimilar to much of that which Jaruzelski himself had recently been
249The Financial Times, December 23rd 1988
2^ T he Financial Times, December 23rd 1988. Ibid.
2 5 lTrybuna Ludu, December 21st- 22nd 1988
252jan0wski, K. B., (Sanford, G., 1992. op cit. pp.45-46) Opposition to the Party leadership’s pragmatic 
policies at the Plenum was most clearly evident during its first half . One third of the Central Committee 
voted against the proposed promotion of a reformer and Jaruzelski figure, Ciosek, to the Politburo and 
Secretariat. Also, other Jaruzelski appointees such as Czarzasty and Reykowski found little support in CC 
elections. Six Politburo members and two secretaries who had not been overtly enthusiastic about talks with 
Solidarity were demoted (including Baryla and Jlowczyk), while the recently resigned premier, Messner also 
lost his Politburo place. Key Jaruzelski reformers were elected, for example, Stepien, Miller and Czarzasty, 
although some anti-reform characters retained their positions - Sobotka, for example (from Huta Warszawa, a 
hard-line stronghold-non-voting member).
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using (before the 10th Plenum), the level of disaffection was high. This 
was something that had various negative consequences for the PZPR's 
bargaining position within the round table and most clearly at the June 
elections later in 1989. It reduced the bargaining power of the Party- 
government side within the round table negotiation by indicating to the 
Solidarity negotiating teams that any threats made, for example, by the 
pragmatic centre to derail the talks would prove politically impossible.
Within the reformist centres of the PZPR elite on the other hand a 
struggle was emerging at a more open level than previously, between 
groups advocating competing versions of reform socialism. A cleavage 
within this group was discernible between what are referred to here as 
Globalists and Populists.253 Globalism was rooted in a fundamental rejection 
of existing structures of economic decision-making. Its proponents were 
closely associated with the emergence of neo-liberal reform initiatives 
within the Party (which had been increasingly prevalent after 1986 within 
Party economic discourses). In order to reform the economic structures, 
however, political changes were deemed indispensable. Thus a round table 
would have a deep significance in the reform process, not merely as a 
form of window-dressing or symbolic posturing. It would, argued 
Cackowski254 at the Ideological Conference in February, necessitate a 
rejection of the a-priori myth of the leading party, lead direcdy to the 
implementation of accountable political structures, public control of and 
legality within the State and a stricter framework for making political and 
economic decisions.
^•^Staxiiszkis, J., (1992) op cit.
254Cackowski, Z., (1989)
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'Populist reformers tended to articulate the views of the PZPR's Warsaw 
Committee, the main core of the domestic security service and sections 
of the army.255 They denied that reforms of the economic model 
necessitated extensive political reform and stressed the 'deformities of 
socialism' in terms of specific leadership failings and an obstructive 
bureaucracy, which the leadership had failed to deal with. Their support 
for reforms at all was conditioned on a renewal in the Party's leading role 
and in the links between the Party and its socio-economic base within the 
working class and peasantry. This view was thus most closely in line with 
that of the pragmatic centre around Rakowski and Jaruzelski, whose 
interpretation of odnowa did not extend to relinquishing the PZPR's 
leading role. A system of government, of selecting leaders and their 
exercise of power without the leading role would, argued Wiatr,256 soon 
cease to be socialist at all.
Populists articulated a discourse of pragmatic and piecemeal reform within 
the existing institutions and structures of power and limited, highly 
conditional support for any deals with traditionally conceived 'enemies' - 
the Catholic Church, Solidarity and the 'West.' They treated political 
reforms as an "autonomous element...as a temporary manoeuvre that will allow 
socialism to catch its breath"751 Both factions agreed, however, that the 
existing Party was the main obstacle to reform, due to its so-called 
'transmission belt' role for local and branch interests, although reform 
options differed. 258 Globalists proposed the withdrawal of the Party from
255Wiatr, S., (1989)
2-^Ksztatt pdskiego Socjalizmu, (1989). Three positions: Radical Globalism: Cackowski, Z., (1989), backed 
by Orzechowski; Moderate Globalism: Bodnar, A., (1989), backed by Kiszczak, Jaruzelski and Ciosek. and 
Populism: Wiatr, S., (1989), backed by Warsaw Party committee, security and army.
257wiatr, S., (1989) op cit.
258Wiatr, S., (1989) Ibid.
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the enterprise level,259 while Populists proposed the abolition of the 
nomenclature, but keeping the Party at the local - class - level, in 
enterprises.260 More radical Globalists spoke of two parties of the left 
(reformist and revolutionary),261 whereas Populists talked of "a strong lively 
party, one party of the left and the keeping of factions within the Party)" - the PZPR 
as the centre of the power structure, but a different type of Party, one 
operating in a ’movement' style, like Solidarity (with confrontational and 
dynamic leadership, active at election time and with wide and loosely 
affiliated membership). Moderate Globalists tended to be interested in a 
weakening of the PZPR or its transformation into a broadened coalition 
of smaller leftist and green parties with a highly mobilised representation 
in parliament262
The discourses outlined by the Politburo at the 10th Plenum were a 
compromise between the more legalistic version of social democracy 
(Globalist% the more Statist (socialist) democratic (Populistj and the more 
conservative traditions and wings of the Party. Since the key to the 
legitimation of the PZPR was so closely associated with the type of 
signification its major ideological 'texts' were able to generate, the 
construction, presentation and alteration in them is central to the 
changing Party and the reforming political-economy of the State and 
nation. These texts are analysed below. At the first part of the 10th
259Trybuna Ludu, 17th - 18th December 1988. This was something that was agreed, in principle by the 
Central Committee and incorporated into the body of the final text.
260Wiatr, S., (1989) op cit.
1 Bodnar, A., (1989) op cit.
262Bodnar, A., (1989) Ibid.
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Plenum Ideological Secretary within the Politburo, Orzechowski,263 
delivered the Politburo’s keynote address:
"The current State model is certainly in crisis...It does not guarantee, nor does it 
enforce sufficient effectiveness in the new conditions... We must create a new model 
of socialism, one that is socially rational, since socialism was only one stage in 
the development of human civilisation."™
He stated the Party's intentions clearly in relation to " elimination of the last 
vestiges of S ta lin ism a new dialogue with the Catholic Church and the 
terms on which a "constructive opposition should be allowed to function 
within the existing system, including the stipulation that its 
representatives must:
”Disassociate themselves from extremist political forces that are funded from 
abroad and whose activity is aimed against the very essence of the system... This 
would provide for a limited renewal in 'horizontal structures' which opened in
1 9 8 1 ."265
Orzechowski was clearly seeking to wrap the elite's new political strategy 
in a discourse that would be seen as an extension of odnowa, although the 
reference to '1981' is highly significant in that it signified Party 
recognition that another version of socialism existed and that it had 
involved Solidarity. The two key slogans which marked the written Te%a 
of the 10th Plenum, "socialist parliamentary demo crag" and "socialist civil
263Reforma Partii-warunkiem powodzenia strategii odnowy i reform, (1989)
2***Radio Fee Europe Progress Report, January 11th 1989 
265Radio Free Europe Progress Report, January 11th 1989. Ibid
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society" were constructed as a part of the line adopted within odnowa. For 
example:
"The basic features of socialism are to be retained, but should be based on the 
following values: of humanism and socialist personalism, work, social justice, 
democracy, social ownership, new rights of citizenship, patriotism and 
internationalism. We envisage a return to man as the basis of society: man as 
the indivisible element in society in self-realisation with others. Socialism must 
have a human face; the cult of collectivism hasfailed."™
However, much of the content of the Te%a actually "reversed the established 
interpretations of Marxism," which, as Wiatr suggests, "had idealised the State 
while neglecting the importance of associations and organisations, legally guaranteed 
rights and various forms of property that could protect the individual from 
encroachments by the State."261 This humanistic element of the Party's 
discourse is significant in that it echoed and reproduced much of the 10th 
Congress (odnowa) discourse, but - in the context of real political 
negotiation (with a non-Party opposition) - acquired an immediate 
political edge. It expressed the same belief in the values of socialism but 
was much more open in its criticism of socialist practise. Socialism with a 
"human face," for example, was as old as the "Polish road to socialism" (post- 
1956), but translating this into practise demanded a more rigorous 
analysis and open assessment of the real possibilities available of 
achieving it. The Te%a continued:
^^^Ksztah Polskiego Socjalizmu. (1989) op cit.
267Radio Free Europe Progress Report, February 6th 1989
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"This does not mean reducing the role and significance of classes in society, but 
recognising that energy comes from individuals...man controlling the processes of 
work and the needs of society...the end of purely economic rights...in conditions of 
solidarity between nation and society, which have chosen a socialist route.”268
The significance of a reworking of the traditional value system of 
socialism is that it represented the most open first stage in a removal of 
doctrinal signifiers from the central Party discourse. The notion of 
'individualistic socialism' had become a part of PZPR discourse during the 
1970’s under Gierek, although its positioning within the central Party 
discourse in dialogue with itself, as opposed to a discourse aimed at 
assuaging and appeasing societal demands, is vital. The socialism that was 
being envisaged came from individuals within civil society, from the 
1Public' sphere, from a sphere that the Party had long failed to subjugate 
and control completely. Odnowa was emphasised as a dynamic discourse 
of gradually extending civil rights:
"In realising the strategy of renewal and reform, we are still at the start of 
building socialism. The 1980’s will be seen as an historical turning point in 
Polish history. The gradual creation of civic power, self-government, rights of 
citizens, transformation of consciousness of society and political culture of society, 
as well as gradual changes in the role of the State in the economy. In the political 
system we have seen deep changes - a national understanding  ^ the growth of 
representative organs of power and the Sejm becoming a real centre of power, the 
Constitutional Tribunal, Tribunal of State, Parliamentary Ombudsman, High
268Radio Free Europe Progress Report, February 6th 1989. Ibid.
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administrative court, a broader coalition of ZSL, SD and Catholic groups in 
PRONforum and open andfree trade unions"269
The discursive notion that the PZPR itself had engineered a radical 
transformation of society including its democratisation during the 1980’s 
was predicated, however, on its ability to ignore what had actually 
happened in 1980-81 and subsequently, in particular the role played by 
Solidarity in articulating the need for almost all of the above self-claimed 
reforms. Furthermore, the discourse of democratisation, while thorough 
enough on its own terms, did not, at this point, address the immediate 
question of round table talks with Solidarity or the concrete means by 
which these grand socialist values would continue to be implemented in 
practise. References to the doctrinal role of Marxism-Leninism, however, 
within the opening 10th Plenum Te^a were, at the same time, diluted and, 
significantly, marginalised. While Marxism-Leninism was and would 
remain the ideology of the Party, reaffirmed by both Rakowski and 
Jaruzelski at the opening and closing ceremonies, within that all- 
embracing ideology, various re-interpretations were possible. 
Orzechowski stated at the opening session of the 10th Plenum, for 
example:
' W ithin Marxism-Leninism, the ideological-theoretical base of the Party, we 
find the aims of the Party towards a just society. The values of the system rest 
there. It is, above all, a dialectic analysis of social reality in terms of the 
categories of class structure. We often hear that, 'wouldn't it be better if  we had 
a new Lenin?’. But Marxism is a living idea. We must treat it as an objective 
and critical science whose results can and must be verified in relation to reality.
269Radio Free Europe Progress Report, February 6th 1989. Ibid.
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The spirit of the people lies at its heart. It must be alive and practical. Much is 
said about the crisis of the (existing) model of socialism. But what we have is a 
crisis of the first stage of socialism - the 'pioneering stage.' What is needed is a 
fast ideological re-evaluation. How can it be improved? It must be about real 
problems and tasks, in agreement with the bases of Marxist thinking. The 
ideology must not be impoverished."210
This text retained, at one level, traditional commitments to Marxism, but 
at the same time, it cannot be read as a full affirmation of these 
principles, rather, as an attempt to widen the possibilities the ideology 
was able to express. In this regard one can view the text in terms of an 
alteration in key ideological discourses. This alteration had two central 
legitimational functions; one overt, the other covert. Overt functions 
were to do with giving off the right impressions to Western governments 
and financial institutions that Poland was ditching its commitments to an 
outdated political philosophy and accepting many of the principles of the 
market economy. This was particularly salient in the context of the 
Rakowski government’s marketisation reforms in late 1988. It also 
opened up the possibility of talking with ’moderate' (*Constructive) 
opponents, since it opened up the possibility of discussion within 
ideology. Covert functions were more to do with the conflicts within the 
PZPR and the methods used by the power elite to diffuse them. If the 
elite was obliged to seek new sources of legitimation (i.e. outside its 
traditional community) it would, inevitably, be obliged also to alter the 
discursive tone and content of its discourses. The notion of the 'working 
class,' for example was central to the ideological discourse of socialism 
and how it became constructed discursively therefore revealed much
^^Ksztah Polskiego Socjalizmu (1989) op cit.
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about the changing character and political role of the PZPR itself. 
Orzechowski’s speech at the opening session of the Central Committee 
Plenum in December is indicative of this critical question:
"The role of the working class in the creation of new structures has developed 
over the last few years. New structures are needed to reflect the changed and 
changing role and subjective position of the working class....The leading role 
remains in the interests of the working class (its aspirations, in line with existing 
laws, equally of chancesj and against the entrenched interests of the 
administration. But we are against those who interrupt the normal rhythm of 
work. History tells us that the working class is a unified entity, with common 
aims. There are no real methods of having two parties of the working class. This 
would strengthen rivalry within the working class and not help to solve any of 
the problems of society. The PZPR is the party of working people. It is and will 
remain a workers' party."m
The reference to the consciousness of the working class was clearly an 
indirect reference to the on-going struggle between the OPZZ and 
Solidarity concerning the right to organise trade unions in enterprises 
(either a one-union per enterprise or plurality of unions). If the working 
class remained the ultimate source of the Party’s strength (as it itself 
stated) and the working class had itself not changed, the Party was not 
obliged to accommodate it. If, however, the working class had changed, 
then the position of the pragmatic centre of the PZPR in relation to the 
OPZZ and local Party units both at the enterprise level and elsewhere, 
could not be legitimated without reflecting this change.
^^Reforma Partii (1989) op cit.
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"The PZPR CC comes out for a strong and independent trade union movement 
providing that the unions abide by the constitutional and legislative order and 
trade union statutes, act in favour of economic development, rely upon financial 
sources in tune with the law in force in Poland and the principle of loyalty to 
their State"111
The "strong and independent trade union referred to, however, was not 
specified. Given the on-going struggle between the PZPR leadership and 
both the OPZZ and Solidarity to find methods for negotiating with each 
other at the local and national levels, this lack of detail did not provide 
any of the discursive addressees with any substantial affirmation or 
disaffirmation of their existing negotiational position. However, the 
language of pluralism, differentiation and institutionalisation of political 
pluralism within State structures can be read as a major alteration in the 
ideological text of the PZPR. At the same time as reaffirming its 
commitments to the working class, a sense of realism underpinned the 
10th Plenum Te%a.113 It stated that
"..the end has arrived of a certain phase in the development of socialism and also 
of the ideas of socialism. Whoever doesn't understand that and thinks that one 
can wait and avoid a bold look at the world in which we live is a sham 
Marxist. Marxism says that the system, which creates the more perfect 
conditions for economic progress, is the better one."11*
■^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid. 
^^^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid. 
^^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid.
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Socialism was thus becoming constructed as one particular, normative 
option amongst others, with no intrinsic right to exist and prosper. If 
socialism was only of value in so far as it could satisfy human needs, then 
either human needs needed either discursive reinterpretation or else 
actually existing socialism was not relevant to these needs. The Party elite 
was saying that it had no absolute right to govern and that the existing 
structures of socialism have no necessary connection with the basic 
principles of socialism. This indicated that the PZPR recognised that it 
could not claim legitimacy solely from its vanguard role and that other 
political forces and social actors could contest the public sphere.
"No higher force guarantees that the PZPR will retain its leading role in the 
future development of Poland. That depends exclusively on us, on our ability to 
perceive the world and its problems in their entire complexity and also to rid 
ourselves of our narrow mindedness and egoism. "21S
The PZPR was taking a step which had fundamental consequences for 
the further transformation of socio-economic and political relations in 
Poland. As Janowski suggests, "(The PZPR) recognised its self limitation as 
justified and declared its abdication from its monopoly and all embracing influence on 
the State."276 The following fragment from the 10th Plenum Te%a 
represents the clearest indication that the PZPR was prepared to accept 
the need for a round table and that, in order to make this possible, it was 
prepared to relinquish many of its traditional discourses. A stress on the 
notions of a "constructive opposition" and the "constitution," however, are also 
evident:
^^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid.
276janowski, K.B., (Sanford, G., 1992. op cit. p. 166)
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"The Central Committee considers it necessary to define a new formula of 
shaping political pluralism, reflecting differentiation and multiple interests and 
political orientations as well as beliefs of particular social groups and circles, be 
conducive to solving contradictions and disputes with no harm to the supreme 
values of the nation and law within state structures and not against them. The 
Central Committee confirms the readiness of the PZPR to conduct dialogue and 
search for forms of agreement with any constructive politicalforce if  the latter - 
irrespective of political orientation and ideological inspiration - observes the 
country's constitutional order and regards the well being of the nation and State 
as the supreme value...The PZPR Central Committee sees the need and the 
possibility to include a 'constructive opposition' in the political ystem."211
The precondition of political change - that any opposition group had to 
accept the existing constitution (even if the existing constitution did not 
sanction any real form of opposition) - reflects the tautological confusion 
at the heart of the traditional discourse. The collapsing of the orthodox 
dichotomy of capitalism versus socialism, for example, was a central 
feature of this confusion, as the following text from an interview with an 
unidentified Politburo member in January 1989 illustrates:
"Capitalism and socialism shape each other, therefore neither model can reject 
outright elements of the other. Both types of system incorporated universal 
features and solutions and both of them can take positive examples from each 
other. For decades the capitalist countries have been carefully following socialist 
experiments and have accepted some of them. Now it is our turn to learn from
^^Reforma Partia, (1989) op cit.
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the capitalists. The principle is simple: what is good for man is also good for 
socialism - even if  it comesfrom hell."218
This type of pragmatic reasoning was significant in so far as it 
demonstrated the extent to which the PZPR had moved in its 
recognition of the need for non-traditional models to improve socialism. 
Discursive references to socialism were also ceasing elsewhere to be 
contrasted with, or set up in opposition, to capitalism. Socialism was no 
longer posited as a unique, self-contained and inherently superior 
philosophy operating according to a fundamentally different logic, but 
rather as a moral standpoint or counterbalance to capitalism, as an 
option rather than the expression of a 'higher stage of history.'279
"The rules of a market economy and political democray have an older pedigree 
than capitalism and the use of them in this ystem should not limit their 
usefulness in the next one. What is recognisable as 'capitalistic' is simply the 
result of recognising objective laws and principles, which are independent of the 
political system. There is no problem of rivaly or the replacement of the 
socialistic by the capitalistic...Socialism in itself is of no value-it is necessay only 
in so far as it becomes useful for the survival and life satisfaction of wider circles 
than in capitalism. We are overcoming the barbaric, essentially mad way of 
ramming society into discredited political forms and replacing this with a 
civilised, normal, isolated, evolutionay, reformatoy adaptation of the forms of 
social life to new social needs. We are recognising multiple, intermediate forms,
^7^Wspolistnienie (1989) 
^^Wspolistnienie (1989) Ibid.
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between the traditional variables of 'public jprivate,' 'spontaneous/guided' and 
1State/  market. "2m
This type of discursive reasoning represented a definite collapse of the 
traditional focus on the belief that absolute historical analysis is better 
than intermediate or procedural reasoning.281 It is important in terms of 
the evolution both of competing discourses (and practical programmes) 
and factions within the Party but also for the specific development of 
Party-opposition dialogues. The weakening of the ideological 
preoccupation with contradiction was also central to this relaxation of 
discourse. As Staniszkis suggests, the PZPR was coming to terms with 
the fact that "there no longer existed a notion of absolute truth or purity of man, 
action or system, which could be addressed in terms of contradictions which had, 
somehow, to be resolved"2*2
Rakowski's rejection of 'historical rights'2*2 (of the leading party) is vital in 
an understanding of the Party elite's movement away from its own 
community and its search for a common language with which to 
negotiate with Solidarity. Rakowski's speech on 17th January 1989, at the 
closing ceremony of the 10th Plenum illustrates this:
"The Tarty has matured and can now look at reality not in categories of wishful 
thinking or discontent, but on the basis of facts of life...Either socialism will 
understand this, or it willpass into history as an experiment thatfailed,"284
280wsp61istnienie (1989) Ibid.
^ S ta n is z k is ,  J., (1992) op cit. p.136
282staniszkis, J., (1992) Ibid.
283jrybuna Ludu, January 18th 1989 
284staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. p.136
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Rakowski told the second part of the 10th Plenum, furthermore, that 
Solidarity was not the same as it had been in 1980-81 and that it could 
become "a genuine part of Polish socialism."285 However, the discourse of a 
'constructive opposition' was, significandy, tempered by the reality of an 
opposition that continued to seek more concessions from the 
government than the PZPR was prepared to offer. During January, thus, 
the Jaruzelski-Rakowski axis was obliged to clarify the Party's conditions 
for negotiation with Solidarity. Jaruzelski stated, that:
"The one indispensable condition is that Solidarity agrees to accept and respect 
the legal and constitutional order of the socialist State. Within this framework, 
everything else, including the pace and the form of building the relationship 
between the union and authorities, is negotiable."286
In late January Rakowski's invitation to Walesa and various Church 
figures to meet and discuss the forthcoming round table was met with a 
positive response. Rakowski proposed a two-year social-contract 
between the government and Solidarity that could lead to its eventual 
legal recognition (3rd May 1991 was suggested) and stated publicly that he 
was "not theoretically opposed to trade union pluralism,"287 During this period, 
Solidarity would not be allowed to strike and would be co-opted onto an 
undefined State 'consultative body.'
In relation to both the Catholic Church within Poland and the USSR, 
one finds a large degree of ambivalence in Party discourses, however. On 
the one hand the Party remained constructed as a Marxist-Leninist party,
285Radio Free Europe Progress Report, 20th January 1989
286Radio Free Europe Progress Report, January 20th 1989. Ibid.
287y7jg Economist, January 21st 1989
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operating within an international movement centred in Moscow. On the 
other hand the Party wanted to be seen as progressive to the West and as 
a national party to the nation, a nation firmly committed to Catholicism. 
Untying these contradictions lay at the heart of the struggle to define and 
construct new discourses at the turn of 1988-9. Orzechowski talked of 
the:
"...national and workers' character of the PZPR. Socialism in Poland stems 
from deep national traditions. We are not a foreign party. The Party defends the 
interests of the nation, its sovereignty and existing alliances within the 
framework of the Yalta-Potsdam settlements. We feel we are the main heir to 
the Polish nation and State, mthin which there are various strands and 
tendencies-hoth glorious victories and hitter defeats. There are different classes 
and values, political orientations and understandings of the national interest.
We can return to them in order to find the best contemporary solutions."288
In relation to the Church, he stated,
"Since the 9th Congress a great debate has taken place. The majority of society 
are (Catholic) believers and that is an objective fact. There are those within our 
ranks who argue that materialism and atheism are what the Party should seek. 
They argue that any talks with the Church will take away the Marxist 
character of the Party. But our Party doesn't have to be and shouldn't be 
organised in the spirit of atheism. It must be tolerant. The Party is and will 
remain neutral. The Party is secular but not anti-religious. Socialism, as a 
form, is not anti-religion nor anti-religiousness. Its aim is not an atheistic society 
and socialism is not a choice between religion and atheism. The Party does not
^^Ksztaft Polskiego Socjalizmu, (1989) op cit.
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take it upon itself to decide whether God exists or doesn't. The PZPR values 
and understands Christian values in the life of society. There is a connection 
between the universal values of religion and scientific and humanistic values of 
socialism. Countless elements of Marxist learning have adapted to the teachings 
of the Church. Many of its values, especially in the sphere of ethics, philosophy 
and morality are close to ours."289
The discourses of the 10th Plenum clearly signalled the PZPR's 
acceptance of the Church as a valid and valuable social institution. It also 
recognised the need to talk with the Church, both to vindicate its 
discourses of national responsibility and to locate itself closer to Polish 
society. These discourses were underpinned by meetings between 
Church and Party representatives. During early January, Rakowski and 
Church representatives met on various occasions to discuss the round 
table. These meetings were a decisive factor in the PZPR elite's decision 
to continue to stress the reformist line at the second part of the 10th 
Plenum. The Church was promised official legalisation in return for an 
agreement that it would seek to temper any radicalism within the 
Solidarity negotiating team.
^^Reforma partii, (1989) op cit.
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3. Past Vs Present
Interspersing the central ideological alterations in official discourse 
during this period was a continued search for historical legitimation. At 
the 10th Plenum the PZPR Politburo reaffirmed its intention of 
eradicating 'the last remnants of Stalinism' in Polish socialism, signalled its 
desire to see a conclusive end to the work of the Blank-Spots 
Commission, addressed the role played by the PPS in the building of the 
Polish socialist system and openly apologised to the Church for the 
treatment of Cardinal Wyszynski during the 1950’s. As the Party elite 
began to move away from its exclusive narratives in the ideological 
sphere of discourse and began to adopt a more pragmatic stance in 
relation to non-Party actors, it also recognised that any form of 
democratic contestation (however limited) demanded that the Party 
attempt to relocate itself in the popular, national consciousness.
During the 10th Plenum and at the Ideology conference a coded search 
for both a more national discourse (locating the PZPR in relation to 
national traditions) and a more variegated and autonomous socialist 
tradition was evolving. The PZPR elite accelerated, for example, in both 
Nowe Drogi and Trybuna hudu, its re-examination of various 'closed' or 
'blank-spots' in the history of the Second and the First Republics (1944- 
89 and 1919-39 respectively). For example, it began to talk more candidly 
about the role played by the Soviet Union at Katyn, the issue of 
responsibility for other crimes against the Polish nation committed by 
the USSR during WWII and a reappraisal of the brief post-war flirtation 
of the Polish left with ideas of a 'Grand Coalition,' within a mixed and
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plural socialism, between 1944 and 1948.290 The PPS was talked of as a 
"vital' and "significant?291 element of Polish socialism. Polish socialists, 
intellectuals and activists who had been either branded counter 
revolutionary, both within the pre-1938 KPP (Communist Party) or 
ignored and marginalised within the post-1948 political settlement, were 
resurrected as examples of Polish patriotism and socialism. Significantly 
also were the attempts to re-evaluate the more recent political history - 
for example, the issue of responsibility for the March events of 1968, the 
Gdynia massacre of 1970, but not, significantly, responsibility for the 
imposition of Martial law in 1981.
The opening 10th Plenum Te%a openly dealt with the question of 
Stalinism under the heading of 'liquidating the remnants of Stalinism.' This 
discourse of 'Stalinism' had various significant legitimational functions. 
"(Stalinism) was a product of the Soviet Union. (It had) repressive, anti-democratic 
and self-interested features)'292 the Te%a read. Historical references to 
Stalinism and the so-termed fdeformities in socialism' defined the PZPR as a 
national - and therefore non-Soviet - party. It also constructed Polish 
socialism as distinct from and independent of the Soviet Union. The Te%a 
continued:
"1948-56 (was) a time of massive social change - industrialisation and 
urbanisation. But with what costs? After 1956 Boland rejected Stalinism and 
returned to moral social justice. Much, however, remained of the centralised -
^^Nowe Drogi, February 1989. Articles appeared, locating the reforms of the 1980’s in terms of a process of 
de-Stalinisation begun in the 1950’s - Antonszewski, A., (1989); the role of socialist organisations in the 
struggle for independence in 1918, Sobczak, J., (1989). In January’s edition of the same journal, articles about 
the PPS also appeared.
291Sobczak, J., (1989) Ibid.
292Reforma Partii, (1989) op cit.
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bureaucratic State, economy, Party and all of society. This became the source of 
dogmatism and conservatism. In the 1980's odnowa has removed many of these 
remains."m
Again, the PZPR was seeking to distance itself from the Soviet Union 
and locate odnowa both within national and socialist traditions.
"Within the Party, these ideas and concepts (of Stalinism) must be rejected in 
favour of a new Leninist model - the Party as a mass organisation, with 
intellectual leadership. How? - the reintroduction of political leadership, the 
Party as a movement, with independent thinking and activity of members, with 
inner Party demo crag... (to) reawaken intellectual criticism."29*
This element of the historical discourse recognised, implicidy, that odnowa 
had not fully eradicated ‘the last remnants of Stalinism in Poland.' It did not, 
however, elaborate on where these obstacles lay, whether they were 
institutional or cultural (or otherwise) or who the Stalinists were. Under 
the sub-heading "40 years of PZPR,"  the Te^a continued its search for 
historical legitimation:
"The Party was created in an atmosphere of tension and external pressure. A  
strong role was played by the PPS. We call for an open re-evaluation of history 
and appeal to Party historians and to the Academy of Social Science."295
This reference to the PPS was, within the context of wider ideological 
debates within the PZPR and within non-Party socialist groups in
^■^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid.
^^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid.
^^Reforma Partii (1989) Ibid.
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society, an attempt to appeal to a milder socialist tradition. The PPS 
signified both the PZPR's pre-Stalinist traditions, its strong national and 
democratic roots in the workers’ movement and thus its mass popular 
appeal.
Changes in the Party’s historical discourses are explicable in terms of two 
central factors. One, the internal power struggle within the PZPR, in 
particular the reformist wing's search for labels to define itself and 
consolidate its position within the elite and its influence over the 
conservative wings of the Party. Two, the Party's search for discourses 
with which to appeal to a wider national audience. The PZPR Politburo 
clearly sought to relocate the Party within a notion of Polish history that 
reflected, or was seen to reflect, the collective experience and discourses 
of the Polish people. It linked ideological and historical discourses by 
offering a rationale and alibi for the so-called 'deformities’ of real 
socialism' (i.e. problems 1within' socialism not problems 'of socialism) by 
equating contemporary systemic problems with external factors. This was 
closer to the Populist discourse than the Globalist. By shedding 
responsibility for Katyn, the Party would be seen, during the 
forthcoming period of negotiation, as a truly national and authentically 
Polish entity.
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4. E ast Vs West
In attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to speed up its political 
evaluation of the 'blank spots' investigation during January 1989, the 
PZPR was seeking, if covertly, a signal from Moscow that its domestic 
reform process fell within the political limits prescribed by Moscow. The 
PZPR clearly wanted a Soviet admission of culpability for Katyn, for 
example, in order to distance itself from the image commonly held in 
Polish society of the Soviet Union - and, in particular, from the Stalinist 
model - while at the same time, locating itself in the vanguard of the 
Perestroika reforms taking place in the Soviet Union.
"There is an inevitability of reform...a re-evaluation of the role of the Party in 
the State is a precondition of change in socialism and must be co-ordinated with 
the rhythm of changes in the USSR. Historical challenges confront socialism. 
The Party does not exist just for itself. It wants and needs it be a vanguard 
party, but this vanguard status cannot be achieved without fundamental 
changes."2%
The Soviets, however, although in close contact - via Czyrek - with the 
PZPR Politburo, failed to offer any clear signal that responsibility for 
Katyn would be offered during this period. This apparent discrepancy, 
however, between Soviet and Polish discourses can also be seen as one 
of the PZPR's key bargaining chips in the forthcoming negotiations with 
Solidarity. As Osiatynski suggests,297 the use of the Soviet threat during 
the negotiations, in particular at the round table, provided the PZPR 
leadership with an opportunity to exploit the real fear in Moscow that
296Try buna Ludu, 17th - 18th December 1988 
2970siatnski, P., (Elster, J., 1996 op cit. p.71)
163
any Solidarity-inspired domestic political changes unsanctioned by the 
USSR leadership could aggravate an international conflict. Sources 
related to this period in Soviet-Polish relations are confused on the 
question of whether this silence on the part of the Soviet elite was a 
deliberate political ploy or simply a product of domestic Soviet factors, 
however.
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5. Conclusions
The 10th Plenum period represents the key turning point in the process 
of changing PZPR discourses in the period before the round table talks. 
More obviously Public-type discourses in relation to and about the 
Church, the political and trade union opposition, the Soviet Union and 
various historical references were planted close to the centre of the 
Party’s public and official discourses.
The PZPR openly located aspects of other - traditionally competing - 
ideologies and discourses at the heart of its legitimational discourse. It 
borrowed, for example, from both overtly ideological {social democratic, neo­
liberal) and 'sub-ideologicaiv narratives {economic reform, negotiations) and pieced 
into these aspects of a national discourse {democratic heritage, cultural 
continuity). The distinction between 4Public’ and ‘Private,’ between 
ideological and non-ideological discourses was thus becoming 
increasingly blurred.
The Party elite's political pragmatism is central to the partial 
relinquishment of ideological discourse. The new discourse made a direct 
connection between the needs of the economy and the decreased 
intervention of the State in economic matters and of the Party within the 
State at all levels. This is significant for two reasons. One, it represented a 
fundamental shift in the legitimational basis of the Communist State, 
away from a traditional emphasis on the unity of Party and State and the 
traditional notion that the interests of the Party and the working class 
were, if not identical, then either should or did coincide to a considerable 
degree. Two, it opened up various political possibilities both within the
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PZPR and between it and the Solidarity elites and its wider movement. 
That this happened at this point rather than during or after the 
subsequent round table negotiations, meant that the leading group within 
the PZPR was able to contain, to a greater extent than might have been 
possible otherwise, the strands of internal factionalism within the Party 
and movement.
The PZPR's pragmatic centre, at this stage, however, remained confident 
of controlling the outcome of the round table talks and it couched all its 
ideological discourses in terms of odnowa. Without concrete forms of 
application, odnowa would, it was hoped, retain both the central political 
role of the PZPR (in the form of the leading role principle) and, at the 
same time, provide a legitimate mechanism for integrating an opposition 
into the decision making process. Odnowa sits at the core of the 
problematic. It both prescribed medicines for the cure, but at the same 
time was, itself, the disease - as a product of one party rule - although its 
overt prescriptions were insufficiently authoritarian to achieve its aims 
without some form of genuine democratisation. The core of the 
legitimating discourse thus continued to centre on the notion that the 
PZPR - in a different organisational form and in a redefined relationship 
with society and State - would and should retain its avant-garde position 
in Poland's public and political life. The language used, however, made it 
less than clear what this actually meant in practise. Within the 'symbolic' 
realm of discourse the constituent elements of a post-Communist 
discourse were bred, although at this time, they were legitimating 
discourses that were shaped by a correlation of historical and structural 
socio-political and socio-economic forces that the PZPR no longer either 
fully controlled or understood.
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Chapter 5 
The End of History 
February-August 1989
i.  Introduction
If the 10th Plenum Central Committee Te%a had located PZPR discourse 
within a wider, more 'Public''-oriented interpretation of odnowa, the period 
February-August 1989 illustrated the political limits to its 
operationalisation. The transformation of the political system (an 
independent Sejm, end of the leading role principle) initiating after April 
by the round table accords, pushed the Party elite into re-evaluating the 
sincerity of its commitments to 'socialist constitutionalism.’ However, many 
within the pragmatic centre treated the round table as an unavoidable 
political necessity that would buy industrial peace, time and renew the 
Party by opening it up to a (limited) form of public contestation, while, at 
the same time, open up divisions within Solidarity. It was not therefore 
seen as a mechanism for altering the basic value of its leading role, which, 
in modified form, would continue to define the essential terms of 
political decision-making. PZPR elite intentions and strategy represented 
a last attempt, as Kaminski argues, to ''constitutional communism.'298 That 
is, retain the core of the leading role of the party principle, while altering 
various decision-making and administrative structures within the State.
^^Kaminski, B., (1991) op cit. p.248
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The agreements signed between representatives of the government, 
OPZZ, an opposition centred around Solidarity’s newly formed Citizen’s 
Committees (OKs) and representatives of the Catholic Church on 5th 
April 1989 - in particular the agreements reached on the political sub­
table concerning constitutional reform, changes in the legislature and 
electoral rules - in their political effects, however, undermined the odnowa 
principle that the PZPR would be able to retain its leading role while 
simultaneously widening the terms of political contestation and decision 
making within the State. The agreement led to semi-open elections that 
undermined the political position of the PZPR within the legislative 
branch of the State and led to a political and constitutional crisis of the 
one party system. By the time it became clear that the PZPR would not 
be in a position to implement its version of civic-democratic socialism 
'from above' or 'from within' (the State) after June, however, it was too 
late to return to the pre-lO^ Plenum discourses of legitimation. The 
PZPR was losing political support from all sides: the OPZZ, SD and 
ZSL were shifting their allegiances away from the PZPR, local Party 
units, in many areas, had failed to support PZPR candidates at the 
elections in June and the option of force had all but disappeared. In 
short, the PZPR was obliged to honour many of the largely unintended 
outcomes of its new discourses.
The key to the pattern of discourse change lies in two interrelated 
factors. One, in the vagueness of the discursive notion of 'socialist 
constitutionalism.' Two, in the PZPR elite's political weaknesses leading up 
to and at the round table itself, in particular its inability to determine the 
composition of the Solidarity-Opposition team or keep the OPZZ out of
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the talks. Its pragmatism and diluted ideological discourses actually made 
it more difficult to exert direct political pressure in the traditional way.
The PZPR, thus, moved from a position of articulating various, 
apparently secondary or sub-discourses which the pragmatic centre of 
the elite saw as peripheral to the key discourses of ideological continuity 
(within odnowa) and the retention of political control (within existing, but 
altered, political structures), to relying on these discourses for its political 
survival. The discourses, unhinged from their political sources within the 
pragmatic centre, acquired a definite political role within the process of 
changing PZPR legitimation. They anchored the PZPR to the 
constitutional process of system reform and to the dismantling of State 
Socialism in Poland, both of which obliged the PZPR to re-evaluate its 
discourses of political legitimation.
The PZPR continued, however, to seek to locate itself during this period 
within two broad traditions. The first was of, rather than despite of the 
Polish nation - the PZPR as a genuinely national entity, grounded in 
Polish traditions and driven by the national interest. This was illustrated 
in discursive reconstructions of various national signifiers, including 
historical figures and traditions, support for an accommodation with the 
Catholic Church and locating itself on the side of 'victims' rather than 
'perpetrators' of Stalinism. The second was that of Polish traditions of 
democracy and constitutionalism, the elements of which mirrored many 
elements of the official discourses of the Party.
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2. Public Vs Private
During March and April 1989, the Party elite declared, at times quite 
unambiguously, its intention to control and regulate the round table talks. 
Orzechowski, for example, although associated with the Globalist project 
at the 10th Plenum, made repeated references to the PZPR's ability to 
cancel or abandon the talks at will.299 A clear example of the traditional 
type of discourse is found in a March speech made by Rakowski on 
nationwide television:
" We decided, here in government, that after the round table is over, we will 
make a list of all the proposals, demands and needs that were put forward. 
Then we will make an economic calculation and will say what can be realised 
and what is, in fact, merely wishful thinking. We have to stick to reality, or, in 
Poland, we will achieve nothing"™
Rakowski also sought to locate the Party on the side of those who had 
had enough already of what he referred to as "the constant talking and 
who, in his words, wanted "bread on the table. "30t The assumption was still, 
therefore, that the Party knew better than anyone else what 'the people' 
wanted and was able to stand above the process of debate, discussion 
and contestation at the round table (an assumption that evoked the spirit 
of the Party's belief in its leading role). Repeatedly during the period of 
the talks, Rakowski sought to undercut their significance in the reform 
process, both by attempting to make deals with the (supposedly) more 
pragmatic or opportunist groups within the Solidarity camp and by
299Pravda, January 21st "We have the power, always have had and will continue to use it in a way we see 
fit," Orzechowski reported as saying.
300Trybuna Ludu 28th February 1989
301 jrybuna Ludu, 28th February 1989. Ibid.
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sending sensitive economic reform legislation to the Sejm at the end of 
March (a week before the final agreements were signed) without the 
consent of Solidarity. Ciosek's response to Russian journalists who asked 
what the round table meant for the PZPR at a foreign press conference the 
day after the agreements had been signed, is also illustrative of the Party 
elite's concerns, particularly for an 'Eastern' (read Soviet) audience. He 
said:
"The round table is the Party's attempt to build lines of defence. The President 
and, i f  need be, the armed forces, would keep things under control and the 
Party's majority in the Sejm would ensure its ability to block any changes in the 
constitution."302
The pragmatic centre of the PZPR, around Rakowski, was seeking to use 
the round table as a method of undermining the unity of Solidarity, seeking 
to 'divide and rule.' Political compromise, Ciosek suggested,303 would 
undermine the moral certainty of Solidarity, oblige it to make real, as 
opposed to 'symbolic,' choices and open up practical issues for groups 
within it. "What," for example, Rakowski asked rhetorically, (of 
Solidarity), "is your economic programme?."304 At the opening round table 
talks, Ciosek asked Geremek, "what is your relationship to Socialism?"305
The Party clearly continued to seek to bind Solidarity to making explicit 
its acceptance of the terms defined by its definition of socialist 
democracy. This can be seen as an attempt to contain the negotiations
302Pravda, April 6th 1989 
3®3Trybuna Ludu, February 16th 1989
3®^Trybuna Ludu, February 16th 1989. Ibid.
305Trybuna Ludu, February 8th, 1989
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within limits acceptable to both the wider PZPR community and an 
international audience - most importandy the USSR. Solidarity's 
negotiators, most specifically, Geremek, however, refused to be 
pressured to support, unequivocally, the existing socialist constitution. 
Geremek, for example, in response to Ciosek's question would not 
equate socialism with 'actually existing socialism': "which socialism do we 
accept? State owning socialism we do not accept and will not understand. To social 
ownership we do say 'yes'."306 The Party-government's round table negotiators 
could not readily summon a response without reverting to the ideological 
language that had been heavily diluted and at the talks themselves 
references of this type were conspicuous by their absence.
Even before the talks began, the pragmatic centre was attempting to 
determine both the composition and, thus it was hoped, indirectly, the 
outcomes, of the talks. However, having failed to control the Solidarity 
team's composition (to 'constructive guests') and also, in many ways, its 
failure to control the participation of other groups at the talks (in 
particular the OPZZ307), the pragmatic centre sought various ways to 
underplay the significance of the talks and to construct them discursively 
within the traditional interpretation of odnowa. The Party elite, via covert 
contacts with it's own negotiating teams, stressed the need to contain the 
talks to areas that would not threaten the status quo within the State,308 
but its public discourses remained vague and open to multiple 
interpretation. This confusion can be seen partly as a product of the
306Trybuna Ludu, February 8th 1989. Ibid.
307The OPZZ found a place at the round table against the wishes of either Rakowski or Jaruzelski. See 
Osiatynski, in Elster, J., (1996), pp.77-78
-^Osiatynski, P., (Elster, J., 1996 op cit., pp.78-80). Osiatynski talks of the ways in which the PZPR 
government sought to relay vital information to its representatives in the negotiations, not always with great 
success.
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PZPR's attempt to assuage Soviet fears that negotiation with Solidarity 
would not inevitably mean loss of Communist power in Poland and 
pardy a product of its need to reassure the more hard-line members of 
the Party-government 'community' that changes in the organisation of 
socialism did not mean a loss of prerogatives, either at the local or 
national levels.
However, the round table talks are central to the dynamics of changing 
PZPR discourses. They ushered in radical changes in the political system 
which, in turn, created divisions within the PZPR community, isolating 
the pragmatic centre (which was hung between the two wings of reform 
and reaction within the Party) and obliged it to honour its overt 
discourses of constitutionalism. The discourse of 'socialist constitutionalism,' 
which acted as the cornerstone of the Party's post-10th Plenum 
legitimational discourse, played an unavoidable and prominent role in the 
Party's round table discourses. Almost all references at both the opening 
and closing addresses were defined by the Party's explicit desire to 
operate within a democratic - and hence legitimate - constitutional 
system, although one still within 'socialism.' This is illustrated in the 
opening round table speech of Kiszczak on 6th February 1989:
"The methods of government must be relevant to the requirements of socialism 
nnth an explicitly democratic and humanistic face. Political relations in Poland 
ought fully to reflect the differentiation of opinions and convictions, as well as 
create the conditions for their legal articulation. Such far-reaching changes 
require us to overcome conservative constraints. Odnowa demands social calm, 
consideration and responsibility and the shaping of polity through dialogue. We
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must accept responsibility for; and the philosophy of, gradualness. We must not 
negate the historical attainments of socialist Poland. 11309
1 Socialist constitutionalism1 was also slipped into most of the Party's Plenary 
discourses during and after the round table. It provided the Party's round 
table representatives with very litde practical guidance within the 
negotiating environment of the talks themselves, however. In fact, it 
reduced the PZPR-government's option of threatening to derail the talks.
After almost nine weeks of negotiations between teams of government 
and opposition representatives in Warsaw, a formal round table agreement 
was signed on April 5th 1989.310 The agreement laid down the terms and 
the timetable of reforms in all significant political, economic and social 
spheres. It made provisions for to the creation of an openly elected 
upper house of parliament (Senate) with powers of legislative initiation 
and veto (something that both Jaruzelski and Rakowski had been loath to 
concede since it would have had the potential to curtail the unbridled 
executive powers of the Sejm, within which the PZPR was to retain an 
automatic majority), the creation of the institution of President (to 
replace the Council of State), a semi-openly elected Sejm and set an 
election timetable and electoral guidelines. The questions of the role and 
powers of the Senate and Presidency were the subject of fierce 
bargaining between the government and Solidarity sides.311 How they 
were resolved had significant consequences both for the subsequent
^O^Smolenski, P., (1989) op cit. p. 12 
3 ^ Kowalski, L., (1993); Porozumienia okrqglego stolu (1989)
3^Osiatynski, P. (Elster, J., 1996. op cit. p.82) For a fuller exploration o f the political bargaining, in 
particular concerning the relative powers for the Senate and Presidency.
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transformation of the political system as well as for the process of PZPR 
legitimation after the June elections.
The possibility of a freely elected Senate arose during late March in 
discussion between Geremek and Kwasniewski at the political sub­
table.312 Kwasniewski (without the explicit sanction of the Politburo313) 
agreed to a freely elected Senate in return for Solidarity’s support in the 
creation of an office of President. The Presidential office was to be non- 
party based, although, as agreed, would be occupied by the PZPR First 
Secretary, General Jaruzelski. The office was empowered to override any 
legislative initiatives and executive decisions taken in either house of 
parliament. The creation of a strong office of President (though elected 
by both houses of parliament) was designed to legitimate the reform 
process in the eyes of the Soviet Union. The Sejm was to have wider 
representation. All of these agreements, however, undermined the 
strategy of the pragmatic centre, which was to limit the talks to trade 
union matters, break up the fragile worker-intellectual alliance within 
Solidarity and retain the structurally dominant role of the PZPR within 
the political system.
The PZPR’s discourses after the 10th Plenum had been of constitutional 
reform (widening the State, reforming the Party, creating a civil - if still 
’socialist' - society) - which meant that it had no effective public 
discourse with which to argue against the agreements. The idea of a 
'national lisfiu of 35 senior (mainly Politburo) PZPR (as well as other,
• ^ D u b i n s k i ,  £  # (1990) op cit pp. 127-140
3 ^ Osiatynski, P., (Elster, J., 1996. op cit, p.84)
314Lewis, P., (1990)
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non-PZPR, for example SD and ZSL) candidates, who would stand 
uncontested at the June elections, also appeared both to fit into a 
democratic discourse and meet the pragmatic centre's aim of relocating 
itself at the apex of the parliamentary system, thus retaining its leading 
role but within the State, rather than above it.
The apparently fragile coalition of forces within Solidarity, however, did 
not crumble during the round table. The negotiating teams, in fact, 
consolidated their contacts with the wider organisation, thus retaining a 
strong bargaining position in relation to the government side at the talks. 
Solidarity's negotiating teams, grouped around Geremek (Solidarity- 
Opposition leader on the political sub-table), for example, kept in close 
contact with Walesa and Pietrzyk of the trade union wing, both of whom 
retained day-to-day contact with the wider trade union movement. This 
can be seen as one of several factors that pushed the PZPR-government 
side into conceding greater constitutional reforms than the pragmatic 
centre had wanted. Rakowski's aim of opening up existing divisions 
within the Solidarity bloc, most specifically between trade unionists and 
KOR based intellectual 'advisors' explains the apparent ease with which 
this legalisation was agreed. The Solidarity camp was far better mobilised 
and more unified than Rakowski expected315 and the Catholic Church's 
role in underpinning this unity was also either ignored or simply 
misunderstood, by Rakowski.
The role of the Church, in retaining unity within the opposition and 
undermining the political strategy of the PZPR's pragmatic centre during 
the round table was important for several reasons. The Church appeared to
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provide a form of indirect social legitimation for a reform process the 
PZPR believed it could control, without the apparent need to offer real 
concessions to Solidarity or institutionalise the democratisation process. 
Before, during and immediately after the round table, the PZPR's 
discourses referring to the Catholic Church in Poland and Catholicism in 
general reflected the Party’s political strategy of attempting to offer 
largely symbolic political reform in exchange for an industrial deal with 
Solidarity.
The Party's traditionally observed ideological antipathies concerning its 
post-war relationship with the Polish Catholic Church had been reduced 
at the 10th Plenum (see chapter 4). During and after the round table any 
openly negative formal Party discourses in relation to the Church lapsed 
into obscurity.316 The Rakowski pragmatic centre discursively recognised 
the Church's important role in Polish national culture and began to 
formalise a relationship of semi-formalised and open political exchange 
based on what one can surmise it believed to be based on mutual 
interests. It also continued, after the round table and the Party's failures at 
the June elections, to seek reassurances from Church figures that any 
attempts to break up the deals agreed at the talks would not be 
sanctioned by the Church. However the Church's representatives at the 
round table (Orszulik and D^browski) played a definite role in supporting 
and legitimating the tough stance taken by Geremek at the political sub­
table and at various sub-meetings held at Wilanow and elsewhere. The
315Rakowski, M.R., (1992) op cit. pp.171-172
31^Tanalski, T., (1989) pp.84-93. In the Party’s main theoretical journal, Nowe Drogi, during February-April, 
a series of articles appeared, in which the traditional antipathies of Marxism and Religion (specifically 
Catholicism) were explicitly dealt. Tanalski talked of a series of overlapping values between Socialism and 
Catholicism and of the need for both parties to work together for the "National good."
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Church, in fact sided, in many areas, with the Solidarity teams.317 The 
Party's search for a compromise with society that would allow it retain its 
prerogatives was premised on the view that the Church, as symbol of an 
autonomous society, would have to be ostentatiously respected. It was 
hoped that the Church could be tempted by the prospect of greater 
autonomy within a revised, but still 'socialist' system of government not 
to play too strong a role in organising and supporting the opposition. 
Again this premise was based either on faulty analysis or wishful 
thinking.
Between the formal meeting of Rakowski and the Papal Nuncio, 
Archbishop Colasunno, on January 3rd and mid-April, the Party and 
Church hierarchies engaged in a series of meetings laying the groundrules 
for a formal re-legalisation of the Church in Poland and a formal 
agreement between Church and State.318 These international talks 
coincided with and were clearly part of the discussions taking place 
between PZPR and Church officials within Poland during the period. On 
March 2nd, the two Church representatives who had sat in on the 
Magdalenka talks, bishops Goclowski and Orszulik and Czyrek, the 
Politburo representative responsible for Church-State relations, issued a 
progress report in which the question of a new State-Church relationship 
was outlined.319 This followed a meeting between Ciosek and other 
members of the Church-State Advisory Council (which had been set up
317Gebert, K., (1989) op cit. pp.45-49. Gebert talks of the Church playing a very clever mediating role that, 
almost imperceptible "moved the talks into a new phase."
3 ^ Rakowski, M. R., (1992) op cit. Rakowski notes two important meetings between high party officials and
Church officials during January 1989. On 4th January Rakowski, Ciosek and Cypriniak met with Macharski,
Stroba and Orszulik to discuss the church’s role in the round table (which at this time was not certain to take
place at all) and on 23rd January when a Joint Party-Church commission was set up to oversee changes in
Church state relations.
• ^ D u b i n s k i ,  k., (1990) op cit. pp.59-78
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in January), at which the former spoke of ’progress’ being made. On the 
basis of the report and various smaller meetings, a draft law on Church- 
State relations was agreed. On 15th April, Czyrek met with the Pope in 
the Vatican and two days later the Roman Catholic Church in Poland 
was accorded a legal status unparalleled in the history of Easter 
European Communism. A new legal framework for Church-State 
relations, which guaranteed freedom of conscience and religious belief 
(for example, the right to run Catholic schools and social welfare 
organisations, to regain property confiscated in the 1950’s and run its 
own press), was established. Rakowski also spoke of the Party's use of 
repressive measures against the Church, "most heineously" in 1953, with the 
arrest of Cardinal Wyszynski. He also referred to the new Polish-Vatican 
relations as "a step in the right directionwithout fully articulating in which 
direction.320 On July 17th, the Vatican announced the reopening of 
diplomatic relations with Poland.
The Church's role in the changing discourse of the PZPR was clearly to 
underpin the more reformist and conciliatory elements within the PZPR 
by offering (within its own discourses and contacts with society) support 
and justification for the round table, for national agreement and for 
evolutionary political changes. The Party's need for a mechanism for 
appealing to society for social calm and with which to legitimate its own 
reformism was, in large measure thus met, although at a price higher than 
the Party would have liked. The failure of the elite to control or 
effectively regulate the outcomes of the talks can be explained largely by 
its failure to recognise that the Church would not be prepared to trade its
320Trybuna Ludu, May 19th, 1989
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own formal legalisation in return for support for a limited political deal 
between State and Solidarity.
At the round table talks themselves the specific dynamics of negotiation 
also played a significant role in the wider process of democratisation, 
contrary to what many have suggested, including Staniszkis, that they 
were merely symbolic events 'for the cameras,' the real political deals 
having been drawn up elsewhere.321 The two main sub-tables (political 
reform and trade union reform) were linked, for example, via often 
concealed and unreported contacts between smaller sub-tables and key 
individuals and groups outside of the talks themselves. On the Party- 
government side, the Reykowski (political reform team) held frequent 
meetings and discussions with key figures within the Party hierarchy 
during breaks in negotiation. Between the Party and Solidarity elites 
(those not represented at the talks themselves) those contacts that had 
been built up during 1988, between reformist groups within the Party 
and moderates within the Solidarity group, continued during and after 
the round table talks themselves, at Magdalenka.322
Another of the keys to the PZPR's failures at the round table talks lies in 
its failure, by the time of the inaugural session, to determine the 
composition of the Solidarity-opposition team. The refusal of Solidarity 
in late 1988 and early 1989 to agree to talks with the PZPR without the 
right to select its own participants was crucial. Kiszczak was thus unable, 
without moving the Party back into the traditional form of legitimation 
(pre-lO* Plenum), to select what had been constructed in PZPR
321 Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. p.90
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discourse from mid-1988 as "constructive oppositionists." The Solidarity- 
Opposition side therefore included those figures who had been 
ostentatiously excluded from the primary series of talks in 1988, most 
notably, Michnik and Kuron. Internal resistance within the PZPR after 
the 10th Plenum, furthermore, obliged Rakowski and General Jaruzelski 
to sanction, against their better instincts,323 the inclusion of those who 
remained in the words of Kiszczak, "bete noires" for the majority of the 
PZPR apparatus.324
Solidarity's round table composition is vital to an understanding of the 
dynamics of the talks themselves and also to the changing discourse of 
the PZPR. It can be assumed that, had the Party been able to control the 
composition of the opposition side (i.e. exclude Michnik, Geremek and 
Kuron), the Polish transition, and the role of the PZPR within it, would 
have turned out very differendy. Rakowski, for example, clearly believed 
that the Party could manage a limited reorganisation of the existing trade 
union laws (to allow Solidarity to operate as a trade union) which would 
ease social pressure on the economic reform process but he was not 
prepared to make concessions in the sphere of political reforms. Both 
Geremek and other leading ex-KOR figures, however, having found 
their place at the table, linked trade union matters with political and 
constitutional affairs.325 This is most clearly illustrated at the sub-table on 
political reform (headed by Professors Geremek and Reykowski, 
Solidarity and PZPR respectively). The PZPR was thus faced with a
■^Gebert, k ., (1989) op cit. pp.41-49
323perzkowski, S., (1992) op cit. p. 123. Politburo meeting of 27th January 1989 at which Rakowski spoke of 
the need to limit concessions.
•^B eres, W. and Skoczyla, J.,(1991), p.59
^^Osiatynski, P., (Elster, J., 1996, op cit.) and Gebert, K., (1989) op cit. pp.102-111
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situation in which it was obliged, by the logic of its own discourse, to 
support a deal that undermined its own position within the existing 
structures of power. Furthermore, the Party-government round table team 
was made up of reformers, many of whom, like Orzechowski and 
Kwasniewski, had not been associated with martial law or the PZPR's 
failures during the 1980's. Many, therefore, did not share the strategic 
aims of the Rakowski 'pragmatic centre' and could not be treated simply 
as an extension of the traditional elite.
In part, the pragmatic centre's strategy of seeking to open up divisions 
within Solidarity had some success, however. Splits did emerge within 
Solidarity. Within the context of continued industrial unrest (in many 
areas under the leadership of a younger generation of workers with little 
or no experience of the Solidarity of 1980) and the general sense of a 
'sell-out'326 by key groups on the margins of the Solidarity movement, 
these strains began to push the more secular and intellectual, Warsaw 
based groups further towards making deals and contacts with the reform 
minded groups within the PZPR. A key public split between the 
Geremek and Kaczynski groups in June, for example, illustrated one 
definite line of internal Solidarity discord. Both Elster327 and Kurski328 
also point to strains developing during the election campaign. The 
Kaczynski twins, two key Solidarity trade union representatives from 
Gdansk, became increasingly concerned, for example, about the over­
friendliness of the two post -round table elites, suggesting that Solidarity's
•^Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. p.143. The new generation of striking workers in 1988-9, had no historical 
terms of reference in which to locate their experience and many rejected the conciliatory gestures of the older 
elite groups, out of hand.
327Elster, J., (1996)
328Kurski, J., (1993)
Warsaw intellectuals were afraid of losing out to the Gdansk trade union 
wing if elections were fully open. KOR figures such as Kuron, on the 
other hand, were critical of the role played by the Church in the election 
campaign.
The PZPR's pragmatic centre, despite this partial success, remained hung 
somewhere between its negotiating team at the talks themselves and 
those within its wider, auxiliary community, many of whom were still 
resistant to the talks at all. This internal tension and the political 
cleavages it fostered, came to a head at the end of March, as decisions 
regarding political reform moved to centre stage at the round table. The 
notion that the Party could continue to separate economic/trade union 
matters from political matters had become increasingly tenuous. 
Geremek had agreed to support the Party's terms for industrial peace (a 
strike-free period and recognition of the need for social calm) on the 
Party's acceptance of a much wider set of constitutional changes than the 
Party elite wanted to give.329 This was related to the relative percentage of 
Party and coalition allocated seats at the June elections, the role and 
powers of the Senate and of the Presidency.
These political decisions at the round table coincided with the PZPR's 11th 
Central Committee Plenum, which took place on 31st March amid great 
uncertainty within the Party. Its opening Te%a and the surrounding 
plenary debates within the Central Committee illustrated the continued 
struggle that was taking place within the wider Party community 
concerning the round table. Followed the opening Politburo addresses,
■ ^ R a k o w s k i ,  m .R., (1992) op cit. pp. 189-90
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opposition to any form of political concession to Solidarity was widely 
articulated, most notably, as before, by the OPZZ's Miodowicz. He told 
Trybuna Ljidu during the Plenum:
"We see this (the round table) as a tactical error. It will have profound effects on the
status of the Polish working class.1,330
During late March, furthermore, tough negotiations at the political sub­
table of the round table concerning the precise details of the semi-free 
elections were being brokered between Kwasniewski and Reykowski on 
the PZPR-government side and Geremek and Walesa on the Solidarity- 
opposition side. Widening the legislature aroused very little support 
within the Central Committee, although it voted, by a large majority, to 
endorse the Politburo's resolutions. The Plenum's resolutions, however, 
in particular its references to socialism continued to be both vague and 
open-ended, referring to "commitments to constitutionalism that must be 
continued}' and "the need for patience and forward thinking in the road to 
socialism."331 The Party's Globalist reform wing, heavily represented at the 
round table, was clearly not prepared, in the heat of open negotiation, to 
commit itself openly to any overtly ideological discourses. This might 
have had the effect of furthering existing divisions within the Party 
community as well as pushing the various groups within Solidarity closer 
together. Both of these possible outcomes also appeared contradictory to 
the tactical aims of the pragmatic centre. The Politburo's final resolution 
at the 12th Plenum, which took place on 15th April, almost two weeks 
after the signing of the agreements at the round table, further illustrates 
this.
330Trybuna Ludu, April 3rd 1989
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"The Party is the initiator and promoter of reform, the spokesman of national 
understanding and at same time, guarantor of the socialist order and internal 
and external stability of the Polish State and nation." 332
The 12th Plenum represented a public ratification of the Politburo's 
commitment to a continuation the 10th Plenum resolutions, within 
odnowa. The centrality of economic discourses at the Plenum also served 
to underline the increasing absence of ideological discourses. The 12th 
Plenum Te%a, for example, promised a continuation of economic reforms 
(the 'second stage*) line adopted by Central Committee at the 10th 
Congress of 1986. Concerning elections, however, the final resolution 
stated:
"(We seek) a speeding up of the transformation of the fatherland en route to 
socialist parliamentary democray and citizenship. We envisage a continuation of 
the line adopted between the 10th Congress and 10th Plenumeconomic reform; 
national understanding reform and rebuilding of the State. The Part)/ m il co­
operate with any force that is constructive and supports the dialogue opened at 
the round table."333
During April and May, in the build up to the elections in June, divisions 
within the PZPR wider community became increasingly apparent. In the 
opening section of the Party's election manifesto, the Politburo outlined 
the need to retain the political unity of the auxiliary community.
331perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. pp.317-319 
332perzkowski, S., (1994). Ibid
^Perzkowski, S., (1994) Ibid p.312: Politburo approved Kiszczak's "Projekcie Wyst^pienie Gen. Kiszczaka 
na posiedzeniu koncowym 'Okr^glego Stolu’ w dniu 5 kwietnia 1989r" (General Kiszczak’s project outlined 
at the end of the round table, 5th April, 1989).
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"Who are we? Each group (co-operation between the PZPR, ZSL, SD and lay 
Catholic and Christian movements, PAX, UChS, PZKS) has its own identity 
and sovereignty. Our opinions differ on many ideological, political and economic 
matters. We are not trying to blur these differences, which are found in 
individual declarations and election platforms. Rut we want to stand together.
We initiated the process, we have exceptional candidates and clean hands."334
The Party was clearly recognising that there did exist differences between 
itself and its traditional coalition parties - something that had become 
increasingly apparent from the 10th Plenum onwards and acquired critical 
political importance during and after the round table. The discourse did 
not, however, fully outline what precise shared interests, aims or values 
linked the parties, other than the explicit support for the constitution and 
for odnowa. "Who are we?" recognised that the coalition was not 
unanimous in its support for the new line adopted at the 10th Plenum and 
codified at the round table. In fact, the discourses of socialist pluralism and 
the centrality of the democratic Sejm within this discourse actually made 
it less clear who V  were and who "they" were. This was further 
compounded by the new political position of the ZSL and SD. Their 
potential political influence and bargaining position within the new Sejm 
were enhanced by the decision agreed at the round table to increase the 
majority needed in the new Sejm to overrule Senate decisions from 60% 
(3/5, as Reykowski had sought) to 66% (2/3, as Geremek had sought).335 
This 6% meant that the PZPR, in order to veto Senate legislation or 
overrule a Senate veto on Sejm legislation, would be obliged (assuming
334Perzkowski, S., (1994). Ibid.
333Dubinski, K., (1989) op cit. p.71
186
that the Party obtained the minimum number of seats in the new Sejm) 
to seek support from the ZSL and SD. These parties would, in effect, 
hold the balance of power. Given the PZPR's desire to retain a united 
'Popular Front', its parliamentary room for manoeuvre was therefore 
limited. The second part of the manifesto referred to the role of doctrine 
in the Party's operative political strategy.
"The world is not waiting. Transformations of old dogmas are necessary, while 
protecting the authentic achievements of the PRL."336
These authentic achievements were not specified; socialism once more 
left open to a wide range of alternative positions. Each position thus 
could be held, without negative sanctions, by any of the Party's erstwhile 
'allies.' Within the prevailing discourse of "removing the remnants of Stalinism 
in Poland," socialism was defined by what it was not: not Soviet, not 
Russian, not bureaucratic and not anti-democratic. It did not define what 
it was, other than in allusions to weakly defined goals and the notion of a 
"Polish road to Socialism." At the same time, however, the discourse 
stressed the 'equality' of Polish-Soviet relations:
"For many centuries Poland was crushed between hostile powers. Today it 
breathes the air of full national security. Even if  the past has not always been 
without blemish, our relations with the CPSU and USSR are authentically on 
equal terms. We are moving towards an honest assessment of the past and a 
clear vision of the future."
The third section of the discourse located the notions of 'responsibility,' 
'legality' and 'national interest' at the heart of the Party's value system:
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"We defend law and common sense. We believe that wise, coherent and carefully 
observed law is the source of the State's power. We want to take part in the 
passing of laws in co-operation with people who respect the same principles i.e., 
anyone guided by the supreme interest of Poland. Our foreign polity guarantees 
this. Pdvalry and political struggle are normal things but should not be 
conducted without tolerance and respectfor democracy."337
Again, this declaration is vague and open to multiple interpretation. 
Clearly the Party elite was caught somewhere between its traditional and 
revised discourses. References to ’foreign policy' by this stage clearly did 
not contain the same degree of implicit threat (of Soviet intervention) as 
they had in 1988, before the 10th Plenum. The fourth section stressed the 
Party’s commitment to democracy with parliament at the core:
"We are determined to continue these changes in concordance with the wishes of 
the majority of society. We have enrolled as candidates people of action, with 
remarkable knowledge, definite achievements and clean hands. They will 
guarantee the continuation of changesfree of dangerous turmoilI"338
This was a reference to the Party's strategy of forming a reformist block 
within the new Sejm PZPR Club of Deputies (after June). The National 
List was to represent the Party's pragmatic centre within the Sejm. The 
core of the democratic reformist block within the Party would thus 
obtain a central role within a democratically elected Sejm. The PZPR 
thus confirmed its commitments to parliamentary (although still socialist,
336Dubinski, K., (1989) Ibid. p.71
337Dubinski, K., (1989) Ibid. p.74
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, May 13th 1989
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i.e. not fully democratic) democracy. This was intended to legitimate the 
reformist strand within the Party and anchor its position within the 
reforming institutions of State. The Party could move away from a direct 
involvement in the State and adopt a 'supervisory’ role during the transition 
period, thus retaining both the notion of the leading role of the party and 
simultaneously the veneer of democratic legitimation.
The Party's election campaign was fought on the three principles of 
'Reform, Responsibility and Respectability.'339 ’Reform’ indicated a 
continuation of the odnowa strategy and discourses. It implied limits to 
the reform process and the continuation of the leading role of the PZPR. 
At this time the Party elite's commitment to and overt belief in its 
privileged position remained strong. For example, the manifesto read:
”We have taken Roland away from the static command economy and waited 
long for Solidarity to mature... We control the reform process, which remains 
socialist in orientation,"340
’Responsibility’ implied the Party's acknowledgement that it had made 
mistakes in the past and was prepared to accept that its role had been 
neither as positive nor as unproblematic as it had traditionally argued. It 
also evoked an image of a party that could handle relations with external 
actors (from the USSR as well as the West). ’Respectability' was related to 
the PZPR's stand on Polish democracy and its advocation of a strong 
and healthy State. However, the PZPR election campaign was, by most
339Zubek, V., (1990)
3^0Radio Free Europe Progress Report, May 13th 1989. Ibid.
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accounts, a ramshackle affair.341 Full time Party workers were often at 
odds with their local Party candidates (many of whom were suspected of 
harbouring Solidarity sympathies), many seats were contested by two or 
more PZPR candidates sorting out local rivalries and some PZPR and 
allied party candidates had already offered allegiance to Solidarity. Many 
Party workers also lacked the spirit and organisation required to mobilise 
and fight the campaign and the peculiarity of a real election in a one- 
party State continued to colour the thinking of many. Some leading 
figures, such as Reykowski, suggested that the elections could not be won 
at all.342 The Party would not gain any public respect if it managed to 
obtain it’s reserved (National List) quota (simply because it was a 
reserved quota), while any losses would be seen as victories for the 
opposition. Little thought was thus placed on organising and fighting a 
coherent and unified election campaign against an opponent whose 
intention, regardless of its commitments to honouring the 'spirit' of the 
round table (conciliation, non-confrontation and respect for the existing 
(socialist) constitution) was to win as many votes as possible and thus to 
undermine the position of the PZPR within at least one sector of the 
Party dominated State.
At the elections, the Party fared dismally. Although guaranteed at least 
38% for its own candidates in the new Sejm, plus another 13% when 
combined with its coalition partners (ZSL, SD, PAX and other smaller, 
Catholic parties) the PZPR lost almost the entire openly elected 35% of
341zubek, V., (1990) and Janowski, K. B., (1992) op cit. Both point to the schisms that had emerged within 
the PZPR community that undermined its election campaign. Local party workers failed in many cases to
support local party candidates, many party candidates fought between themselves and generally the party 
acted as if the election was, as had always been, a sham and the party could not lose.
342Trybuna Ludu, 16th March 1988
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the vote for the Sejm and the same for the Senate elections. Its ’National 
list’ candidates (bar two) were not elected, even in the 1un-free'343 (reserved 
65%) proportion of the vote, thus depriving the Party elite of its 
intended position within the new legislature. After June's hastily re­
arranged 2nd round of elections (designed to fill the gaps left by the 
failure of the National List), it emerged, furthermore, that many new 
Sejm PZPR deputies had either been personally sponsored by or had 
strong sympathies and/or connections with Solidarity and Solidarity's 
Citizen's Committees.344
Figure 2)
June 1989 'Election Results
PZPR ZSL SD Catholic Solidarity
(Communists) (Peasants) (Democrats)
173 (38%) 76 (17%) 27 (6%) 23 (5%) 161 (35%)345
Following the PZPR's electoral disaster the situation turned sharply 
against the round table as a viable method of regulating changes in the 
political system under the aegis of the PZPR and its traditional coalition 
allies.346 The Party, quite simply, had suffered humiliating defeat at the
343Lewis, P., (1990) op cit.
344Millard, F., (1994)
343Lewis, P., (1990) op cit. 4th and 18th June - Elections to bicameral National Assembly. The ’National List’ 
was almost totally not elected because the majority of voters crossed out (rather than simply left blank) 
names. Fresh elections for the 33 (of 35) vacant seats, followed a reconvening of the round table committee. 
National List candidates defeated included: Baka, Barcikowski, Ciosek, Czyrek, Kiszczak, Miodowicz, 
Rakowski, Siwicki, Malinowski (ZSL), Democratic Party leaders and the heads of three pro-government 
parties - Christian organisations (PAX, Polish Catholic Social Union PZKS and Christian Social Union 
Uchs).
346Lewis, P., (1989) Ibid.
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hands of those it had 'invited to renew socialism.347 Added to this, key 
constitutional questions emerged in the aftermath of the elections. 
Without a full Sejm (lacking the National List candidates348), under the 
terms of the new electoral laws, a President could not be elected. The 
PZPR was thus faced with a peculiar situation. It retained its prerogative 
position within the State and in government but it no longer held a 
parliamentary majority. This opened up the question of who would 
become the President and who would lead the new government.349
The role of the office of President was central to the negotiated terms of 
transition and to the dynamic process of changing PZPR discourse. The 
new office of President was to perform the same functions as those 
previously performed by the Politburo and Council of State, thus 
removing the Party from it's leading role within the State, while 
maintaining continuity of key actors. Solidarity agreed that, within the 
constraints imposed by 'geopolitical! realities,350 the President should be a 
leading Party figure. However, because the Party had no majority within 
the Sejm, the theoretical possibility opened of the election of a non- 
Communist President. The role-played by Solidarity during the 
constitutional and political crisis that followed is crucial in explaining 
how the PZPR managed to retain any kind of political foothold within 
the post-election political environment and acts as one key to 
continuities in many PZPR discourses as the Party lost power.351
347Michnik, A., (1989)
348Millard, F., (1993) op cit. p.71
34^Rakowski, M. R., (1992) op cit. p.236
33®Both Ost, D., (1990) op cit.; Walicki, A., (1991) op cit.
331 Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. pp.66-72
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During June and July, amid negotiation and political struggle between the 
PZPR and Solidarity (and within each group) to define and construct a 
viable government, the Party elite underwent a decisive and pivotal 
process of discursive re-evaluation. Its discourses from this period are 
illustrative of the inner Party debate and continuity in discursive 
commitments. The immediate political concern, however, was to stem 
the flow of support away from the PZPR within the new Sejm and to 
consolidate existing pockets of support in the wider PZPR-State and 
areas of society. At the 13th Plenum, held on 29th July, the Central 
Committee began to engage in a critical evaluation of the its election 
campaign. The Plenary Te%a, for example, stated:
"We acknowledge a critical appraisal by society of the forces exercising power 
who are therefore responsible for the long running crisis. We acknowledge that 
economic weaknesses played a part: a rapid worsening of the socio-economic 
situation in Poland during the campaign indicated the Party's weakness as a 
participant in political struggle and mistakes in planning and carrying out it's 
campaign.”352
The main emphasis of the Central Committee, however, continued to lie 
within the "unity of the Party as the instrumentfor the guaranteeing of socialism in 
a modernisedform"353 The following fragment illustrated this recognition of 
the new political reality, but also underlined the Party’s retention of many 
socialistic values:
"The PRL has found itself at a breakthrough moment in its history. The 
dangerously aggravated economic difficulties, returns to the Sejm and Senate, the
352janowski, K. B., (1992) op cit.
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participation of the opposition in State authority bodies are the main elements of 
the radically new situation...The Central Committee affirms the correctness of 
the 10th Plenum and approves the assessment of the elections as presented by the 
Politburo report. While reaffirming the social ownership of the means of 
production in the country's social and economic development\ we come out in 
favour of changes in ownership relations which make it possible to fully combine 
high economic effectiveness with social justice. The CC comes out in favour of a 
continuation of market restructuring but stresses the importance of the State's 
social polity. This poliy must ensure equal chances of life, the right to work in 
line with ones qualifications and pay reflecting the effects of work as well as 
general social security."354
The Party elite’s intention was, however - at least in the short term - to 
carry on the process of implementing odnowa., in alliance with the ZSL, 
SD, PAX and ChSS and PZKS and any other legal political parties and 
groups ready for such co-operation, including Solidarity. This apparent 
contradiction could only be resolved with the political acquiescence of 
Solidarity. The Teya confirmed, in this spirit, the Party's readiness to co­
operate with the parliamentary opposition on the:
"plane of co-responsibility for Poland, for overcoming the crisis, preventing 
economic catastrophe, introducing reforms and ensuring a favourable 
arrangement of relations with Poland's socialist allies"355
The Party would, the Te%a continued, also 'engage in polemics and 
conduct political struggle' against those who threatened socialism and the
353Radio Free Europe Progress Report, 3rd August 1989
354Radio Free Europe Progress Report, 3rd August 1989. Ibid 
355Radio Free Europe Progress Report, 3rd August 1989. Ibid.
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legal order of the Polish People's Republic (PRL). At the same time as 
recognising in its official public discourses the results of the elections and 
their political ramifications, however, the Rakowski government began to 
assert its prerogative status within the State, by, for example, accelerating 
economic reform legislation to the Sejm without the prior agreement of 
Solidarity. This strategy was clearly based on the view that the Party 
would be able to construct a new government and that Solidarity would 
factionalise after its election victory.356
However, the hard-line option that had acted to underpin the pragmatic 
centre's strategy of limited compromise with Solidarity had become all 
but redundant. The option arose in debate within the Politburo and 
found some support from Rakowski, who, it seems clear, was still 
operating on the basis that a more hard-line reaction within the Soviet 
Communist Party (CPSU) would develop during 1989 the clearer it 
became that Poland and Hungary could, quite easily, fall out of the Soviet 
bloc.357 The PZPR tried, for example, immediately after the collapse of 
the National List in June, to paper over the results of the elections by 
seeking to reinforce a new political centre within the State. That is, a new 
version of PRON was discussed, which would co-opt leading members 
of the Church and Solidarity, combined with the traditional sources of 
political power, the military council (WRON) and representatives of the 
Politburo.
Neither the PZPR's reformist wings, supported by the PZPR Sejm Club 
of Deputies nor the intelligentsia branch of Solidarity's OKP, however,
•^6Gazeta Wyborcza, July 25th 1989
357Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. pp.78-80. Staniszkis argues that Rakowski was "gambling" on a conservative 
Soviet backlash within the Kremlin, which would act to legitimate a tougher domestic line.
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would sanction this proposal.358 Furthermore, the nomination of 
Kruichkov to the CPSU Politburo and the strengthening of the 
KGB/Globalist faction within the Kremlin undermined this possibility. 
Another option discussed was for Solidarity to form a government in 
coalition with the PZPR, which was rejected by Solidarity, who, at that 
time did not know that Cypryniak and Gdula had been themselves 
instrumental in setting up the round table, and close to Soviet decision­
making via the so-called Kukhanov committee in Moscow.359
At the Central Committee's 14th Plenum (19th August 1989),360 held 
during this government crisis, the Central Committee finally resolved to 
join a Solidarity-led government, provided it would be adequately 
represented with more than defence and interior ministries. Rakowski 
acknowledged that the old coalition, de facto, now ceased to exist, but 
was still in favour of a so-called 'Grand Coalition' - a reworking of the 'pro­
reform coalition' that had arisen in 1988. At the Plenum, which was held 
behind closed doors, Rakowski dealt with the failure of the PZPR to 
have its nominated candidate, Kiszczak, appointed premier of a new 
government:
"Poland can be extricated from the present crisis by way of evolutionary and 
consistent reforms only by a government enjoying the widest confidence and social 
support including representatives of all parliamentary forces. We are still in 
favour of a Grand Coalition government. It must be a coalition of all forces 
within the new Sejm. We offer support for a Solidarity government. Neither 
PZPR nor Solidarity can cope with threats and lift the country out of the
■^Kaczynski, (1991b)
•^Szczuciriski, p., ( 1991)
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collapse on its own and less so opposed to each other. Partner-like co-operation, 
free from mutual prejudice can become a qualitatively new fact in the history of 
Poland...Poland must remain an economically and militarily credible link of the 
COMECON and Warsaw Pact. Our participation has guaranteed our 
national security for several decades. "361
At the same time, however, the PZPR sought to undermine any anti- 
Communist tendencies within the Solidarity-led (Mazowiecki) 
government. This it did, for example, by seeking assurances from the 
USSR that it would not tolerate anti-Communist purges in Poland. 
Gremitskik, Soviet foreign ministry spokesman, for example, stated that 
the USSR had Mno problem" with a Solidarity-led government, provided 
that Poland remained a member of the Warsaw Pact and that the PZPR 
remained in charge of "certain" ministries (defence, interior, media and 
secret services).362 This reassurance clearly enhanced the influence of the 
Populists on the pragmatic centre by underlining the need for a gradual 
process of reform, within the existing geopolitical framework. The PZPR 
also sought to undermine any government initiatives designed to seize 
Party assets or purge key ministries of personnel. Mazowiecki, against the 
demands of both Walesa within Solidarity, drew what he termed a "thick 
line" (gruba linia'p63 separating his government with any from the past, 
arguing that the questions of the PZPR's responsibility for past crimes 
should be investigated by a Commission of Enquiry and most 
importantly, he argued against the immediate derailing of the deals 
agreed at the round table.
Radio Free Europe Special Supplement, August 22nd 1989.
Radio Free Europe Special Supplement, August 22nd 1989. Ibid.
36^-Radio Free Europe Progress Reports, August 28th 1989 
363£)omarancZyiCj 2., (1990) pp.106-108
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3. Past Vs Present
As the process of constitutional transformation was unfolding during 
mid-1989, a series of other PZPR discourses that had arisen from early 
1988 onwards, also gained greater prominence. Key historical discourses 
for example, acquired a greater legitimating significance of their own. 
The Party's continued deepening of its discursive reconstruction of the 
past defined a recognition that, within the context of negotiations and 
semi-open elections, it would have to answer questions that had 
previously been problematic even to ask. For example, these centred on 
Katyn above all, the role of the PPR in WWII, the role of the PZPR 
during the Stalinist period in Poland (1948-56) and various other 
significant historical 'blank-spots,' including the question of responsibility 
for the imposition of martial law in 1981. Interestingly, however, as 
Gebert explains, during the round table itself, there was a tacit 
understanding reached between the two sides behind the public scenes 
not to mention martial law and the period 1980-81 during the public 
sessions.364 This is well illustrated in a section of dialogue at the 
Magdalenka talks, which ran in parallel to the round table. Ciosek said
"Martial law, its legal aspects and its correctness, cannot be questioned. I
propose that we deal with them at the 'Union table' (of the round table)."
To which he received a unanimous:
"No"
-^Gebert, K., (1990) op cit. p.23. The period 1980-81 could not be discussed, argued Kiszczak, since it did 
not fall within the "terms of the existing law." Geremek, as Gebert explains, although prepared to accept this 
for the sake of negotiation, sought to embarrass the PZPR by focusing on areas in the "existing law" that 
illustrated the need to return to 1980-81.
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from Mazowiecki, Bujak and Frasyniuk.365 Martial law, argued Geremek, 
had either to be treated as a central element of the main round table 
discussions, or not at all. The latter, for obvious reasons, was preferable 
to the PZPR.
The Party’s discourses of the past, in particular areas relating to Polish- 
Soviet relations, were of importance during the round table in so far as 
they illustrated the changing political rationale of the pragmatic centre, 
but without, significantly, obliging it to make any concrete moves 
towards authentic power sharing. Within the context of the round table, 
any references to Katyn can be interpreted as a means by which the Party 
sought to illustrate that it had autonomy from, but, at the same time, 
good working relations with, the USSR. The Party, in other words, was 
attempting to cross the line from "them" to "us" to develop a discourse of 
'Public* Poland, competing with the Church-Solidarity discourses which 
had all but appropriated the national identity and national interest in the 
post-1981 period. The 11th Plenum Te%a touched on one particularly 
significant element of the blank-spots commission’s work to illustrate 
this:
"Irrespective of the motives, the advancement of Soviet troops into Poland on
17th September 1939 was based on false evaluations, expressions insulting Poles
and the tragic oppression of the Stalin-Beria apparatus. "366
This element of the historical discourse also fitted into the issue of 
Katyn. Within the context of the round table negotiations, it was clearly 
designed to indicate the emergence of a reform-minded elite, whose
365]~)ubnski, s K., (1989) op cit. p.53
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hands were not tied by the Soviet Union and whose political roots lay 
within the nation and within the new democratic discourse. At this stage, 
however, the discourse was designed to remain firmly within the 
synchronic sphere of discourse - i.e. not impinge on any areas of PZPR 
power holding. The National Delegates Conference held in May during 
the round table talks is illustrative of this attempt to deal discursively with 
an area of historical ambiguity that had traditionally weakened the PZPR. 
The final resolution of the Conference, under the heading of 'Removing the 
remnants of Stalinism, ' read as follows:
"Criticisms that took place after 1956, while greater than in any other socialist 
State, did not fully reach the roots of the deformations. The leading politician of 
the period was Bierut. The current state of historical knowledge authorises one to 
blame Beirut in particular for the Stalinisation of Poland, including violations 
of human rights. He initiated numerous unjustified trials of leading groups of 
activists within the PPR, first of all Gomulka and Spychalski. He was 
responsible for opposing de-Stalinisation after the death of Stalin and the 
execution of Beria. Responsibility falls on Beirut, Berman, and Reidkdewic£ 
We come out in favour of fullpolitical and moral compensation to the victims of 
Stalinist lawlessness. The Party, in making a critical assessment of the past, 
does not prove its weakness but, on the contrary, strengthens its moral power 
and respect for the nation. "367
At the start of the round table talks in February various references to the 
progress of the on-going Polish-Soviet historical (Blank-spots) 
commission's were also pieced into PZPR public discourse, although
366Trybuna Ludu, April 2nd 1989
367Trybuna Ludu April 2nd 1989. Ibid.
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were not made at the talks themselves. No member of the Party- 
government team of negotiators, for example, made any references to 
Katyn.
Other, non -round table references within Party discourse to elements of 
history were numerous and were significant not only in terms of the 
effects they had on the thinking and tactical considerations of the 
participants themselves, but in terms of how the talks were perceived by 
non-participants. The timing of the first set of discourses is, for example, 
significant in that they coincided with the end of the first week of the 
round table discussions. During this time various agreements had been 
reached: on trade union affairs (most significantly the legalisation of 
Solidarity), the de-monopolisation of the mass media and the allocation 
of State funds for a Solidarity newspaper (Ga^eta Wyborc^a). The 
pragmatic centre was clearly willing to sanction this historical discursive 
opening if it could be seen to have a positive effect on the negotiations at 
this stage. This type of discourse threaded its way into the 11th and 12th 
Central Committee Plenums and the National Delegates Conference. By 
continuing the discourse of anti-Stalinism, the Party clearly wanted to 
illustrate its reformist credentials (although within the socialist terms of 
ideological reference) and at the same time, indicate to Polish society that 
it was a national party. Jaruzelski's speech to the National Delegates 
Conference on May 6th 1989 illustrates this:
"Let us state openly, thatfor many years the Vary operated under an umbrella 
- ideological, political and administrative.This resultedfrom a monopoly position
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and insufficient feeling of serving society. This omnipotence put an enormous 
burden on the Party."368
Jaruzelski, however, had expected the issue of Katyn (and other Polish- 
Soviet questions) to have been resolved by the time of the round table, 
thus freeing the PZPR of its negative associations with the USSR. The 
visit of Gorbachev in July 1988 had clearly encouraged this hope. 
However, the Soviets' procrastination during 1989 reflected badly on the 
PZPR for two reasons. One, by refusing to offer full and unconditional 
responsibility for Katyn, the USSR undermined the notion that reformers 
within the Kremlin were in ascendance, thus undermining the position of 
reformers within Poland. Two, by not accepting any blame, the Soviets 
highlighted the PZPR's domestic weakness. The more the Party made 
public noises to the effect that it wanted a public resolution of the Katyn 
issue, while, at the same time refusing to blame the Soviets openly for it, 
the more Polish society became aware that the PZPR was unable to act 
without the sanction of the USSR, as was popularly believed. Elster 
argues,369 however, that for the Communist Parties in each of the Eastern 
bloc countries, society's fear of the Soviet Union remained a definite 
political instrument of domestic legitimation. It offered an implicit 
advantage in any set of negotiations.
Other references to the role of the Soviet Union in Poland during the 
Stalinist period added to this scramble for historical legitimation during 
the round table. This is partially evidenced by the setting up of a State 
'committee for remembering the victims of Stalinist repression' on 11th February
Radio Free Europe Progress Report, May 6th 1989 
^^Elster, J., (1996) op cit. Chapter 1
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1989. Its aim was to assess the claims of those who had suffered at the 
hands of the Stalinist authorities in Poland. This expressed the Party's 
responsibility in dealing with the past and its commitment to 
constitutionalism and legalism. The Committee was, however, 
responsible to the Sejm and not directly to the Party, and after June, 
therefore assumed a high degree of autonomy from the Party. Another 
example was the official weekly, Odrod^enia, publishing on 18th February 
four pages of a 'confidential report by the Polish Red Cross on the Katyn 
massacre. The report, found in British archives, provided evidence that it 
was the Soviets, not the Nazis, who had carried out the massacre. It 
concluded that the murder of 4,000 of the officers was carried out 
between March and May 1940, when the Soviets were in possession of 
the territory.370 This revelation is significant in so far as it represented the 
first official recognition of Soviet culpability (the Polish authorities, 
aware since 1943 of the existence of this report allowed its publication 
for the first time). On 21st February, Urban (the Party's press spokesman) 
stated that the authorities intended to change the inscription on the 
monument to the victims of Katyn (at Pow^zki cemetery in Warsaw), 
although was not prepared to say what the precise wording would be.371 
On 24th February, speaking in the Sejm, foreign minister Loechowski 
stated that Poland would like to see a definite ending to the Katyn issue. 
He said that prospects for the development of Polish-Soviet relations 
were particularly favourable. In reference to the 'blank spots' commission, 
he said that an answer would soon be reached.372
370 Radio Free Europe Progress Report, February 25th 1989
3 1 lTrybuna Ludu, February 22nd 1989
372Trybuna Ludu, February 25th 1989
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During March, as it became clearer that the Party elite would be obliged 
to concede more political reforms than it had intended, a tightening of 
the process of discursive disclosure might have been expected. However, 
the growing autonomy of State bodies from the direct influence of the 
PZPR, one of the prerequisites of odnowa (as defined by the PZPR itself) 
and one of the effects of the round table (combined with relaxation in 
censorship and political interference in the mass media) undermined any 
attempts within the Party elite to stem the process. This is most clearly 
illustrated by the Supreme Court's pronouncement on 19th April that the 
group of leading socialists sentenced to death by the Warsaw Military 
Court on 14th November 1948 were not guilty.373 During discussion 
concerning political and constitutional reform at the round table on 7th 
March, the Polish government for the first time openly placed blame for 
the Katyn massacres on the USSR. Urban stated that the historical 
commission had found enough evidence to indicate that "the crime was 
committed by the Stalinist NK VD ."374 He told a press conference that the 
last meeting of the blank spots commission had produced results which 
proved this. The Soviet side, however, both within the blank-spots 
commission and within the CPSU sought to blur the issue. They were 
reported as stating that the evidence was "circumstantial!"375
Another key historical discourse centred on wider questions of Polish- 
Soviet relations in WWII. On 7th March, for example, an interview with 
former President-in-exile, Edward Raczyriski was carried in Pr^eglqd 
Tygodniowy. The war, he said, had not started on 17th but 1st September
373Kersten, K., (1986). Puzak, Szturm de Sztrem, Dziegielewski, Misiorowski, Cohn and Krawczyk had
been accused of attempting to overthrow the State.
374East, R., (1992) p.130
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1939 - that the Soviets and Germans, in collaboration, attacked the 
Polish State on the 1st. It was, he said, "a conspirag of our neighbours.1,376 On 
9th March the Polish Press Agency (PAP) reported a Politburo plan to 
rehabilitate the victims of Stalinism in Poland. A special commission to 
investigate the role played by Boleslaw Bierut (First Secretary of the 
PZPR between 1947-52 and Premier 1952-54) was to be set up in order 
to "overcome the negative heritage and to provide for moral retribution to the victims of 
illegal repression." On 15th March, the commission openly Mrehabilitated' 
Anders, Mikolajcik, Banczyk and Wojcik, all key figures within the Home 
Army (AK) and/or members of the London government (in exile). On 
16th April, following his trip to Moscow, Jaruzelski stated that the 
historical "blank spots" commission's work would be speeded up. He also 
said that a joint document on the period before WWII (references to the 
dismantling of the KPP in 1938) would soon be made public. On 29th 
April the Sejm finally pardoned those convicted after 1980 for being 
involved in strikes, demonstrations and supporting banned organisations. 
By appealing to historical symbols, however, the Party elite was, if 
inadvertendy, distancing itself from the people within the community 
whose support it needed during the election campaign to fight at the 
grass roots level. Thus what emerged was a curious discourse. It didn't 
fully recognise the full implications of the round table, which had pushed 
the negotiations beyond the limits sought by the elite. At the same time it 
revealed the Party's search for metaphors that signalled a radical rejection 
of the monistic discourse of power, that of combined (coded) threats of 
Soviet intervention and the ideological imperatives of the leading role 
principle. The Party elite was thus caught in a political no-mans land. It
375East, R., (1992) Ibid. p.131
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had moved away from its own traditional community by rejecting the 
Soviet option, diluting Marxist-Leninist discourses and openly castigating 
the bureaucracy. However, it had not (and could not) sanction any 
discursive recognition of the fact that it had lost its leading role position 
already (simply by agreeing to constitutional changes that might lead to 
the end of the dominant role of the PZPR).
During the election campaign intense revisionism of the past continued, 
as well as an attempt to relocate the PZPR within a more neutral and 
sympathetic relationship with the Catholic Church, both within Poland 
and in relation to the Vatican. The Party’s National Delegates 
Conference (2nd'4th May 1989), at which the PZPR Government- 
Coalition election manifesto was published,377 can be read in this light. It 
was a strategy that backfired on the PZPR, however. On the one hand, 
the more it changed the less it was able to hold together its interpellated 
community. For example, Party activists, threatened by a loss of local 
prerogatives if reformism at the top continued, worked, in many 
localities, to undermine candidates suspected of reformist leanings and 
the PZPR's coalition partners, ZSL and SD, talked openly about their 
own political autonomy.378 On the other hand, the more it changed, the 
more society recognised that Solidarity was enforcing real concessions, 
which added to public support for the Solidarity campaign. The Party, 
however, by this time had moved towards a historical discourse that 
acknowledged and sought to deal with events during and after 1980-81 
(something it had been reluctant to do during the negotiations at the
376East, R., (1992) Ibid, p.132
377Slodkowska, I., (1995), pp. 11-13. 'Deklaracja Wyborcza Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej1, 
Materialy programowe' (Election manifesto of the PZPR).
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round table) as well as re-setting out its position on the post-war role of 
the PZPR in Poland. At the National Delegates Conference the 1947-56 
period was characterised within Party discourse as a period ’dominated 
by fear’; of Soviet intervention, of German resurgence (and reclamation 
of 'lost' territories) and the role of Polish Stalinists, such as Bierut who 
" betrayed the cause of Polish socialism,"379 The Party continued to blame its 
weak domestic position and its use of terror during that period on the 
imposition of geo-strategic realities and individual errors. The 1956-80 
period was analysed and presented as a period of "Mitigating, objective 
circumstances and specific leadership errors"380 This fitted into the Party’s anti­
bureaucracy rhetoric. The so-called ’Salvation of the nation'381 became 
adopted as the Party’s explicit explanation of its own role. The Party had 
been 'waiting /  this implied, for Solidarity to reform itself and become a 
’constructive partner’ in the reform process undertaken after 1982. 
Jaruzelski told Trybuna Ludu in May, for example, that:
"For 8 years the historical process of odnowa has been in progress. Step-by- 
step, among horrible circumstances and threats, in defiance of the powers of this 
world, even against resistance in our own ranks, we have not wavered from the 
chosen road."382
378Zubek, V., (1990) op cit.
379Zubek, V., (1990) Ibid.
380Zubek, V., (1990) Ibid.
381Zubek, V., (1990) Ibid.
3S2Trybuna Ludu, 25th May, 1988
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4. Conclusions
The PZPR finally grasped the nettle in February 1989 by undertaking the 
task of negotiating a political settlement to the industrial and social crisis. 
Its failures and weaknesses at the round table, combined with its overt 
discursive shift away from traditional signifiers meant, however, that, in 
the absence of genuine alternatives, it was obliged to submit to the 
principles of democratic accountability.
The Party’s inability to control the composition of the opposition's 
negotiating team (prior to the talks taking place), the relative solidity of 
the Solidarity movement’s various groups, combined with the weakness 
of internal Party support for the government negotiating team meant that 
this, in itself, was never likely to satisfy the opposition. Initially neither 
Rakowski nor Jaruzelski expected the talks to lead to radical change in 
the Party's prerogative position. The PZPR would retain its leading role, 
albeit in a revised form. The pragmatic centre of the PZPR was 
committed to a wider version of the existing legitimational strategy, that 
of eudaemonism combined with limited relocation of ideological and 
other discourses (historical and legalistic). The agreement to legalise 
Solidarity as a trade union in return for its support in economic reform 
was made very early in the talks (in February). The PZPR was still hoping 
at this stage to narrow the round table to trade union matters only. They 
continued to couch the language of reforms in the existing odnowa 
discourse: economic reforms and limited constitutional changes would 
lead to a strengthening of democratic and constitutional socialism. The 
Warsaw based dissident intelligentsia (KOR and ROPCiO groups), 
centred around the trio of Geremek, Kuron and Michnik, pushed the
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talks into a harder political phase during March. They pushed the 
government side into accepting the introduction of key constitutional 
changes as conditions of the trade union’s acceptance of an end to strike 
activity for an agreed period.
The Party was, as a result, faced with the reality of discourses of 
democratic socialism - of greater legislative and executive autonomy (a 
loosened leading role) and thus less direct power in the traditional form. 
Sections of the Party elite, having acknowledged the potential 
uncontrollability of semi-open elections, stressed various discursive 
references that had previously acted to underpin other, supposedly more 
important discourses - if the Party was obliged to stand and contest for a 
democratic mandate from 'the people,' it would have to have something in 
common with 'the people.' As it discovered during the election campaign, 
however, by moving towards 'the people,' if only discursively, it was losing 
both the support of its own community and weakening the bonds that 
held together its traditional alliances with the ZSL, SD and OPZZ. The 
Party’s reformist wings found themselves both isolated from their own 
auxiliary community and tied into political contracts with the Catholic 
Church and Solidarity.
The Globalist faction which was heavily represented at the round table 
itself, failed, furthermore, to negotiate a deal commensurate with the 
pragmatic centre's aims. As the negotiations progressed it became 
increasingly clear that the pragmatic centre's control over the bargaining 
process was not as strong as it would have liked and its lines of 
communication weaker than expected. Reformist sections of the PZPR 
elite, having negatively weighed up the Party's chances of winning a fully
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democratic election, began to seek both new sources of support from a 
widened coalition of forces and locate the Party within a revised version 
of socialism and the nation. This, it was hoped, combined with limited 
political reforms and the Party’s continued control over the core State 
apparatus (especially its coercive branch, defence and interior ministries) 
would anchor the reformist agenda both within the State and society. 
The failure of the PZPR to manage to achieve any of these things led to 
a new phase in the process of discursive transformation.
Chapter 6 
Becoming Post-Communist 
August 1989-January 1990
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i. Introduction
The end of the PZPR's leading role in August 1989 did not lead to the 
immediate or unambiguous abandonment of many elements of the 
Party's odnowa discourses, either on the part of the new, non-Communist, 
government or that of the PZPR itself. Furthermore, the Solidarity 
government could not afford to abandon the Rakowski-initiated 
economic liberalisation reforms. Many of the prescriptions contained 
within the odnowa discourse, such as opening up foreign trade, liberalising 
the banking system, reforming interest rates and seeking credits from the 
IMF, were central to the so-called 'shock-therapj economic plan 
implemented after January 1st 1990 by the new government. It was clearly 
the Party itself, therefore, rather than many of its discourses, which had 
became anachronistic in the context of a rapid shift in the language of 
State and society towards liberalisation and democratisation.
Two processes effecting changing PZPR legitimation were evolving at 
different rates, but in synchronicity, between August 1989 and January 
1990. One, the PZPR's continuation and consolidation of a discourse of 
democratic legitimation. Two, a discursive summing up of the past. In an 
attempt to control the dramatic transformation of political circumstances 
in which it became obliged to operate, the PZPR ditched many elements
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of its existing, traditional' discourses, although, significandy retained clear 
lines of continuity both in form and content. In this period the broad 
outlines of the post-Communist reformed party's legitimational 
discourses were formed. Discontinuities within PZPR discourses lay 
predominantly within the sphere of ideology. This was reflected most 
clearly in the rejection, at the end of 1989, of the two core principles of 
the preceding period of PZPR legitimation: the leading role principle and 
democratic centralism. The Party continued to deploy historical, civil, and 
geopolitical discourses, however, in ways similar to those it had been 
using throughout the late 1980's.
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2. Public Vs Private
The PZPR’s civil discourses evolved during this period in response to a 
series of short and longer term factors similar to those that had patterned 
the preceding periods. The first were located within an immediate, 
tactical matrix: in relation to Solidarity, the Soviet Union and Polish 
society. The second were longer term questions of ideological identity: 
'who are we?,' 'what do we stand for?’ and 'who do we represent?.' Immediate 
political discourse, however, more clearly than before now influenced 
core discourses, particularly as traditional ideological signifiers became 
openly rejected in late 1989 and early 1990. Debates between the 15th and 
17th Plenums within the Party Politburo illustrate this tendency. This 
extract from the Te%a of the Central Committee’s 15th Plenum (held in 
two parts, 18th September and 3rd October), indicates the confusion at 
the centre of the PZPR’s legitimation, as its traditional - ideological - 
discourses were being rejected:
'What is and should be the Party's immediate line within the context of its 
weakened political position within the State?, What, for example, can we do to 
contain anti-Communist forces within the opposition and in government? There 
is no going back to a false understanding of socialism. ”383
The Party’s ideological discourses could not remain above or immune 
from these questions. They had immediate implications for the way the 
PZPR spoke of itself, for its political and historical role and its identity. 
They were no longer merely theoretical, abstract notions that could be 
discussed, agreed on and quietly forgotten.
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The Politburo came to terms very quickly after August with the fact that 
the PZPR would have to operate in a political environment dominated 
by Solidarity.384 At the 15th Plenum - one month after the resolution of 
the government crisis - the newly appointed First Secretary of the PZPR, 
Rakowski (Jaruzelski having become President), for example, told his 
audience that:
"We have arrived at the end of the 9th Congress (1982) line. The fact that the 
Party no longer holds the monopoly of power entails great consequences. There 
are various strands in the opposition, but I  think that the one having its roots in 
the Catholic outlook on life is the most dynamic."™
At the Plenum, the Politburo Te%a outlined the Party’s position in 
relation to the new government, of which - by this time - it was a junior 
partner. It recognised that the Party's failures at the election had been, at 
least in part, self-inflicted in that insufficient stress had been placed on 
fighting a coherent and organised campaign. The Politburo reiterated, at 
the same time, that the PZPR would also seek to commit the Mazowiecki 
government to honouring the terms of the round table, in particular those 
related to co-operation between the PZPR and Solidarity within the Sejm 
and government.386 The Plenum, however, took place amid general 
uncertainty as to the direction a Solidarity government would take or be 
allowed to take in the context of Soviet foreign policy. There still existed,
383Radio Free Europe Progress Report, September 29th 1989 
384perzicowsiQ s., (1994) op cit. pp. 178-84.
385Radio Free Europe Progress Report, September 29th 1989. Ibid.
386perzjCOwski, S., (1994) op cit. p.469: Decyzje Biura Politycznego KC PZPR, posiedzenie w dniu 22 
sierpnia 1989r.’ (22nd August 1989 Politburo decision). The four posts were MON, MSW, Wspolpracy 
Gospodarczej z Zagranica oraz Transport (Transport and Foreign Economic Co-operation), and vice­
premiership (General Kiszczak). There was also political struggle over control of personnel in the ministry of 
foreign affairs and attempts, on both sides, to maximise influence over Radio and TV.
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furthermore, the real possibility that the Party could, if it so wished, 
revert to a more traditional method of exercising power, particularly if 
the political signals from Moscow suggested a non-sanctioning of 
domestic developments.387 Rakowski told Trybuna Ludu in early 
September, for example:
""Responsibility for the nation does not permit it (the Party) to remain in 
opposition"™
Bisztyga, the Central Committee press spokesman, also told a meeting of 
PZPR activists in late August that the Party could and would derail the 
new processes if it didn't get its "allotted powers in the new political 
arrangement,"389 although he failed to elaborate on what this meant in 
practise. Reformist groups within the PZPR elite, however, had already 
made strong political commitments both at the round table and after to 
moderate groups in Solidarity and many believed that the agreement 
could actually benefit the PZPR. The PZPR Sejm Club of Deputies, led 
by Orzechowski, had also become engaged in talks with representatives 
from Solidarity's Parliamentary Citizens' Committees (OKP) concerning 
either a parliamentary merger of the two parties or, at least, a working 
understanding that retained the key elements of the round table. Added to 
this, the qualitatively new political arrangements after August, also put 
increased strain on alliances within the wider Solidarity movement, in 
particular between the new government, which was seen by many as
3^7Rakowski, M.R., (1991) op cit. p.154; Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. p.284; Berezowski, M., (1991). 
Staniszkis argues that this was the Rakowski intention at this time. Berezowski’s interview with Orzechowski 
further corroborates this view.
388Trybuna Ludu, September 2nd 1989. Interview with Rakowski, in which he reiterated the leading role 
principle. Contrasted with Orzechowski's "Tylko zgodnie i wspolnie" (Only by agreement and in co­
operation), Trybuna Ludu, August, 31st 1989.
3^9Trybuna Ludu, September 2nd 1989. Ibid.
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having compromised too much and too early with the Communists, and 
its more radical, nationalist and trade union wings. The commitment of 
many within the Solidarity elite, therefore, to implementing a rapid 
process of 'de-Communisation' were limited not only by the external 
conditions imposed by the USSR, but also by the existence of a series of 
awkward internal political and discursive questions.
In this context the 15th Plenum took place,390 at which various questions 
were pieced into the opening Te%a. "What next}" it asked, "how do we 
operate in these new conditions? What do we reject, what do we retain in everyday 
practise? Whom do we serve?'391 The questions were of course, in part, 
designed to bolster the impression that real debates were actually taking 
place within the PZPR, thus illustrating either the Party's transformation 
to or its reaffirmation of democratic principles. In part, however, these 
were questions that needed concrete, practical answers. Furthermore, no- 
one in the leadership really knew the type or depth of reaction the new 
discursive line would receive from the Central Committee, Polish society 
or the USSR.392 The democratisation of the procedure for selecting Party 
leaders, as well as changes in the Party's wider political discourses and 
immediate tactics vis-a-vis the new government were all, however, passed 
by the Central Committee by a large majority,393 although the need for
390Trybuna Ludu, September 18th 1989: 15th Plenum Teza outlined. Also an interesting interview with 
Miller: *Nim spytano o parti? zapytano o Polsce, rozmowa z Leszkiem Millerem', (Asked about the Party, 
asked about Poland - a talk with Leszek Miller)
391Trybuna Ludu, September 19th 1989
392Trybuna Ludu, July 28th 1989. Leszek Miller and Martin Krol, two newly elected, Populist figures within 
the Politburo met on several occasions with PZPR local, regional and factory committees, seeking both to 
find out what the feelings of Party members were at the lower levels and attempt to push themselves and their 
political line as forcibly as possible within the wider Party.
393janowski K.B., (Sanford, G., (Ed.) 1992 op cit. p. 170) The results of poll showed a decisive majority of 
party members favoured a radical version of the proposed change (72.1% of respondents), with 25% 
preferring caution. The second part of the 15th Plenum incorporated most of the proposals submitted at the 
first stage.
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internal Party unity, rather than wider ideological debate and reflection, 
was central to the Politburo’s Te%a. The Politburo communique 
supplemented to the 15th Plenum Te%a read, for example:
"The present social-political situation obliges the PZPR to operate under 
pressure radicalised by social structures. The majority of the new political forces 
have negatively evaluated the Party since the elections. This negation of the 
PZPR relates to Party mistakes and opinions from the past. But the Party 
must not resign from its mission to retain the most valuable elements of the 
socialist State.”394
This represented both the PZPR's recognition of the autonomous 
character of collective choice and civic autonomy and the fact that it was 
not a popular party and had to change. According to Central Committee 
member, Grzyb, for example, at the 15th Plenum:
"We must discard managing, putting labels on trouble makers or oppositionists 
who nurse different opinions and seek allies through our programme, activity 
and authority. "m
This theme of accepting the process of systemic change and its 
irreversibility runs throughout the period leading to the PZPR Central 
Committees final, 11th Congress in January 1990. "Changes in the sphere of 
political rebuilding have a revolutionary-evolutionary character...," the 15th Plenum 
Te%a continued:
394Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 5th 1989 PZPR Central Committee Plenum 
39$Radio Free Europe Progress Report, October 5th 1989. Ibid.
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"...in the sense of deep transformations in the form and methods of exercising 
power...They are continuing and irreversible. Sections of the opposition have 
already moved towards co-operation and programmatic-tactical alliances...We 
are also aware that the CPSU has made internal changes possible."™
Party tactics could not be successful, however, argued Miller at the 15th 
Plenum, if its discourses evoked indecision or weakness, although the 
central question remained: how to combine this relative openness and 
debate with unity within the Party? In other words, how to reconstruct 
the existing mode of interpellation? Three discursive options - all of 
which had immediate and longer term significance simultaneously - 
emerged during the autumn. One was to continue with the PZPR in its 
present form, reinforcing the traditional, ideological, elements of the 
discourse, thus eliminating any semantic - and thus intepellatory - 
ambiguity. This would have been a reversion to a more cynical 
interpretation of the round table accords. The facade of democracy would 
be retained while 'real' power would be concentrated in a widened, 
although still Party-controlled, set of committees operating behind the 
veneer of a democratic Sejm. Another option was a complete rejection of 
the round table accords and a reversion (as would have been most likely, 
given the socio-economic context) of a confrontation between State and 
society, as had occurred in 1981. This traditional discourse was supported 
by groups in or around the OPZZ and various ultra-Communist (for 
example, the Warsaw Workers’ Congress Forum), conservative, 
nationalistic groups who harked back to the traditional methods of 
exercising power. The discourse was, as it always had been, class-driven. 
Various speeches opposed, for example, the exclusion of the Party from
396perzkowski, S., (1994) op cit. p.198
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the workplace and argued against the "restoration of capitalism in Poland"391 
The OPZZ was instrumental in the creation of a so-called ’Socialist Bloc,' 
which combined official trade unionists and old-fashioned Marxists. 
Miodowicz called on several occasions for the end of the "squabbling 
between a do%en leftist parties "m  This hard-line option, however, unlike in 
1981, had very little support in Moscow, particularly after the victories of 
Gorbachev at the 15th Plenum of the CPSU in August and was, to a 
certain extent, also limited by the vociferousness with which many hard­
line nationalist Communists had attacked the Soviet regime over, 
amongst other things, Katyn during 1988 and 1989.
The second discursive option advocated scrapping the PZPR and 
building a new party in its place. This was proposed by the Movement of 
8th July,399 a radical Globalist grouping within the post-election Sejm with 
strong links with Solidarity. They argued that the PZPR should relinquish 
its claims to be the only representative of the working class and should 
merge with the Solidarity movement. This group, perhaps more strongly 
than any other within the Party-State, was also in favour of a market 
economy "combining efficiency with the social responsibility of the State"400 
Globalist sympathies grouped themselves around the Sejm Club of 
Deputies, led by Orzechowski, which had acquired a degree of authentic 
political autonomy from the Politburo during the summer's negotiations 
with the Geremek wing of the OKP. Many joined the PUS (Union of 
Social democracy) which was set up during the 11th Congress in January 
1990.
Trybuna Ludu, October 24th 1989 
398Trybuna Ludu, October 24th 1989. Ibid.
399Trybuna Ludu, October 24th 1989. Ibid.
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At the 13th Plenum, held on 29th July, key Globalist reformer and head of 
the PZPR Parliamentary Club, Orzechowski, lost his place on the 
Politburo (which he had attained at the 10th Plenum). Thereafter, the 
discourses espoused by his wing (as above) became increasingly defined 
in open conflict with the pragmatic centre. Its discourses, however, are 
significant in that they represent the most openly identifiable social- 
democratic reasoning within the Party. They acted, in many ways, to 
underpin one key precondition of the success of the reforming PZPR in 
the period leading up to the 11th Congress, that of open and 
unambiguous support for the reform process and strong connections 
with left of centre groups within Solidarity. The PZPR Parliamentary 
Club issued this statement in August:
"The fiasco of our holding ofpower and methods of running an economy are now 
proven facts. The Party has lost the support of a majority of society...a new 
government is attempting to correct these deformations and we offer it our 
support. A.s a club of deputies, we bridge the traditional borders between right 
and left, believers and non-believers, Party and non-Party, legal and non-legal. 
We are of the conviction that there have always been people within the PZPR 
searching for reformist solutions. Without them we would not have had either the 
9th Congress or the turning point decisions made at the 1Cfh Plenum. The 
alternative is chaos, anarchy andfinally dictatorship, a 1 strong-arm'government. 
There are advocates of this on all sides. We also appeal to the left, to all those 
identified with the PZPR - those who gave us what we have and to others we
^OOjanowski, K. B,. (1992) op cit. p. 170
stress the ideals of demo crag, humanism, freedom, social justice and 
progress." m
The Movement of the 8th July's declarations at the 16th Plenum, held on 
6th November, further illustrate this discursive search for democratic, but 
significandy still socialist, legitimation. They also pre-empted the 
pragmatic centre's adoption of similar discourses in early 1990. A key 
fragment of the declaration read:
"We reject the dictatorship of the proletariat as well as the anti-democraticforces 
of the right. In this struggle we propose co-operation with democratic forces 
located within Solidarity. The new democratic party must continue to defend the 
interests of working people, but not at the expense of others and not to the 
detriment of the law and a tolerant society. The new party must continue to 
respect friends and allies within the socialist world, although at the same time 
seek to democratise the Warsaw Pact. The most important thing is the value of 
national sovereignty...there is no point in attacking the USSR, especially as it is 
itself undergoing democratic transformations. "402
The third discursive option that emerged at the 15th Plenum was to form 
a new left-wing party which would take with it many of the traditional 
discourses of the old party, but at the same time, change its ideological 
character and identity: the Populist' option. This was favoured by many 
within the Politburo, including Rakowski. The pragmatic centre was 
moving towards accepting the logic of what had appeared previously to 
be peripheral discourses, but at the same time, holding onto key 
discourses. Miller's speech, under the heading "What does socialism mean
^^Slodkowska, I., (1995) op cit. pp. 13-14
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today? (what is laid out and what remainsyoung?Z'403 for example illustrates the 
support of the new pragmatic centre within the Party for the third 
option: "We reject the option of the worse the better...we support the new Grand 
Coalition...hut we say 'Yes...But'.”404 Populism found its mouthpiece in the 
Ruch Ludzi Pracy (Movement of Working People405), whose use of the 
discourse of 'removing the remnants of Stalinism' was indicative of the rather 
conservative and defensive reformism espoused earlier by the pragmatic 
centre.'Stalinism' could be used as a catch-all term which actually denoted 
very little. "With the fa ll of Stalinist structuresthe group’s November 
resolution began:
"Society has freed itself. But we see the state of Poland today. Polish wealth, 
work and ideas are being sold for nothing and Poland is losing its economic 
sovereignty. The future of our fatherland and the biological entities of our 
families are the values of the highest order. Our aim is to create a society of freely 
working people. A. real threat is marked by the loss of working class control over 
the exercise of power."406
The advocation of a strong PZPR bargaining position within the reform 
process attracted many middle and lower level Party members and many 
working in the State administration. Populists' call for a defence of "the 
working classf echoing the first discursive option, for example, indicated 
to these 'inner' constituencies, a continuity in ideological commitments.
402Stodkowska, I., (1995) Ibid. p.17
4^Slodkowska, I., (1995) Ibid. p.18
404Slodkowska, I., (1995) Ibid. p. 18
Trybuna Ludu, October 13th 1989
4^Slodkowska, I., (1995) op cit. pp.34-35
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From the 13th Plenum onwards the struggle to influence the pragmatic 
centre was being won by the Populist rather than Globalist reformers. This 
was most evident in the Party elite's rejection of a merger with leftist 
groups in Solidarity and its resistance to the fundamental rejection of 
existing ideological and historical discourses also reinforced this. 
Rakowski and Jaruzelski, began to play a much harder game with 
Solidarity. A coded discourse of threats emerged; threatening Solidarity 
with either bureaucratic resistance ('Your premier, our bureaucracy"407) or 
outright threats of a return to martial law. The main concern of the 
pragmatic centre was clearly to preserve as much of the round table as 
possible; to hold onto whatever political gains had been afforded to the 
Party by the accords. However, in many public speeches in late August 
Rakowski congratulated Mazowiecki and stated publicly on September 
2nd that a government of "broad coalition" could count on his party's 
support. "The Party does not intend," he stated, "to shun co-responsibility for 
Poland"408 If Mazowiecki failed, however, Rakowski continued, to meet 
the Party's expectations, it (the Party) would only occupy the posts of 
external and internal security and would go into "constructive opposition"^ 
However, by mid-September Rakowski's position had hardened:
"To Party and non-Party members alike, the Party has not abandoned its 
position too easily. It is guided in its actions by the national interest and has no 
desire to adopt the stance o f'the worse, the better.' I  am convinced that time m il 
free the Party from the experience of the past. It has an historic chance of
407Trybuna Ludu, September 4th, 1989
408Trybuna Ludu, September 4th 1989. Ibid. 
409Trybuna Ludu, September 4th 1989. Ibid.
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strengthening its political vitality and becoming a broad based party of the Polish 
left.”410
The key domestic non-Party factor influencing the new PZPR discourse 
and political line more widely continued to lie in the deals drawn up at 
the round table and the relationship between reformist sections of the 
PZPR and moderates within Solidarity. Following the elections and the 
formation of a non-communist government, the Party’s relationship with 
Solidarity became more complex. Groups within Solidarity began to 
question the need for an agreement at all. The PZPR was politically 
bankrupt, argued a significant section of the Solidarity trade union 
movement, centred around the Walesa and Kaczynski milieu in 
Gdansk.411 They called, for example, for a ban on the PZPR, abolition of 
the nomenclature and stripping of the PZPR's legal right to own 
property. The trade union wings of Solidarity, supported by a section of 
the Polish Episcopate and endowed with external (Western) support and 
societal legitimation, however, were becoming increasingly detached 
from the Warsaw-based intellectual elites that had dominated the 
Solidarity round table delegation in April. Various de-Communisation 
legislation was passed during late 1989.412 However, the Mazowiecki 
government, which sat, as had the Rakowski government between two 
extremes within its own ranks, continued to talk of a legal, constitutional
410Trybuna Ludu, September 4th 1989. Ibid.
^^Trybuna Ludu, September 4th 1989. Ibid.
4 ^ M i l l a r d ,  p^  (1994) 0p cit. De-communisation: name change, from Polish People’s Republic to the 
Republic of Poland; abolition of ZOMO special police forces and other sections of the army and police; 
commission to investigate the activities of the MSW (Ministry of Interior) since December 1981 set up; 
PZPR privileges, in the form of bank subsidies, credits and tax exemptions were stopped and PZPR assets, 
those which were accessible, were confiscated. By the end of January 1990 a government commission had 
been set up to assess the legal title of the PZPR to State assets.
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and evolutionary process of transition.413 The government thus did not 
seek to marginalise the PZPR immediately and the PZPR promised to 
continue to provide support for the economic legislative programme 
undertaken from October 1988 onwards. However, the government also 
made some concessions to the more hard-line elements within Solidarity 
by setting up the so-called 'Michnik Committee'414 to investigate the 
affairs of the MSW (Ministry of the Interior).
The most coherent answer to the question of why the new government 
did not seek immediate retribution, however, lies in the alliance of PZPR 
Sejm deputies and OKP Sejm deputies within the Sejm. Combined, they 
resisted any executive push towards de-Communisation. The role of the 
Rakowski leadership group within the Politburo is also significant in this 
regard. It sought to counter balance any anti-Communist tendency within 
Solidarity by a dual discourse of hard talk vis-a-vis the USSR and 
nomenclature and softer talk with those within Solidarity sympathetic to 
reformers within the PZPR. Furthermore, the rapidity with which 
Solidarity had come to executive power clearly alarmed many within the 
opposition movement and the seriousness of economic problems 
continued to be a crucial factor. Any government would be faced with 
resolving structural and long-term economic problems (exacerbated in 
the final weeks of the Rakowski government by the unconditional freeing 
of agricultural prices415). Added to this, Solidarity was already showing 
signs of fragmenting internally and cleavages that were to develop after 
1990 can be seen as significant at this early stage - for example between
413Millard, F., (1994) Ibid.
414Millard, F., (1994) Ibid.
413Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit. pp.140-143
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the leftist, Warsaw based intelligentsia, the Gdansk based trade union 
sections and the lay Catholic KIK groups.416
The new government was unable to move in any direction without the 
implicit sanction of the PZPR, which retained control over Ministries of 
Interior, Foreign Office as well as the Presidency. Thus Solidarity was 
faced with a paradox. It was popularly committed to de-Communisation, 
but it could not achieve this without the support of the PZPR - the 
Communists themselves. The new government was also obliged to 
operate within the context of a Soviet presence on Polish soil and within 
the terms dictated by existing commitments both to COMECON and 
the Warsaw Pact. It was thus faced with various choices conditioned by 
both of the above factors, as well as pressures exerted through groups 
within Solidarity, the Church and non-Solidarity opposition and the 
parameters of possible policy within the existing economic conditions. 
Between October and January 1990 there was a continuation of the 
existing political alliances forged during the round table talks which acted 
to shield the changing PZPR. Solidarity leftists such as Mtichnik, Kuron 
and Litynski, who had made contacts with figures within the PZPR, were 
clearly also aware, however, that any overt merger would undermine the 
legitimacy of the new government. What, therefore, took place is an 
implicit compromise between the two factions of their wider 
constituencies.417 The PZPR pledged to support the Solidarity 
government’s ambitious economic reform programme418 in return for a 
tacit agreement that the Solidarity government would honour the round
416Staniszkis, J., (1992) Ibid.
417Kaczynski, J., (1991a) op cit
418Karpinski, J., (1994)
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table agreements, i.e. that the new government would not engage in 
immediate de-Communisation and public purging of Communist 
officials.419
Mazowiecki’s "thick line" approach represented a refusal to engage in 
immediate anti-Communist activity. Added to this, the two mouthpieces 
of the secular and lay Catholic left within Solidarity (Tygodnik Pom^echnj 
and Ga^eta Wyborc^a respectively) began to emerge as de facto 
legitimators of this strategy. Michnik even forgave the PZPR for things 
done in what he called the spirit of "promethean ideals."420 Contacts and 
meetings between various members of both reformist camps continued 
to take place up to and after the PZPR's final Congress, with Rakowski 
and Walesa having at a highly publicised ’informal’ meeting at the end of 
December. Walesa offered Rakowski his public support (which he 
subsequendy was obliged to retract) in the rebuilding of the post- 
Communist left.
What was emerging was a new PZPR which adopted much of the 
rhetoric of its Globalist wings but combined this with a much more 
traditional conception of its role within the political process. The PZPR 
elite clearly also sought to retain much of the financial, political, 
organisational and, in part at least, the political-historical capital accrued 
during 40 years of Communist rule. Between the 15th Plenum and 11th 
Congress, the Party elite articulated, at different levels, a highly consistent 
discourse with which to justify itself as a political entity. Rakowski, at the 
final Congress of the PZPR on 30th January 1990, for example, sought to
41^Wildstein, B., (1991) op cit.
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salvage something from the ideological baggage that had most clearly 
defined the PZPR. Socialism was about values and had no necessary 
connection with the dominating role of the State in public and political 
life, he argued. It should, thus, not be jettisoned.
"We are against the attempts to restore capitalism. However we support the 
reforms aimed at a social market economy. The parties and organisations active 
on the left cannot retreat from all forms of socialism. Contemporary socialism 
cannot shut its yes to the real contradictions. In this sense, the tradition which 
we follow is socialist, not Communist, in its ideology. In practise, however, the 
economic programme of the left m il concur with social democracy. The Solidarity 
group is also looking for an ideological identity. In this the Polish left is 
indispensable. Its ideals and values are in line with national and personal 
aspirations of Poles. We have exhausted the strength of the PZPR and its 
possibility of retaining social trust. There is still time to build a new Polish left- 
in line with Polish left intellectual traditions"421
420 Zubek, V., (1995) op cit. pp.453
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3. E ast Vs W est
Central to the PZPR's evolving discourse of legitimation was the notion 
of the PZPR as composed of decent-hard working and patriotic Poles, 
who had been pushed into making compromises (like everyone else) by 
the strength of hard-liners within the Polish State, supported by the 
USSR.422 The 'real* PZPR thus began to be portrayed as a bearer of Polish 
progressive and cultural traditions, as an outpost of Western social 
democracy, a carrier of Western values.423 The PZPR had always been a 
national party, a public and progressive entity, according to this 
reasoning:
"We reject dogma. We do not defend Stalinism. We reject coercion as a foreign 
method and source of exercising power. We reject the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the undemocratic character of State institutions and instruments 
used by the Vary. We are moving away from primitive collectivism and towards 
personal freedoms and the rights of man, from the doctrines of a falsification of 
the understanding of internationalism. We are not capitulating from the past. 
Socialism is not a level of Stalinism. We are convinced that a new left party will 
be able to return socialism to its values."424
The notion of socialistic values which pre-date Stalinism was central to 
the emerging rationale of the new Party elite. Operative or practical 
socialism - that which the Party could claim to have been deploying 
throughout the post-Beirut period - was essentially at odds with the 
doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. If the doctrines themselves could be
^^SJodkowska, I., (1995) op cit. pp.18-27 
^^Rakowski, M. R., (1992) op cit.
^^Kozniewski, a ., (1991)
424punk Widzenia (1989)
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passed off as rhetorical devices for justifying or covering up Russia’s 
imperial intentions, all the better for the collapsing PZPR and its 
potential post-Communist legitimation.
However, the PZPR was still caught in a delicate political position. On 
one hand it was seeking, by deploying in key Party texts a continuation of 
the discourse of ’crimes of the Stalinist period,' to locate itself closer to the 
Polish nation be evoking Soviet repression. On the other hand, after 
August 1989, the plight of the PZPR was partially conditioned by the 
involvement of the USSR in the domestic affairs of the newly formed 
Solidarity government. Alongside the anti-Stalinism discourse therefore, 
a continuation of socialist internationalism (as a signifier of bloc 
orthodoxy) was also clear, illustrated in the following passage:
"Our place in Europe and the world: The sovereignty and independence of our 
nation is the highest priority. We reject the role of external domination between 
States. Our aim is solidarity and national friendship, placing Poland in the 
heart of Europe. Our membership of the Warsaw Pact alliance should be 
realised in the conditions of 'our common European home.' We want to move 
closer to Europe, while keeping our strong links with the USSR. We are an 
integral member of the European and world left."A2b
The role of the Soviet Union in the domestic affairs of both the Polish 
State and the PZPR is significant, if not always clear, during this period. 
Between August and January a series of meetings took place between 
representatives of the new Polish government and the Soviet leadership 
and between CPSU and PZPR leaders. The defining moment took the
425Punkt Widzenia (1989) Ibid.
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form of a telephone conversation between Gorbachev and Jaruzelski on 
August 22nd.426 Gorbachev moved from pressing the PZPR into resisting 
the relinquishment of its executive position to accepting that 
fundamental political changes were unavoidable and that the Party must 
participate in the formation of a government. Subsequent meetings 
marked the Soviet position in relation to a Solidarity-led government and 
laid down various implicit and explicit conditions for its effective 
functioning. The first such meeting, on 25th August, took place between 
Mazowiecki and Kryuchkov, Chairman of the Soviet State Security 
Committee (KGB). Kryuchkov spoke of Mazowiecki as a 11solid and 
principled marl'*11 and stated that Moscow had nothing to worry about 
over the political changes in Poland, thus signalling the Soviet’s 
recognition of the existing state of Polish affairs. The second signal came 
on 15th September from Soviet foreign minister, Gerasimov, who stated 
that the USSR was ready to co-operate with the new Polish government 
and develop mutual relations. On October 7th Rakowski visited Moscow, 
assuring various groups, most notably within the CPSU, that those who 
wanted to dismantle socialism in Poland would be resisted while the 
PZPR remained in a strong position. "Who knows" Rakowski told Pravda, 
”economic realities may also undermine the Mazowiecki government. The PZPR 
supports those of responsible and socialist orientation within Solidarity.”428 On 23rd 
October Gorbachev's senior reformist ally, Shevadnardzy, visited Poland 
and during a meeting with the new government stated that what was 
happening in Poland was not "causing an allergic reaction in Moscow"429 On 
23rd November Mazowiecki assured Moscow that Poland was stable and
^^Niklasson, T., (Pridham, G., and Vanhanen, K. (Eds.) 1997) p.189 
^^Niklasson, T., (Pridham, G., and Vanhanen, K., (Eds.) 1997. Ibid. p. 190 
4^ Niklasson, T., (Pridham, G., and Vanhanen, K., (Eds.) 1997. Ibid. p. 193
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continued to commit itself to the Warsaw Treaty alliance. On 24th 
November Gorbachev and Mazowiecki exchanged public apologies for 
so-called "past mistakes" and recent anti-Soviet attacks in Poland, 
respectively. Mazowiecki also called for a clearing up of history and a 
settling of accounts about Katyn and the deportations and persecution of 
Poles. Following the collapse of the Berlin wall in November, the USSR 
restated its commitment to a new mode of socialist alliances, one which 
recognised the need for national autonomy within the Soviet bloc.
However, it is also clear that the Soviets were keen to guarantee that any 
changes within the bloc could be controlled and would not undermine 
the internal security and existing borders of the USSR. The Kremlin 
sanctioned changes within Poland on condition that Solidarity was made 
aware that any reforms had to submit to certain preconditions. One, that 
Poland would not fall out of the existing Warsaw Pact alliance. Two, that 
trade and other economic commitments within COMECON would be 
changed gradually. Three, that the PZPR would be allowed to play an 
important role within the new political environment. The Mazowiecki 
government was made aware of these conditions at these meetings and 
via other public communiques.
Rakowski* s speech to the last Congress of the PZPR in January 1990 is 
symptomatic of the reasoning embedded in the emerging legitimational 
discourses of the PZPR in relation to the USSR. It is questionable if 
Rakowski, himself in close contact with figures in the Soviet Union, 
would have felt able to use such strong language had it not been for three
^^Niklasson, T., (Pridham, G., and Vanhanen, K., (Eds.) 1997. Ibid.
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factors. One, the Gorbachev line on satellite autonomy within Eastern 
Europe. Two, the failure of hard-liners within the CPSU to wrestle 
power out of the hands of Gorbachev during late 1989. Three, the Soviet 
discourses of Perestroika. All of these combined to make any domestic 
Polish discourses in relation to the USSR pro-Soviet, anti-Stalinist and 
nationally oriented at the same time. Rakowski's line was clearly located 
within the traditional anti-Stalinist line that had been developed from the 
7th Plenum onwards in 1988. He rhetorically asked the 11th Congress:
"Was the PZPR, which was created out of the unification of PPR and PPS, 
ever capable of becoming a party, which resolutely went along the Polish road to 
socialism? Pet us remember that the Party was created when Stalin was 
strengthening his powerful influence on the international Communist 
movement...the possible choices were very limited. In this situation only a 
government of the left, accepting subjugation to the USSR was capable of 
maintaining sufficient range of autonomy and independence. The alternatives 
were dangerous. The Stalinist repression cannot be forgotten, including that of 
Gomulka."™
Rakowski’s reference to Gomulka is significant in that, by equating 
Gomulka with Stalinism, he was clearly close to accepting that Polish 
Communists (even during the post-1956 period of A  Polish Road to 
Socialism*) had some domestic autonomy from Moscow. However, his 
main line of reasoning did not, in fact, seek to equate the two spheres 
and relied on the traditional rationale:
430Trybuna Ludu, February 2nd 1990
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"After 1956, the Party sought to gain maximum autonomy in the years before 
Perestroika. The polity of the USSR in the pre-Gorbachev days had an 
imperialist character, the effects of which were most sharply felt in 1981. 
Brezhnev was incapable of understanding the reasons for the mass workers revolt 
in July and August 1980. Why, they asked, are you not allowing the real 
Communists to speak? I  recall the constant visits of Gromyko, the words of 
Kulikov and Zamyatin. The above mentioned doctrine blocked, to a large 
extent, the dismantling of the Stalinist economic and political structures. The 
imposed model of Soviet socialism was one the main reasons for our heavy defeat 
(at the June 1989 elections). The Soviet model was developed in a county 
without deep democratic traditions and was a continuation of customs 
characteristic of the feudal era. Our nation instinctively felt the artificial and 
foreign nature of the concept of the political ystem that was being implemented. 
This is undoubtedly an unpleasant confession, but it has to be made if  we want 
to win the bridgeheads of credibility for the future leftist socialist party which is 
being created?'431
The Rakowski speech is interesting for two main reasons. One, the place, 
occasion and time of its delivery and two, in that it opened up a more 
pronounced anti-Soviet discourse. Rakowski was freed, to a certain 
extent, from the need to appease the USSR. The Soviets had reconciled 
themselves within the Gorbachev camp to a relinquishment of direct 
influence and were prepared to deal with the various ’national1 parties 
that were emerging in each previously satellite country. The PZPR was 
thus no longer central to the Soviet Union in its relationship with Poland.
Try buna Ludu, January 30th 1990
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4. Past Vs Present
"The Party," Rakowski stated at the 16th Plenum:
"must come to terms with its role in the past... not all of which is negative... We 
recognise the authentic achievements of the PRL - post-war reconstruction, 
advancing the mass of people, assuring peace in Poland and external 
security. "432
The PZPR was developing a discourse that dealt with recent, as well as 
more distant history. Rakowski, for example, talked of Jaruzelski as a 
national saviour and martial law as a national tragedy: "It was a national 
tragedy brought about by national heroes who, appearing to undermine the nation, 
saved it,"433 He also talked of the 1980's as a period during which the 
PZPR "had waited for the opposition to grow up" The notion of 'impossible 
circumstances''434 also became regularly adopted both at Central Committee 
sessions and elsewhere in the Party-controlled media to sanction the role 
of the Party within the period of martial law.
Rakowski was searching for a discourse that was able to evoke the 
traditional signifiers to Party faithful via continued references to Polish 
socialist precedents while also indicating the Party's desire to run with the 
course of reforms and not undermine the Solidarity government. He 
used the traditional language of threats combined with the Globalist 
language of legality, responsibility and progress, all of which could be 
read both as support for the new regime and as a part of a line of Polish 
socialist discourse linking the present with the post-1956 PZPR. The
432Trybuna Ludu, January 25th 1990.
433 fry  buna Ludu, January 25th 1990. Ibid.
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following section is interesting in terms of this historical discursive 
legitimation:
"How can we overcome the past, the ballast that is placed on our back? Only by 
a return to the European and Polish understanding of socialism. I f  we go back 
to the origins of socialist thought we see that its authors saw socialism as a 
development of democratic republicanism. A. State governed by law, 
parliamentarianism, rights, separation of Church and State, secularity and 
universal education, the autonomy of science, independence of courts, freedom of 
speech, religion and conscience. The feudal ystem of socialism created by Stalin 
distorted these concepts. We must reclaim them. The new party should carry on 
the living tradition of the Polish left: Dcibrowolski and the Legionnaires, 
Euella, Dgbowski, and the Revolutionaiy Democrats, Worcell, Krqpowiecki, 
Traugutt and the Reds, Warsynski and Umanowski, Rnymcki and 
Abramowski, Pilsudski (at the time he was a socialist), Das^ynski, 
Nied^alowski, Kostrewa-Kos^utska, Prochnik, Lange and Hochfeld. Without 
the return of those names there can be no awareness of the left and thus no 
party."*15
Resolutions of the 17th Plenum in January 1990 further illustrate this 
historical discourse and its reconstruction of Polish socialism:
"Above all it (the new partyj will be a Polish party. It will offer a third way 
which will be a complete contradiction of real socialism and an alternative to the 
free market... the long term aim is working towards a new form of democratic 
socialism, away from the axiological values of Communism. We are leading
434WolaA, A., (1991)
433Punk Widzenia (1989) op cit.
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towards the ideals of a rational society: against nationalism, chauvinism and the 
neutral state."™
The pragmatic centre was thus seeking both to oust the Globalist factions 
from the Party's decision-making bodies, while also claiming and 
articulating many of its discourses. Marxist-Leninist socialism could be 
passed off as a 'foreign' and even 'anti-Polish' import without actually 
rejecting the core values of this ideology. Practise had failed, but the 
values remained the same, in other words. The Party's reformist wings 
had always, according to Rakowski, been searching for rational solutions 
and had remained national and close to the Polish people. It was, on this 
basis, simply a combination of external pressure and internal 
mismanagement that had undermined the reformist agendas (in 1956, 
1970, 1980-81). The PZPR's so-called Programmatic Commission,437 
which was set up at the 16th Plenum in 1989 to organise the final 
Congress, presented the programmatic resolution of the PZPR at the 
final Plenum in January 1990, including a re-evaluation of the past and 
values for the future:
"The fact is that Stalinism and neo-Stalinism did not rise out of the aims and 
traditions of the Polish left. The current reform thought developed and became 
stronger during the last 10 years and co-created the conditions for reforms which 
were expressed at the 10th Plenum and initiative on the round table. The 
contradiction between capital and labour does exist, the problem is how to 
resolve it. Marxist socialism wanted to resolve it unilaterally and radically which 
caused a halt to economic development, the end of innovation and the strong
436Punkt Widzenia (1989) Ibid.
437Punkt Widzenia (1989) Ibid.
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State. The attempts at reform since 1956 have been, unfortunately, half hearted. 
The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat in this way led to the loss of 
ideological identity of Communist Parties. The PZPR was becoming a party for 
distributing posts and benefits. Society, which has been freed from the barrier of 
fear, has declared its commitment to Solidarity. Let us say openly that we 
deserved a good thrashing. "438
438Punkt Widzenia (1989) Ibid.
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5. Conclusions
It was within this period that the most open discursive transformations 
of the PZPR took place. The Party ditched most of it's core discursive 
commitments to Marxism-Leninism, while retaining and rethinking 
various core values of socialism. This social-democratisation of the 
PZPR, given the gradual and transactional character of the round table 
process of democratisation, the Party's own transformation from the 10th 
Plenum onwards, combined with the weaknesses of the Solidarity 
government and the continued external legitimating presence of the 
Soviet Union, however, was less problematic and more unilinear than 
one might have expected.
The PZPR transformed itself at various levels simultaneously. On one 
level it altered various ideological and historical discourses. It refocused 
on the role of the PZPR reform wings during the 'dark years' of Stalinist 
repression, located itself as the nation's saviour during martial law and 
stressed the essential values of socialism that had been submerged under 
the weight of Soviet and military pressure. It offered its conditional and 
'principled' support for the new Mazowiecki government but also sought a 
means of using its parliamentary position to safeguard itself from the 
rapid de-Communisation strategy advocated by many within Solidarity 
during late 1989. In relation to Western actors, the Party worked hard to 
position itself on the side of responsibility, in particular, its conditional 
support for the 'shock-therapy' programme.
After August 1989 such a transformation appeared unlikely. The Party 
was losing support within its own ranks and the Central Committee,
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which had been less than unequivocal in its support for the elite’s 
decision to enter into the round table talks, was acquiring political 
autonomy. Solidarity's Sejm Club of Deputies had forged good working 
relations with sections of the PZPR Club of Deputies and the latter was 
also distancing itself and asserting its independence from the Politburo. 
Added to this the Mazowiecki government, under pressure from the 
more nationalistic and trade union wings of the Solidarity movement, 
was seriously engaged in a debate concerning the abolition of the PZPR 
altogether and the State's re-acquisition of its funds and properties. 
However, at the same time, Solidarity's leftist elites argued that the PZPR 
could not be allowed to disappear for two main reasons. The first was 
strategic-geopolitical: the importance of recognising the continued 
relevance of the Soviet Union as a player in domestic politics and the 
need to reassure the CPSU that Poland was not undergoing a Catholic- 
nationalist coup, which would have been seen as threatening its internal 
security. The second was related to the need for a strong left in the 
democratic transition. On the other hand, reformers within the PZPR 
were obliged to play a delicate game of political negotiation with 
Solidarity. Solidarity moderation would, it was argued, provide the Party 
with a means of quietly transforming itself and re-adjusting to new 
political realities.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions
l .  Introduction
This chapter sets out four objectives. One, to provide an overview of 
continuities and discontinuities in PZPR discursive legitimations and 
from this to evaluate, on an empirical level, the central continuity 
hypothesis. Two, to comment on the theoretical relevance of discourses 
of legitimation in the Polish transition and more widely. Three, to assess 
these conclusions in the light of the post-Communist legitimations of the 
SdRP. Four, to summarise the relevance of the work on post-Communist 
studies more widely.
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2. Continuity/ Discontinuity
Contrary to many studies of both the PZPR during the Polish political 
transition in 1989 (in particular Zubek's and Smolar’s439) and the role of 
Communist ideology during and after the collapse of Communism 
(Schull’s440), there is a strong case for continuity hypotheses in PZPR 
discourses. The PZPR's changing mode of legitimation during 1988-90 
represents a case of re-ordering and re-emphasising key discursive 
elements. It is not, as Schull suggests, a total negation of the ideological 
legitimations of pre-1989 nor, as Zubek suggests, simply a reflection of 
fragmenting institutionalised elite interests. Schull's argument reduces the 
complexity of the transition. His views postulate over-deterministic 
relations between system and Party and Party and ideology. He therefore 
fails to understand how, as the system transformed in 1989, both the 
Party and ideology altered. Zubek fails to recognise that discourse itself 
plays an important role in the legitimation process and, in this case, a key 
role. Re-ordering and re-emphasis of discourse imply a process of 
selective shedding and reinterpretation of elements of the discourse. The 
PZPR articulated a series of discourses of continuity and adaptation, 
reconstructing and retaining key elements in the normative sphere and 
loosening or abandoning many of its commitments to existing means of 
achieving them.
439Zubek, V., (1995) op cit.; Smolar, A., (1994) op cit.
^^Schull, J., (1992) op cit.; Walker, R., (1989) op cit.; Fukuyama. F., (1992) op cit.
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2.1. Establishing 'continuity'
The dominant tendency during 1988-90 was a reemphasis away from 
traditional towards more legal-rational discourses of legitimation. This was 
illustrated in the three discourses of 'Public’ Vs ’Private} ’Past’ Vs ’Present’ 
and 'East’Vs ’West!
2.11 'Public' discourses
More pronounced ’Public’ discourses evolved out of the PZPR’s pre­
existing ideological structures. This process was driven by a dynamic of 
internal and external forces that necessitated political reappraisal within 
the higher echelons of the PZPR during late 1988 and early 1989 and was 
accelerated by the round table agreements and collapse of the PZPR’s 
leading role thereafter. The evolving 'Public’ discourses centred on a 
discursive reconstruction of ’society’ (and discrete aspects of it), ’the State’ 
and 'constitutionalism.’ PZPR discourses, for example, focused on those 
elements within socialism that corresponded, in discursive terms, with 
aspects of Western-type constitutionalism and of Western-style social 
democracy. The leading role of the party, for example, became 
reconstructed in contingent rather than absolute terms - in terms of a 
dialectic relation not solely between the State (as the subject) and society 
(as the object), but in terms of the Society as an autonomous subject to 
be guided, cajoled and persuaded by an autonomous (although still 
privileged) leading party.
This process of selection and re-emphasis is illustrated most clearly in the 
PZPR’s discourses of 'the working class,' ’trade unions’ and ’opposition. ’ At the 
10th Plenum in January 1989, the working class ceased to represent the
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only driving force of society moving towards socialism, but as one 
amongst a plurality of groups and classes in society. The political 
imperative to legalise Solidarity in early 1989 reduced the political scope 
of the PZPR elite to continue with notions of controlling trade unionism. 
This was driven by factors beyond the PZPR's control, within which it 
became increasingly attached to a set of discourses that had little 
connection with its existing exercise of holding power.
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2.i.ii. 'Western' a n d  'historical' d i s c o u r s e s
The PZPR developed various 'Vast1 discourses to underpin its changing 
relationship with both the USSR and the opposition, but sought to 
marginalise them within a wider discourse of 'socialist reform' (odnowa). 
As the Party lost power during 1989, however, various discourses of 
Polish-Soviet history and Polish history, for example, acquired a more 
pronounced and significant place in the PZPR's search for legitimation, 
both in relation to Polish society and other key groups within the State 
and international society. This is most clearly seen in the discourses of 
Katyn and 'removing the remnants of Stalinism. ' It is also clear in the ways in 
which selected aspects of Polish independence, the traditions of pre-war 
Polish socialism and even martial law were partially reconstructed.
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2.2. Continuity in ’tr a d it io n a l’ discourses
In many ways the tendency towards 'Public' ideological and historical 
discourses was either partial or non-existent,’ however. Partly this is 
explicable in terms of the pre-existing model of discursive legitimation, 
which had been a fragmented and confused combination of competing 
strands within the Communist ideological project, in particular the ways 
in which elements of nationalism and legalism during the 1980's had 
played legitimating roles. The PZPR retained throughout the period 
1988-90 certain discourses that were less unequivocal in their rejection of 
ideological principles, of the USSR and of ‘socialist history, ' representing a 
more traditional, prerogative form of legitimation. Continuities are found 
in many areas, for example, in discourses related to the retention of 
prerogatives in the form of Party control of the security services, the 
military and attempts to retain a widened version of WRON (the Military 
Council) after the elections in 1989. There is a line of continuity within 
the pragmatic centre's discourse related to the notions and applications 
of an ‘opposition,’ for example, which was linked by a desire to continue to 
use the round table agreements as a means of legitimating the continued 
prerogatives of the leading party. Rakowski was clearly willing to sanction 
the continued opening of sub-discourses related to the history of Polish- 
Soviet relations, of Polish socialism and State Socialism, since they 
appeared to have no immediate political ramifications in terms of the 
holding and wielding of power. However, in relation to the concept and 
application of an opposition the PZPR elite was bound by the necessity 
to concede political ground to the Solidarity opposition. The pragmatic 
centre did not fully sanction and did not fully support the round table 
agreement and continued to seek, even after the agreement was signed
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and June elections held, to break up the Solidarity-OKP coalition, steer 
selected members of the Solidarity elite into a widened centre of 
prerogative power within KOK and hoped for a signal from Moscow to 
limit the democratisation process, even as late as November 1989.
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2.3. Longer and shorter-term explanations
Many o f the historical weaknesses of the State Socialist system in Poland, 
paradoxically, made it easier rather than more difficult for the PZPR to 
reconstruct its discourses during 1989-90. The PZPR leadership could 
claim, for example, that it had played a crucial role in retaining a greater 
degree of national sovereignty than would otherwise have been possible 
within the context of the Cold War, the USSR’s aggressively imperial 
interests and Poland inherendy weak geopolitical position. Almost every 
significant milestone in the post-war period provided the possibility of 
multiple interpretation and thus, for the PZPR, space for 
reinterpretation. '1956,' '1968,' 7 970' and 7 980-81' could all be 
reconstructed discursively in terms of gradual reforms within socialism 
that at the same time cemented Poland’s relationship with the USSR.
The short-term political dynamics of the negotiated transition in 1989 are 
also central to the changing pattern of PZPR discourses. In particular, 
the key lies in the dialectic between the political, economic and social 
(both domestic and international) forces acting on the PZPR and the 
changing internal politics of the PZPR itself. The central features of this 
dialectic of discourse and political possibilities are as follows:
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2.31 The moderate Solidarity opposition:
The pragmatic discourses of the PZPR, combined with the apparent 
impossibility of defining a new political arrangement between State and 
society outside of the existing Soviet realm of influence as late as 1990, in 
effect, obliged the Solidarity leadership to adopt a cautious and 
negotiational strategy during 1989. Many within the Solidarity leadership 
retained the desire to 'reform the system from within.' This meant that a 
potential rationale for hard-line reaction within the PZPR to 'anti­
socialist agitators' was undercut. Solidarity moderates thus played a 
definite role in legitimating a reformist branch of the PZPR elite. 
Globalists and 'Populists were thus able to define themselves within a 
political discourse that avoided potentially destabilising possibilities.
2.3.ii. The r o u n d  t a b l e  talks
The agreements reached at the round table institutionalised a legalised 
conception and application of reform and also an institutionalised 
political role for the PZPR. Within this framework the PZPR was able to 
redefine itself in symbolic terms away from a primary association within 
Polish society with non-Polish, authoritarian, and ideological signifiers.
During and after the round table talks, PZPR discourses arose within the 
gap between the formal ideology of the State and the flexible discourse 
of socialist renewal (odnowa), that was being used to legitimate the 
negotiations. 4Past* and West' discourses were exploited by reformers 
within the PZPR and sanctioned by the pragmatic centre within the Party 
during and after the round table, for example, because they appeared to
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legitimate the negotiations taking place, without actually playing a 
determining role within them. They also appeared to sit comfortably 
within the PZPR's existing historical and ideological framework of 
discursive legitimation. They represented continuities within PZPR 
discourse, linking the present with the past of State Socialism in Poland. 
Thus the PZPR could claim to be a party of the nation, for example, by 
re-identifying itself in discursive critiques of Stalinism and pointing to the 
distance between itself and its Russian counterparts. It could also point 
to the principles embedded within odnowa as currents within a deeper 
'Western' democratic and legalistic tradition. Socialism, for example, 
became associated with many signifiers of the Western social democratic 
and socialist tradition, and thus tied into the historical development of 
Marxist thinking in Western Europe rather than the authoritarianism of 
the Eastern version.
The PZPR's deployment of 'socialist reformist' (odnowa) discourses in the 
period of the round table facilitated the repositioning of the Party in 
symbolic terms away from its primary association with the Soviet Union, 
while at the same time the PZPR made clear signals that its position 
within Polish society and the State was a necessary condition of the 
Soviets' sanctioning domestic developments. Since odnowa did not bind 
the PZPR elite to any definite strategy, the language was sufficiently 
flexible to allow the emergence of strands of the discourse.
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2.3.iii. The role of the U SSR
The weakening of the Soviet rationale for PZPR dominance within the 
State and the specific correlation of the role of Solidarity and the Church 
in the construction of a national dialogue undermined any harder-line 
interpretations of the socialist reform process and allowed a reform 
minded set of factions to arise within the pragmatic centre of the PZPR, 
most clearly after the 10th Plenum.
The Soviet Union did not make any definite signal throughout this 
period that it planned to interfere in Polish internal affairs. If anything, it 
signalled that the Polish example could be used as a kind of 'test-case' for 
the region. Thus, what one sees is the absence of another key 
legitimational stabiliser for the pre-existing interpretation of State Socialism 
in Poland. The discourse of gradualism inherent within odnowa relied 
upon the tacit and at times open understanding that the USSR would not 
sanction any reforms within Poland that crossed an arbitrary 'socialist' 
line. As the line blurred and in places disappeared altogether, reformers 
within the PZPR pushed existing interpretations within official discourse 
into a more pronounced articulation of the democratic and constitutional 
elements within odnowa.
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3. The relevance of Discourse
This thesis illustrates how discourse both facilitates and inhibits political 
action and political intention. Discourse is woven by competing groups 
for power in a process of negotiation and compromise. Parties seek to 
locate themselves within aspects of overlapping and generalised modes 
of representing and constructing the world, without ’owning' or 
occupying exclusively these symbolic terrains. Thus the questions of 
intentions and strategies in politics needs reassessment. Those post- 
Communist studies that have tended to focus on the rhetoric of the 
SdRP and its implicit connections with the PZPR (which is often, rather 
unhelpfully, demonised), have tended to focus on one aspect of the 
transition that, in many ways, is less relevant than the overt content and 
functions of discourse in constructing and determining these intentions 
and strategies in the first place. The discourse of odnowa, for example, 
contained within its overt articulation, references to parliamentary 
democracy, to economic marketisation reform, to the rights of man and 
other, apparently non-Communist discourses. It provided the PZPR 
elites with an ideological reference point, but at the same time, provided 
the same elite with many areas where operative (synchronic) 
interpretation was possible.
In the general works on system change in Central and Eastern Europe 
there is a marked absence of work on the ways in which players within 
the political game came to be located on one side or the other, how they 
saw themselves and each other not simply in terms of objectively 
quantifiable 'positions' governed by the logic of rational self- and 
collective- interests, but in often symbolic terms, as part of a "project' or
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"community" or "set of values," for example. The ways in which discourse 
both appeared to ’liberate1 the PZPR elite from its commitments to 
Marxism-Leninism, but simultaneously attached it to a democratisation 
process that it was unable to control, adds w;eight to this theoretical 
position. Discourse, by avoiding the pitfalls of models of legitimation 
that stress either belief or action or both, is better equipped to deal with 
the complexities that structured the pattern of political change during 
this period in Poland.
A discursive analysis of the PZPR's transition challenges some basic 
assumptions in the field of Polish transition studies, in particular those 
represented by Walker and Schull, that the ideological collapse of 
Communism can be equated with the ideological collapse of the PZPR. 
Within the sphere of those who, at least in part, recognise and accept the 
need to adopt a more variegated conception of Communist legitimation, 
such as Zubek441 and Przeworski,442 certain historical and theoretical 
details of the transition in Poland, in particular the role played by the 
discourses of the PZPR and the role of discourse in defining and 
delineating the Party’s (as well as the system’s) transformation are also 
questioned. By constructing forms of political identity, discourse acted to 
alter group relations during this transition. A rational choice 
understanding of the transition, however, fails to conceptualise how pre­
existing identities can structure political choices, and therefore, political 
outcomes.
441 Zubek, V., (1994) and (1995) op cit.
^^Przew orski, A., (1992) op cit. Przeworski deploys the most open rational choice methodology for 
explaining the transition. His "prisoner’s dilemma" model cannot simply be rejected because it represents a 
clear and simplified model o f the ways in which the negotiated transfer of power took place. Osiatynski 
(Elster, J., (ed.) (1996) also shares, to a certain extent the view that rational calculation can act as a way of 
conceptualising and explaining the so-called "Transition through transaction" in Poland. However, 
Przeworski himself recognises the limits to this approach and the weakness of its historical accuracy.
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4. The SdRP'spolitical legitimation, 1990-97
Continuities (and selective discontinuities) in PZPR discourses before 
1990 provided one significant means by which the post-Communist 
SdRP was able to retain a political presence and build a post-Communist 
legitimational discourse. In post-Communist Poland, the SdRP has 
managed to survive successive attempts to ban and bankrupt it, 
undertaken in the name of de-Communisation.443 It has more than 
merely survived, however. It began rapidly after 1990 to dominate the 
political left. Having contested initially with other left and centre-left 
parties, both from the ex-Solidarity movement (Democratic Union, UD, 
and the Union of Labour, UP) and from the old PZPR itself (Polish 
Union of Social-democracy, PUS),444 it emerged as the strongest party of 
the left and the largest single party in the Sejm at the 1993 Sejm elections. 
From 1993 to 1997 the SdRP dominated a coalition government (with 
the reformed peasants' party, PSL) of the centre-left.
The SdRP inherited extensive institutional and organisational structures 
from the PZPR.445 It also possessed an experienced leadership and many 
who had left the PZPR as it was collapsing in 1989-90 moved back 
towards the party.446 Furthermore the leftist wing of Solidarity (around
^^Wprost, 17th March 1998 op cit.
444The literature on the rise of the SdRP after 1990 is quite extensive both in Poland and in the West. See, 
Lewis. P. (1993d) op cit.; Kaczynski, J., (1991) op cit.; Frydman.R, et al., (1996); Glasman.M., (1994) op 
cit.; Jones.M ,. (1993); Malinowski, W., (1989); Michnik, A., (1996a) op cit.; Smolar, A., (1994) op cit.; 
Wojciechowski.J., (1990) op cit.; Zubek.V (1995) and (1994) op cit.; Walicki. A., (1997) op cit. Lewis offers 
perhaps the best analysis of the initial (1990-93) period of post-Communist politics in Poland. He deals with 
the factionalism within the post-Solidarity movement and the ’quiet rebuilding of the SdRP,’ while Zubek 
provides a strong account of the relationship between PZPR reformers and Solidarity moderates. The national 
debate to do with Communism, furthermore, continues to rage well into the post-Communist period. Smolar, 
A., (1994) op cit.; Michnik, A., (1996) op cit., Wanczyk, P.S., (1996), Walicki, A., (1997), and Zaremba, M., 
(1998) represent the tip of an iceberg in terms of the wider debate about the role of the PZPR within the old 
system.
445 Zubek, V., (1995) Ibid.
^^Kadzmarek, L., (1991) op cit.
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Michnik and Kuron), during 1990-93, dominated a government 
campaign against the idea of de-Communisation.447 The Solidarity left 
tended to define its main enemy as the Solidarity right rather than the 
SdRP. The SdRP also managed to retain, via its control of the Presidency 
(until late 1990) and the Ministries of Internal and External Affairs (also 
until late 1990) a strong foothold within key institutions of the State.448
This apparent reversal of fortunes was neither predicted nor at all self- 
explanatory. The end of Communism, one might reasonably have 
expected (and one heard much talk of during and immediately after 
1989449), heralded the political consolidation of one or more of the 
Solidarity groups that emerged during 1990 as the organisational 
structure of the Solidarity movement wound itself down and split into 
various camps (ROAD, and later UD, on the centre-left and KLD, on 
the centre-right). The SdRP, however, had cleared up many historical 
questions,450 disattached itself from dogmatic ideology and reworked its 
legitimational discourses to deal with many of the negative effects felt 
during the immediate period of economic transformation. It appeared 
for many moderate, secular and competent in comparison with the 
Catholic and nationalist right. A central dynamic of the SdRP's political 
successes lies in the ways in which the PZPR had anchored itself before 
1990 in the three key discourses examined during this thesis.
447Wildstein, B., (1993) op cit.
4^Staniszkis, J., (1992) op cit.
^^Lipiec, J.J., (1990) op cit; Poprzeczko, J., (1990)
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4.1. Vast I  Present
Having dealt with much of its past during 1989, the reformed PZPR, the 
SdRP, was able to redefine itself more clearly within a national 
conception of history after 1989. Furthermore, various discourses of 
continuity evoked a link back to what were seen by many as better times. 
It retained, for example, a strong commitment to 'the achievements of 
the People's Republic (PRL),' many of the values of the 'socialist project' 
and constructed a defence of its own role within the transition. 
Furthermore, the SdRP did not apologise for the Communist period, 
instead actively promoting itself as a defender of the national interest by, 
for example, rethinking the role of General Jaruzelski during the martial 
law period. Publicly, the SdRP adopted the discourse and programmatic 
aims of Western socialist and social democratic parties, although 
continued to talk of several infamous names from recent Polish history 
as 'heroes' and 'mentors' (people such as General Jaruzelski and Edward 
Gierek451).
Zubek, V., (1995) op cit; Walicki, A., (1990) op cit. Jaruzelski was portrayed, for example in his own 
biography (1992), in various speeches of Kwasniewski, as a valiant patriot whose actions were motivated, not 
by any commitments to external powers (the USSR), but by a genuine commitment to and love of his 
fatherland, see both.
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4.2. 'Public/Private'
The PZPR reconstructed its ideological discourses during 1989 and early 
1990, thoroughly shedding commitments to authoritarian signifiers, 
reasserting the values of socialism and locating itself within the reform 
process as an ’initiator' and ’defender’ of both constitutionalism and 
modernism. This ideological reassembling provided the SdRP with a set 
of values and a discursive framework within which to develop its own 
focus of legitimation which would not be bound by Marxist ideological 
commitments. The SdRP represented itself as standard bearer of 
reformism and the more progressive and pragmatic achievements of the 
PRL. It offered friendly, although highly conditional, support for the 
post-Solidarity parties (UD and UP) of the left wing, stressing their 
common roots within the PZPR.452 On the other hand it reasserted the 
position of the old faithful: that section of the PZPR that remained 
committed to the cause until the end (not having left during the 1980’s or 
after 1989).453 The SdRP paints itself as a progressive force, both in terms 
of its commitments to the working class and the ’poorest sections of 
society,’ as well as in terms of its commitments to various of the welfare 
and educational priorities of the Communist system, such as free 
education, free health care and legal abortion, where post-Communist 
tensions and disaffections run high.
The SdRP situates itself within a version of social-democracy that is 
secular (keeping the Church away from direct political involvement in the 
constitutional process). It actively courts any left leaning group within
452Zubek, V. (1995) op cit.
453Zubek, V., (1995) Ibid.
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Polish society, seeking to draw centrist and green and other left parties 
and groups into the SLD. The SdRP has successfully managed to retain 
within the SLD the hard-line ex-Communist left, the PPS (which during 
the transition period most vehemently attacked the PZPR), various 
ecology groups, the ex-official trade union (OPZZ) and various employer 
based organisations.454
The Solidarity opposition that was largely held together by its anti- 
Communist discourses before 1989, did not manage, on the other hand, 
to define itself coherently other than in terms of often vague, traditional 
commitments to Catholicism and trade union rights. Until the election 
victory of AWS (Solidarity Election Action)-UW (Freedom Union) 
coalition in September 1997's Sejm elections neither had been able to 
furnish the various smallish rightist groups with a cogent purpose or set 
of operative discourses or policies.
3.3. 'E ast/ West'
In the post-Communist period, the PZPR's association with the USSR, 
before 1990, has acted to construct the impression that the SdRP 
remains in touch with the 'real' power players in Moscow, and thus, given 
Polish society's ambivalence towards Russia, underpins the party's 
legitimation, in the eyes of many, through the traditional combination of 
fear and respect.
^^Significant members of the SLD at the time of the 1995 Presidential campaign included, the ex-official 
trade union, OPZZ (Ogolnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiqzek Zawodowych), Partia Pracy (Party o f Work), 
Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Socialist Party), Polska Partia Zielonych (Greens), Ruch Ludzi Pracy 
(Movement o f working people), Ruch Niezalezna Inicjatywa Europejska "NIE" (Anti-European Union 
group), Socjaldemokracja Rzespospolita Polskiej (SdRP), Zwi^zek Komunistow Polskich "Proletariat" 
(Communists), Zwi^zek Socjalistycznej Mlodziej Polskiej (Socialist Youth League), Zwi^zek Zawodowy 
Pracownikdw Rolnictwa w RP (Agricultural workers).
258
5. Thesis contributions and relevance
This thesis is intended to act, at one level, as a corrective to some of the 
more one-sided analyses of the Polish transition in 1989. It links 
previously ad hoc elements of the transition together, for example, the 
pre- and post-Communist fields of study - in particular in the role of 
discourse in theories of legitimation. The methodological and theoretical 
work of Taras in the early 1980’s, for example, on the structure of 
ideology used by the PZPR between 1956 and 1983, cannot be ditched 
simply because the thing itself appears to have disappeared. One, because 
the "it” itself has not simply disappeared - given both the relative non­
totalitarianism of the old regime and the ways in which the Polish 
transformation evolved legally within existing structures. Two, because 
political discourses are necessarily bifurcated by a contingent and 
dynamic relationship between beliefs, how they are structured into 
bodies of thought and the ways in which they become operationalised in 
speech acts (discourse), which are ontologically distinct from, if also 
interdependent of, the original structure.
The thesis also provides a more detailed analysis of the PZPR during its 
final period of existence than exists at present within existing literature. 
Zubek's implicit (and at times explicit) view that one can analyse politics 
in general, and this case in particular, in terms of the intentions and 
rational calculations of key actors within given matrices, while logically 
consistent in its own terms, fails to address the ways in which these 
actors both become actors and saw themselves and others within the 
matrices so defined.
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The thesis has raises various questions, many of which within the scope 
of the work, have been touched upon but left unanswered. One, the 
possibilities of comparing the Polish case with other similar cases in the 
region, developing a wider theoretical comparative contribution. Two, 
the possibility of deploying a longer time-span with which to assess the 
legitimation process of the PZPR and its successor party, the SdRP. 
Three, the theoretical use of discourse and theories of legitimation.
Comparative analysis was deliberately eschewed in this work for 
methodological and theoretical reasons. The aim of the thesis is also to 
concentrate on depth rather than breadth. What this work loses by way 
of wider theories of regional democratisation - in particular the role by 
the Communist parties of, for example, Hungary or Czechoslovakia - it 
has gained in empirical and historical detail. Consequently, however, the 
door is left open to those who might seek some kind of comparative 
analysis of these Communist Parties, their roles within the 
democratisation process and even of their post-Communist 
developments.
This thesis provides a solid study of one particular case, which can act as 
an empirical base for other studies. The period provides not only insights 
into the nature of legitimation, asking questions which may be challenged 
and explored in any future research work, but also provides a study of 
one aspect of the 'Polish experience' that has implications for both a 
study of contemporary Polish politics and a wider historical study of the 
problems facing Poland as it moves towards the European Union.
Bibliography
260
Abercrombie, N ., Hill, S., & Turner, B.S., (1990) Dominant 
Ideologies, London: Unwin Hyman
Adamski, J., (1989) 'Perspektywy Lewicy' (The Left's Perspective), 
Polity ka, November 11th 1989
Albrecht, A., (1988) 'Rozne strony bilansu. Rozmowa o zjednoczeniu 
PPR i PPS' (Various sides in the balance: A discussion about the 
unification of the PPR and PPS), Norn Drogi, October, 1988
Alexander, J. C., (1991) Real Civil Society: Bethinking Democratic 
Capitalism in Eastern Europe, Los Angeles: UCLA
Antonszewski, A., (1989)'Polskie reformy lat osiemdziesi^tych jako 
proces destalinizacji' (The Polish reforms of the 1980's as a form of 
destalinisation), Norn Drogi, February 1989.
Applebaum, A., (1993) 'Things don't have to be this way,' The 
Spectator, September 25th 1993
Arato, A.,. (1981) Civil Society against the State, Telos 47 
Armonk, T., (1981) Poland Today. The State of the Republic, New York: 
M.E Sharpe 
Ash, T. G.,
(1990a) We The People; The Revolution of 89, Cambridge: Granta Books; 
(1990b) 'Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth', The New York Review of 
Books, February 15th, 1990, pp. 17-22
Austin, J. L., (1962) How to do things with words, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press
Backer, R., (1990) Struktury Po^ome w Torunie (1980-81) (The Torun 
Hierarchyj, Warsaw: PAN
Baczytiski, J., & Wladyka, W., (1989) 'Kampania majowa' (The May 
Campaign), Polity ka, June 10th 1989.
Balcerowicz, L., (1993) ‘Fundamenty i nonsensy', (Basics and 
Nonsense), Ga^eta Wyborc%a]\Ay 3-4,1993
Barnard, F. M., (1991) Socialism, pluralism and legitimacy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Barker, R., (1992) Four dimensions ofpolitical identity - a theory of legitimacy, 
a paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference, March 
1992
Batt, J., (1991) East Central Europe from reform to transformation, London: 
Royal College of International Affairs
Beres, L, & Skoczyla, J., (1991) General Kis%c%ak mowi.prawie wssystko 
(General Kiszczak says...almost everything), Warsaw: BGW
261
Berezowski, M., (1991) Koniec Epoki (End of an era), Warsaw: Novum 
Bernhard, M. H ., (1993J The Origins of Democracy in Poland, New York: 
Columbia
Biondi, L., (1981) Poland's Church-State Relations, Chicago: Loyola 
University Press
Bielecki, C., (1999) Poland: Sharp Edges on the Round Table, 
Transitions, January 1999
Bjork, B., (1995) 'The uses of conditionality, Poland and the IMF', 
East European Quarterly, Spring 1995
Bodnar, A., (1989) 'Reforms in the Party', Warsaw, Ksi^zka i Wiedza, 
April, 1989.
Burton, F, & Carlen, P. (1979) Official Discourse, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul 
Brumberg, A.,
(1983) Poland:Genesis of a Revolution, New York; New York University 
Press
(1989) 'Poland: State and/or Society' Dissent 36,1989
Brzezinski, M., (1998) The Struggle for Constitutionalism in Poland, 
Basingstoke: MacMillan
Buchowski, M., (1992) 'The Magic King Priests of Communism', 
East European Quarterly, January 1992.
Cackowski, Z., (1989) 'Theoretical-political problems of socialist renewal, 
Warsaw, Ksi^zka i Wiedza, April, 1989.
Campbell, J., (1986) 'Truth Claims and Value-freedom in the Case of 
Legitimacy', Journal of Law and Society, summer 1986
Carew-Hunt, R. N ., (1963) The Theory and Practise of Communism, 
London: Penguin
Celt, E., (1984)'Party Documents Assessed', Radio Free Europe (RFE) 
Research, April 7th 1984
Checinski, M., (1982) Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, 
New York: Karz-Cohl
Cziomer, E., (1990) 'Perestroika and the new thinking and their importance 
for the doctrine and practise of Soviet foreign polity from the mid 1980's onwards ’, 
Lublin: Znak 
Davies, N .,
(1981) Bo%e Ignysko (God's Playground), New York: Columbia;
(1988) 'Britain's guilty secret about Katyn', The Independent, July 7th;
(1996) Europe. A  history, Oxford: Oxford University Press;
(1997) Or%el Bialy i C^erwona Gwia^da (White Eagle and Red Star), 
Cracow: Znak
262
de Weyenthal, J. B., (1986) The Communist Tarty of Poland; A n  Historical 
Outline, Stanford: Hoover Institute Press
Dehnel-Szyc, M., and Stachura, J., (1991) Gry Polityc^ne: Orientacje na 
d%s (Political Games: today’s situation), Warsaw: Volumen
Di Palma, L., (1991)'Legitimation from the top to civil society: 
politico-cultural change in Eastern Europe’, World Politics, October 1991 
Domarczyk, Z., (1990) 100 Dni Ma^owieckiego (100 days of
Mazowiecki), Warsaw
DubinskL K , (1990) Magdalenka: Transakc/a Epoki, (Magdalenka: 
Transactions of the Era) Warsaw: Sylwa
Dziadul, T., (1989), 'Opozycja w opozycj/ /  (Opposition within the 
opposition), Polityka, 4th March 1989
Dziewanowski, M. K., (1976) The Communist Party of Poland, 2nd 
Edition., Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
Dzis, Warsaw
East, R., (1992) Evolutions in Eastern Europe, London and New York, 
Pinter Publishers
Elster. J., (1996) The Round table Talks and the Breakdown of Communism, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Eyal, G, Szelenyi, I., & Townsley, E ., (1998) Making Capitalism 
without Capitalists: The new ruling elites in Eastern Europe, Berkeley, UCLA 
Press
Eysymontt, J, and Maciejewski, P., (1985) W., 'Kryzysy spoleczno- 
ekonomiczne w Polsce. Uj^cie modelowe (Socio-economic crises in 
Poland, a modelling approach), Ekonomista 1:2-24
Ferenc, F., (1990) The Left after Communism, Thesis Eleven. No.27, 
1990, pp.20-39.
Firsow, P., (1988) Komintern: doswiadczenia dzialnosci (The 
Comintern: the experience of activity), Nowe Drogi, October 1988
Frydman, R. Murphy, K. & Rapaczynski, A., (1996) 'Capitalism 
with a comrades face', Transition, vol.2, no.2, 26 January 1996
Fukuyama, F., (1992) The End of History and the East Man, London: 
Hamish-Hamiliton
Garrett, T , & Garrett, F., (1987) 'Death and Politics: the Katyn 
forest massacre and American foreign policy, Eastern European Quarterly, 
January 1987
Gazeta Wyborcza, Warsaw 
Gtos Wybrzeza, Gdansk
Gebert, K., (1990) Mebel (Furniture), London: Aneks 
Gebethner, S., (1989) 'What sort of elections? Competitive but not 
confrontational', Kurier Polski, 17th-!9th February 1989
263
Geremek, B., (1990) 'PostCommunism and Democracy in Poland', 
The Washington Quarterly) Summer 1990
Gerrits, A., (1990) The Failure of Authoritarian Change,
London:Dartmouth
Glasman, M., (1994) 'The Great Deformation: Polanyi, Poland and 
the terrors of planned spontaneity', New Left Review, May-June 1994 
Glenny, M., (1990) The Rebirth of History, London: Penguin 
Goldfarb, J. C., (1989) Beyond Glasnost, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press
Gomulka, S. & Polansky, A., (1990) Polish Paradoxes, London: 
Roudedge
Graubard S. R., (1993) Eastern Europe...Central Europe...Europe, 
Boulder, CO: West-View
H ahn, W., (1987) Democray in a Communist Party, New York 
Hall, S, and Laclau, E., (1990) 'Coming up for air', Marxism Today, 
March 1990.
H ausner, J  and Klementewicz, T ., (eds.), (1992) The Protracted 
Death Agonies ofR£al Socialism in Poland, Warsaw: PAN
Harrison, P., (1992) 'Ritual as intellectual property', Man, 27, pp.225- 
44,1992
Hayden, J., (1994) Poles Apart: Solidarity and the new Poland, Dublin: 
Irish Academic Press
Heller, C. S., (1969) 'Anti-Zionism and the Political Struggle Within 
the Elite of Poland', Jewish Journal of Sociology, 11:2,1969
Higley, J, Pakulski, J, & Wesotowski, W., (eds.), (1998) Post- 
Communist elites and democray in Eastern Europe, Basingstoke: MacMillan 
Holmes, L., (1993) The End of Communist power, Cambridge: Polity 
Press
Howard, D. A. E., (1993) Constitution making in Eastern Europe, 
Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Special Studies
Holzer, J., (1984) Solidamosc, 1980-81, Paris: Instytut Literackie 
Holzer, J. & Leski, J., (1990) Solidamosc w Pod^iemiu (Underground 
Solidarity), Lodz
Ionescu, I., (1967) The Politics of European Communist states, London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson
Jablonski, H ., (1988) 'PPR and PPS w pocz^tkowym okresie Polski 
Ludowej' (The PPR and PPS at the beginning of the People's Republic), 
Nowe Drogi, August, 1988.
Jakubowska, H., (1990) 'Political Drama in Poland: the use of 
national symbols', Anthropology Today, 6, No.4: 10-13,1990
264
Janowski, K. B.,
(1988) 'C%y jest motjiwa legalna opo^yja? Dylematy pr%eobra%en systemu 
polityc^nego w Polsce' (Is a legal opposition possible? Dilemmas for the 
Polish political system), Warsaw: KiW;
(1989) 'Trwalosc dorobku PPS* (A continuation of the PPS's 
significance), Norn Drogi, January 1989
(1991) 'Od Kongresu Zjednoczeniowego do lOego Zjazdu PZPR - 
ewolucja mysli politycznej PZPR' (From the Unification Congress to the 
10th Congress of the PZPR - the evolution of the PZPR's political 
thinking), Stadia Nauk Polityc^nych, nr.l. 1991
(1992) 'From Monopoly to death throes' from Sanford (ed.), 
'Democratisation in Poland, 1988-90;
Jaruzelski, General.,
(1983) Pr^emomenia, 1981-82 (Speeches, 1981-82), Warsaw.
(1992) Stan mjenny..DLACZEGO.., (Martial Law...WHY..) Warsaw 
Jedlicki, J., (1990) 'The Revolution of 1989: The Unbearable Burden 
of History', Problems of Communism, July-August, 1990, pp.39-45.
Jones, M., (1993) 'Polish elections-a shift to the left', Critique 26,1993 
Kaczynski, J.,
(1991a) Odmotna Strona Medalu (The other side of the coin), Warsaw: 
Most-Verba;
(1991b) 'Inna wizja wydarzen’ (A different vision of the events), Polityka, 
September 21st
Kadzmarek, L., (1991) ‘Rozpad realnego socjalizmu a interesy 
warstwy zarzadzajacej' (The fall of real Socialism and the rulers' layered 
interests), Dtfs, February 2nd
Kaluza, R., (1989) Polska Wybory '89 (Polish Elections '89), Warsaw: 
Andrzej Bonarski 
Kaminski, B.,
(1991) 'Systemic Underpinnings of the Transition in Poland: the Shadow 
of the Round Table agreement', Studies in Comparative Communism, June
(1992) The Collapse of State Socialism in Poland, New Jersey: Princeton; 
Karpitiski, J.,
(1988) 'Modern Machievelli or the jester and the prince', Uncaptive minds, 
Vol. 1, no. 4;
(1994) ‘Spor o prawo, spor o historie, (Struggle over law, struggle over 
history), Arka, March-April
Kemp-Welch, A., (ed.) (1991) The Birth of Solidarity, 2nd Edition, 
London: MacMillan
Kersten, K , (1986) Narodtfny Systemu Wladsy, Polska 1943-1948, (The 
birth of the system of power, 1943-48), Paris: Libella
265
Kertzer, P., (1996) 'Politics and Symbols, New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press
Kirkpatrick, J. J., (1992) 'After Communism, what?1, Problems of 
Communism, Vol. 41, January-April 1992, pp. 7-1.
Kochatiski, L., (1988) Kronika i dokumentacja. Droga do 
zjednoczenia PPR i PPS, Sierpien 1948 (Chronicle and documentation. 
The road to unification of the PPR and PPS in 1948), Norn Drogi, August 
1988
Kolankiewicz, G.,
(1981) 'Preform, Renewal or Retreat: The Polish Communist Party after the 
Extraordinary Ninth congress', The World Today, vol. 37, no.10, 1981, 
pp.369-75;
(1988) 'Poland and the politics of permissible Pluralism', Bast European 
Politics and Societies, vol.2, no.l.
Kotakowski, L., (1968) Towards a Marxist Humanism, New York: 
Grove Press
Konfrontacja, Warsaw
Koralewicz, J, Bialecld, I, & Watson, M, (1987) The legitimation and 
stability of the social order in Poland: crisis and transition, Lemington-Spa: Berg 
Kowalski, L., (1993) 'Stan wyj^tkowy-okr^gly stol' (The Round table - 
an exceptional state of affairs), ^ 4r^«.44-45,1993
Kozniewski, A., (1991) 'Trzecia normalna rzespospolita' (A third, 
normal republic), D%is 8th August 1991 
Krytyka, Warsaw
Kubik, J., (1994) The Power of Symbols Versus the Symbols of Power, 
University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press
Kuron, J., (1989) Wiara i wina: Do i od komuniymu (Guilt and Belief: to 
and from Communism), London: Aneks
Kursld, J., (1993) Tech Walesa: Democrat or Dictator?, Boulder, 
Co.:West-View
Ksztalt Polskiego Socjalizmu: Glowne elementy problematyki III 
Ogolnopolskiej Konferencji Teoretyc^ no-Ideologic^ nej, (The Shape of Polish 
Socialism: the main elements of the questions of the 3rd All-National 
Ideological-Theoretical Conference), Warsaw: Ksi^zka i Wiedza, April 
1989.
Laba, R., (1991) The Roots of Solidarity, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press
Lab^dz. L., (1982) The Kubiak Report, Survey 26, no.3, summer 1982 
Larrain, J., (1994) Ideology and cultural identity, Cambridge: Polity Press 
Latyszew, J., (1988) Tragedia Kominternu i KPP (The tragedy of the 
Comintern and KPP) , Nowe Drogi, October
266
Le Figaro, Paris 
Le Monde, Paris 
Lewis, P.,
(1990a) ’Non-Competitive Elections and Regime Change: Poland 1989’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, July, 1990;
(1990b) ’The Long Goodbye: Party rule and political change in Poland’, 
Journal of Communist Studies, vol. 6, no.l 1990;
(1993) 'Poland's SLD: The Communists who came in from the cold', 
Focus on Eastern Europe, 46,1993, pp.29-34;
(1994) 'Political institutionalisation of party development in post- 
Communist Poland' Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no.5 1994;
Leski, K., (1989) Cos. R%ec% o okrqglym stole (Round table things), 
Warsaw
Lipiec, J., (1990) 'Lewica Przy Pustych Polkach' (The left in the face 
of empty shelves) Polityka, December 2nd 1990
Lutrykowski, A., (1989) 'Partia Wczoraj-Partia Jutro', (The Party 
today, the Party tomorrow) Norn Drogi, September, 1989
Lipski, J.J., (1985) KOR.: a history of the Worker's Defence Committee in 
Poland, 1976-81, Berkeley: California Press
MacDonald, O., (1983) 'The Polish Vortex: Solidarity and Socialism', 
New Left Review, 139
Malcher, G., (1984) Poland's politicised army: Communists in Uniform, New 
York
Malinowski, W., (1989) 'Socjaldemokratyzacja: Realnosc czy
Zludzenia?' (Social democratisation: reality or vision?) Tybuna Eudu, 2nd 
March 1989
Marxism Today, London
McSweeney & Tempest, (1993) 'The Political Science of Democratic 
Transition in Eastern Europe, Political Studies Association, 1993.
Michnik, A.
(1976) 'New Evolutionism', Survey 22, nos.3-4 Summer-Autumn;
(1985a) Z dsfejow honoru w Polsce (From the period of honour in Poland), 
Paris;
(1985b) Letters From Prison and Other Essays, Berkeley: University of 
California Press;
(1988) 'A battle for memory', Die Zeit, April 15th 1988;
(1989) Your President, Our Premier', Ga^eta Wyborc^a, July 3rd,
(1996) 'The Velvet Restoration', Transition, vol.2. no.6, March
Millard, F.,
267
(1994a) The shaping of the Polish party system, 1989-93', Eastern 
European Politics and Societies, Fall 1994;
(1994b) The Anatomy of the New Poland, Cambridge: Edward Elgar
Mizrahi, S., (1995) A  theory of constitutional change - game theoretical 
analysis of socio-political processes in Poland, 1976-81, a PhD thesis submitted 
to the LSE in July 1995
Modzelewski, K , (1991) Przemiany Solidarnosci ' (Changes in 
Solidarity) Wie% August 7th - 8th 1991, pp.25-31
Morawska, E., (1988) 'On Barriers to Pluralism in Pluralist Poland', 
Slavic Review, vol. 47, no.4,1988, pp.626-36
Morawski, J., (1987) 'Normalizacja partii Rz^dzacej: Powrot do 
Biurokratycznej Anarchii' (Normalisation of the governing party: Return 
to bureaucratic anarchy), Krytyka. Kwartalnik Polityc^ny, no.23-24, Warsaw,
1987
Morawski, W., (1994) Zmiersych Socjali^ mu Panstwowego (Changes in the 
Socialist State), Warsaw: PWN 
New  Left Review, Oxford 
New  Society, London 
Nowe Drogi, Warsaw
Ost, D., (1990) Solidarity and the Politics of anti-Politics, Philadelphia: PA 
Press
!Partia opowiada si^ za kontynuacj^ reform: Obradowala X II 
Plenum Komitetu Centralnego PZPR’ (The Party on the continuation of 
reform.). 'Deczyze Biura Politycznego KC PZPR' (Politburo decision), 
Trybuna Ludu, 4th April 1989
Pakulski, J., (1986) 'Legitimacy and mass Compliance: Reflections on 
Max Weber and Soviet-type societies, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 
16. pp.35-56,1986.
Pelczyriski, Z. A., (1980) 'Poland and its Working Class', New Society, 
28 August 1980
Perzkowski, S., (1994) Tajne Dokumenty: Ostatni rok wlad^y 1988-89, 
(Secret Documents: The Last Year of Power), London: Aneks 
Polityka, Warsaw
Polityka Kadrowe w procesie reform, Trybuna Ludu 13-14 June
1988
Poprzeczko, J., (1990) 'Zapelnic pustk? na Lewicy' (Completely 
empty on the left), Polityka, January 27th
Porozumienia okr^gtego stotu (NSZZ "Solidamosc", 1989), (The 
Round Table Agreement (Solidarity trade Union), Warsaw, 1989.
268
Pridham, G., Herring, E., & Sanford, G., (Eds.) (1994) Building 
Democracy: the international dimension of democratisation in eastern 'Europe, 
London: Leicester University Press
Pridham, G., and Vanhanen., K. (Eds.) (1997) Democratisation in 
Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives, London: Roudedge 
Przegl^d Tygodniowy, Warsaw
Przeworski, A., (1991) Democracy and the Market, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press
Punk Widzenia: Central Congress Commission (CKZ). Special 
edition of Trybuna Ludu, 29th November 1989.
Pye, A., (1990) 'Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism', 
American Political Science Preview, 84, March, 1990
Rachwald, W., (1990) In search of Poland, the superpowers reaction to 
Solidarity, 1980-89, Stanford, Ca: Hoover Institute Press 
Radio Free Europe, Progress Reports, Munich 
Rakovski, M., (1978) Towards an Eastern European Marxism, London: 
Allison and Busby 
Rakowski, M. R.,
(1992) Jak to si$ stalo (How it happened), Warsaw: BGW
(1990) 'Kto komu sluzyl?' (Who served whom?) Dtfs, 1st October 
Reforma Partia-warunkiem powodzenia strategii odnowy i 
reform
(The thesis of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee for the 
10th Plenum), 16 - 18 Stycznia (January) (1989), Podstawowe 
dokumenty i materialy (Reform of the Party-conditions for success of 
the strategy of'renewal' and reform): Warsaw: Ksi^zka i Wiedza, 1989. 
Regula, J. A., (1994) Historia Komunistyc^nej Partii Polski (A history of 
the Polish Communist party), Toruri: Portal 
Res Publica, Warsaw
Reynolds, J., (1978) Communists, Socialists and workers; Poland 
1944-48, Soviet Studies 30 1978 
Rigby, T. H., Feher, F. & Markus, M., (Eds.) (1982) Political 
Eegitimation in Communist States, London: Macmillan
Rychard, A., (1993) Preforms, Adaptation and Breakthrough, Warsaw: IFiS 
Rzeczpospolita, Warsaw
Sadowski, Z., (1991) Spolec^enstwo Pototalitame (Post-totalitarian 
society), Warsaw 
Sanford, G.,
(1983) Polish Communism in Crisis, London: Croom Helm;
(1984) 'The Polish Communist leadership and the onset of the state of 
war', Soviet Studies, October 1984;
269
(1992) Democratisation in Poland, Oxford: Blackwell
Schaff, A., (1989) Oswiadczenie Warszawskiego Robotniczego Forum 
Zjazdowego (The Declarations of the Warsaw Worker's Congress 
Forum), TybunaEudu, November 20th
Schopflin, G., (1993) Politics in Eastern Europe, Oxford: Blackwell 
Schull, J., (1992) 'What is ideology? Theoretical problems and lessons 
from Soviet type societies', Political Studies, 40, pp. 728-741,
Shapiro, M. J., (1981) Language and Political Understanding, New Haven: 
Yale University Press
Sinanian, T. Deak, S. & Ludz, P., (1972) 'Eastern Europe in the 1970’s, 
New York: Praeger
Slay, B., (1994) The Polish Economy, New Jersey: Princeton 
Slodkowska. I., (1995) Programy partii i ugrupowan parlamentamych 1989- 
91, (Party programmes and parliamentary groups, 1989-91), Warsaw: 
PAN
Smolar, A., (1994) 'Polska rewolucja' (The Polish revolution), Gayeta 
Wyborc^a, November 5^6^, 1994.
Smolenski, P., (1989) S^ermier^e okrqglego stolu (zw^tpienia i nadzieje), 
(The wider Paound table - doubts and hopes), Warsaw: Most
Sobczak, J., (1989) 'Wklad lewicy spolecznej w odzyskanie 
niepodleglosci (The shape of socialist society during the recovery of 
independence), Norn Drogi, January 1989 
Staniszkis, J.,
(1984) Ontologia socjali^ mu (The ontology of Socialism), Warsaw: 
Biblioteka Krytyka;
(1991) The Dynamics of the Breakthrough, Oxford: University of California 
Press
Starski, S., (1982) Class Struggle in Classless Poland, Boston: Southend 
Stokes, G., (Ed.) (1996) From Stalinism to Pluralism, 2nd Edition, New 
York: Oxford University Press
Szayna, T. S., (1988) 'Addressing 'Blank-spots' in Polish-Soviet 
relations', Problems of Communism, November-December, 1988.
Szczucitiski, P., (1991) Czy i dlaczego trzeba bylo rozwi^zac PZPR' 
(Was it and if so why was it necessary to dissolve the PZPR?), Dsns, 
August 8th 1991 
Sztompka, P.,
(1991) 'The Intangibles and Imponderables of the Transition to 
Democracy', Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol. XXTV, No. 3, 1991, 
pp. 295-311;
(1993) 'Civilisational Incompetence - the trap of post-Communist 
societies', Zeitschriftfur So i^ologie, April 1993, vol. 22, no.2
270
Tanalski, D., (1989) 'Katolicyzm i Marksizm' (Catholicism and 
Marxism), Nowe Drogi, March 1989 
Taras, R.,
(1984) Ideology in a Socialist State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
(1986) Official etiologies of the Polish crisis: changing historiographies
and factional struggles, Soviet Studies^  January 1986
(1995) Consolidating Democray in PolandCambridge: Cambridge University
Press
Tarkowski, J., (1983) 'Patronage in a centralised Socialist system: the 
case of Poland', International Political Science Review, Vol.4, no.4 1983 
The Baltimore Sun, Baltimore 
The Economist, London 
The Financial Times, London 
The Guardian, London 
The Independent, London 
The New  York Times, New York 
The Spectator, London 
The Sunday Times, London
Therbom , G., (1980) The Ideology of Power, London: Unwin 
Thom pson, K , (1986) Beliefs and Ideology, Chichester: Ellis Horwood 
Tighe, C., (1988) 'Poland and Socialism', Monthly Preview 39,1987-88 
Tischner, J., (1991) Polski Mlyn, (The Polish Melting Pot), Cracow: 
Nasza Przeszlosc
Tittenbrum , J., (1993) The Collapse of Real Socialism in Poland, 
London: Janusz Publishing Company
Toranska, T ., (1989) Oni (Them), London: Aneks 
Tourraine, A., (1982J Solidarity: The analysis of a social movement, Poland 
1980-81, New York: Cambridge University Press 
Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw 
Tudor, H., (1972) Political Myth, London 
Tygodnik Mazowsze, Warsaw 
Tygodnik Powszechny, Cracow
Verdery, K., (1996) What was Socialism and what comes next? New Jersey: 
Princteon University Press
Walker, R., (1989) 'Marxism-Leninism as discourse: the politics of the 
empty signifier and the double bind, British Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 19, no.2 
Walicki, A.,
(1991) 'From Stalinism to Post-Communist Pluralism: the case of 
Poland', New Left review March, 1991;
271
(1997) ’Marksizm Niekomunistyczny' (Non-Communist marxism), 
Ga^eta Wyborc^a, 16th October 1997 
Wprost, Warsaw
Wspolistnienia, ’The Co-existence of capitalism with Socialism in 
Poland', CBOS, May 1989, mimeographed. Compiled by the Central 
Committee.
Wandczyk, P. S., (1996) Spor o PRJL (Debate about the Polish 
People's Republic), Cracow: Wydawnictwo Znak
Wiatr, J. J., (1989a) 'Problematyka nowego okresu' (Problems of the 
new period), Nowe Drogi, September 1989;
(1989b) ’Dlaczego bijemy si? w piersi’ (Why we beat our chests?), 
Polityka, 18th October 1989 
Wiatr, S.,
(1989) 'Structures and Mechanisms of Action in the Party in conditions of 
socialist renewal! Warsaw, Ksi^zka i Wiedza, April, 1989
(1985) ’Wspolczesne tresci marksowskiej teorii panstwa (Modern Marxist 
theories of the State), Studia Socjologic^ ne, 1985, no 3-4.
Wildstein, B.,
(1991) ‘Na Polskiej scenie politycznej’ (On the Polish political scene), 
Dcfs, May;
(1993) ‘Spor o dekomunizacji’ (Struggle over de-Communisation), Res 
Puhlica, April
Wiodka, Z., (1992) Tajne Dokumenty: Biuro Polityc^ nego, PZPR a 
"Solidamosd', 1980-81 (Secret Documents, Politburo, PZPR and Solidarity, 1980- 
81), London: ANEKS
Wojciechowski. J., (1990) ’Czy Lewica w Polsce moze miec szanse?’ 
(Is there a chance for the Polish left?), D%tf, August 1990 
Wolan, A., (1991) Rozwi^zania o nienawisci’, Dsfs, 3rd March 
Yan Sun (1995) ’Ideology and the Demise or Maintenance of Soviet- 
type regimes' Communist and post-Communist Studies, September 1995
Zaremba, M., (1998) Cukierki Gierka (Gierek's Sweets), Polityka, July 
18th 1998 
Zubek,Y.,
(1990) The Polish Party Self-Destructs, Orbis, May;
(1991) 'The Polish Communist Elite and the Petty Entrepreneurs' Bast 
Buropean Quarterly, September 1991;
(1994) 'The Reassertion of the Left in Post-Communist Poland', Burope- 
Asia Studies, vol.46, no.5., 1994, pp. 801-837;
(1995) 'The Phoenix out of the Ashes: the rise to power of Poland's post- 
Communist SdRP', Communist andpost-Communist studies, September;
272
(1997) ’The end of liberalism: Economic liberalisation and the 
transformation of post-Communist Poland’, Communist and Post- 
Communist Studies, vol.30, no.2, June.
Acronyms used in main text and notes
AWS Solidarity Election Action
CBOS Opinion Poll Organisation
CC Central Committee of the PZPR
ChSS Independent Christian Association
CKKR Central Party Control and Auditing Commission
DiP Experience and the Future Reform group.
KIK Catholic Club of Intellectuals
KKW Solidarity's National Election Commission
KLD Liberal Democratic Congress
KO Solidarity's Citizens' Committee
KOK National Defence Committee
KOR Committee for the Defence of the Workers
KPN Confederation of the Polish Nation
KPP Polish Communist Party (1926-38)
MSW Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MON Ministry of Defence
NSZZ Solidarity's Independent Self-Governing Trade Unions
NKVD Soviet Secret Police (pre-KGB)
OKP Solidarity's Parliamentary Citizens' Committee
OPZZ All National (official) Trade Union
OZI Citizen's Intelligentsia Association
POP Basic Party Unit
PRON Patriotic Movement of National Renewal (1982-89)
PSL Polish Peasants Party (after 1990)
PPR Polish Workers' Party (1942-48)
PPS Polish Socialist Party (1892-1948)
PPS-RD Polish Socialist Party-Revolutionary
PUS Polish Union of Social democrats
PZPR Polish United Workers Party
ROAD Citizens' Movement for an Alternative Democracy
ROPCiO Committee for the Defence of Workers
RM Council of Ministers
RP Council of State
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SD Democratic Party
SdKPiL Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and 
Lithuania
SdRP Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland
SLD Democratic Left Alliance
UD Democratic Union
UW Freedom Union
UP Labour Party
WRON Military Council of National Salvation
Pb Politburo
ZSL Polish Peasants Party (to 1990)
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Appendix i)
Key P ZPR  Actors
W. Baka Secretariat of the CC to 29th January 1990.
Minister of Economy, 1986-89, Politburo member, leader of government 
working sub-group on 'Economy and Social Policy' at the round table.
K  Barcikomki Deputy Chairman of RP (Pb until 29th July 1989)
S. Ciosek Head of CC socio-legal Dept. Secretary General
of PRON (Pb until 29th July 1989)
K. Cypriniak Head of CC Political and organisation Dept. (Pb
until 29th January 1990)
J. Csyrek CC secretary (international) (Pb until 29th July
1989)
A . Gdula Leader of government sub-group on 'Law and
Society' at the round table.
J. Glowcvyk CC secretary (propaganda) (Pb until 21st
December 1988)
M. Goiymda Pb and Secretariat from 29th July 1989 to 29th
January 1990
Gen. J. Baryta CC secretary (security) (Pb until 21st December
1988)
Gen.W.Jaruzelski First Secretary of PZPR (1981-89), President of
Poland, 1989-90)
Gen. C. Kis^c^ak Minister of Internal Affairs, Leader of Council of
Minister's Committee, member of Politburo and Central Committee.
Gen. J. Po^oga Member of KOK, close adviser to Jaruzelski
A . Kwasniewski Minister of Sport, member of Council of
Ministers, member of trade union pluralism working group at round table, 
leader of SdRP, President 1995- .
I. Lubowska Pb and Secretariat from 21st December 1988 until
29th January 1990
J. Kubasiewic^  Pb and Secretariat from 29th July 1989 to 29th
January 1990
M. Krol Pb 29th July 1989 to 29th January 1990
Z. Messner Chairman of RP and Premier (1985-1988) (Pb
until 21st December 1988
Z. Michalek Pb (from 21st December 1988 until 29th January
1990
JL Miller Pb and Secretariat from 29th July 1989 to 29th
January 1990
A . Miodowic^ Chairman of OPZZ
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W. Mokngs^cyak Chairman of CKKR (Pb until 14th June 1988)
Z. Muranski Party Foreman (Pb until 21st December 1988)
M. Oryechomki Foreign Minister, Secretariat until 29th January
1990
T. Por^bski CC secretary (general affairs) (Pb until 21st
December 1988)
M. Rakomki Sejm vice-marshall, Premier October 1988 - July
29th 1988, First Secretary PZPR until 31st January 1990 
J. Reykomkd Pb and Secretariat 21st December 1988 to 29th
January 1990. Head of government political reform team at round table.
G. Rembis^ Pb and Secretariat from 21st December 1988 to
29th January 1990
F. Siwicki Minister of Defence
A . Sekula Politburo member
Z. Stolen Textiles Worker
Z. Srnqtek Pb and Secretariat from 21st December 1988 to
29th January 1990
A . WasilemJd Culture, director of publishing
M. Wo^niak CC secretary (economy) (Pb until 14th June 1988)
Government team non-PZPR members at Round table:
OPZZ
J. Jarlinski, Mieczyslaw Krejewski, Harald Matuszewski, Andrzej 
Stelmachowski, Jerzy Uzieblo, Romuald Sosnowski.
SD Jan Janowski.
ZSL Bogdan Krolewski.
The Central Committee was the highest party authority between 
Congresses, which were held ever 5 years and was bound to meet at least 
once every 6 months. The CC elected the politburo and Party Secretaries. 
The Politburo was the leading executive organ of the party and was 
responsible for the conduct of party affairs on a day-to-day basis. By 
virtue of the party’s leading role the Politburo and CC Secretaries had the 
statutory obligation to "articulate their position in relation to the most 
important problems of socio-economic and political life in the country" 
(referred to in the main body of the thesis as 'te%a! (one) or 'teyy' (more 
than one)).
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Appendix ii)
Chronology of key events, November 1987 - February 1990
1988
February
Messner government introduces price rises in fuel and housing sectors - 
as part of an "equilibrium" (of prices and wages) economic strategy.
April
24th-30th Strikes at Bydgoszcz by MPK (communications workers), at 
Nowa Huta, Krakow and sympathy strike in Gdansk in support of Nowa 
Huta - demands for higher pay, wage indexation, amnesty for sacked 
Solidarity activists.
May
8th Meeting between representatives of opposition intellectuals and union 
representatives in Warsaw, following invitation of Mazowiecki and 
Stelmachowski by Czyrek and Kiszczak to act as mediators in the 
industrial disputes. " Without Solidarity, the aspirations of the country mil not be 
r&z//W,"declares Mazowiecki.
10th Strike ends at Gdansk shipyard after mediation from Mazowiecki 
and Bishop Goclowski.
11th Special laws granted to the government to intervene in inefficient 
State enterprises.
Monthly journal Konfrontacja publishes discussions between various 
proponents and opponents of a "Pro-reform coalition."
]une
13-14th 7th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee
Jaruzelski calls for a "wide patriotic reform coalitionf stating that "society's
acceptance of the government's decisions is essential to their implementation?
The final resolution of Plenum: "to introduce changes in economic and 
administrative bodies and to strengthen the democratic character of our Socialist ystem 
so as to ensure the fulfilment of the public's expectations."
Plenum marked by a continued dichotomisation of opposition into those 
who "seek to destroy the Polish State" and "those prepared to take part in a 
programme of reform and reconciliation". The Plenum formally expresses the 
"political mil to continue socialist renewal in all areas of public life" and endorses 
all leadership economic and political activities
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July
Visit of Gorbachev and his "omission" of any references to Katyn. Lull in 
strike activity. Meetings held at Magdalenka between Walesa and Czyrek, 
with Kiszczak and Goclowski meeting elsewhere.
August
Start of strike in Jastrz^bia mines (key pit: Manifest Lipcowy). An 
interfactory strike committee set up (MKS).
17-20* Occupation strikes all over the country. The main demand is the 
legalisation of Solidarity.
20th Secret talks between Cryrek and leader of Warsaw KIK - 
Stelmachowski - on the prospects of round table talks.
26th Special meeting of Politburo about talks with opposition. Ciosek no 
longer finds the word ’Solidarity’ "intolerable nor "the thought of co-operating 
with it." Cryrek talks with Miodowicz about the possibility of offering a 
role to Solidarity in the workplace. The proposal is rejected by the 
Politburo. Jaruzelski proposes Kiszczak to head team of negotiators with 
an opposition.
27th Kiszczak states; "7 have become convinced...that it is necessary to speed up the 
time of the meeting between leaders of various groups in society and workers. This 
could take the form of a round table" - but also rejects the participation of any 
groups that threaten the constitution.
27-28* 8th Plenum of Central Committee
Politburo calls for "the establishment of a broad coalition ofpro-reformatory forces 
that both understands the need for and is willing to take part in the process of 
change," as remedies for the country's ills. Reaffirmation of odnowa. 
Politburo member, Czyrek, states: "respect for the political consequences of the 
diversity of interests, views and orientations in society is central...but the Tarty will not 
accept confrontational pluralism, that is the publics' independence from official 
control" Jaruzelski calls for a new Council for National Agreement out of 
the existing Consultative Council and giving it greater powers of 
proposing legislation for Sejm.
Severe criticism of Messner government by OPZZ leader, Miodowicz, 
amongst others, including PRON, ZSL and SD.
31st Kiszczak-Wai^sa meet, following Walesa’s role in calling for an end 
to the strikes, but also for the legalisation of Solidarity. D^browski and 
Ciosek (head of PRON-Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) 
careful to draw a clear distinction between Walesa as a private individual 
and as leader of banned Solidarity
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3rd End of strike at Manifest Kopalni mines.
15-16th Two meetings in preparation for round table - Kiszczak-Wal^sa- 
D^browski plan to start the round table in October. Kiszczak promises a 
"role'1 for Solidarity in the country's politics but pleads for "calm and 
restraint" Kiszczak also appeals to Walesa to not include Michnik or 
Kuron in the proposed talks.
19th Messner government and Council of Ministers resigns.
27* Rakowski becomes Premier. Jaruzelski states that martial law is the 
primary condition for the round table talks.
27th Sejm passes a bill that provides the basis for the direct and relatively 
free flow of capital in the form of bonds-all sectors of economy eligible- 
aim being to 'release' 5,000 bn zloty of savings.
October
1st Decision to close Lenin shipyard in Gdansk announced.
18-19* Second meeting between Walesa and Kiszczak. Also involved- 
Ciosek, Mazowiecki, Goclowski, Orszulik.
26th Jaruzelski meets with Primate, Cardinal Glemp
November
2nd Economic consolidation plan announced - stress away from heavy 
industry and defence to consumer markets. Seen as set of guidelines- 
equality for all types of entreprise (private, socialised and co-operative).
4* Thatcher visit to Poland
11th Celebration of 70 years of independence - recognised with full 
military honours, for the first time under Communism. Resurrection of 
Pilsudski as a 'national hero.'
17-18* Walesa meets with D^browski and then Kiszczak (also there, 
Orszulik (spokesman for the Church), Goclowski, (Bishop of Gdansk), 
Ciosek and Mazowiecki.
30* Wal^sa-Miodowicz live tv debate. Miodowicz states that the debate 
could "take the place of the round table, if  it were exceptionally successful" It is the 
first appearance on Polish tv of Walesa since 1981.
December
15* Party celebrates 40* anniversary - portrays itself as: "the heir to the best 
traditions in Polish Socialism," claiming descendence from the SdKiLP and 
PPS.
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20-22nd Central Committee 10th Plenum, under the tide "Changes in the 
'Party, the Party in changes" Two slogans used to describe 10th Plenum: 
"Socialist Parliamentary Democrat" and "Socialist Civil Society."
23rd Opposition to Party leaderships1 "pragmatic policies" witnessed in 
one third of the Central Committee voting against the promotion of 
round table initiator, Ciosek, to the Politburo and Secretariat, (of 212 CC 
members, 143 voted for his election).
24th Sejm approves two bills aimed at demonopolising the banking 
system and introducing new laws on foreign investment, aimed at 
encouraging Western capital investment in Poland.
1989
January
16-18th Second part of 10th Plenum. Concerning trade union pluralism, 
the Central Committee states "we see the need and the possibility of moving to a 
system open to members of the 'constructive opposition’...considering the progress made 
in political dialogue, in democratic life and its needs, the Central Committee agrees to 
the conditions for a national understanding and thus the formation of new trade 
unions."
18th The Politburo threatens to resign if its position is not fully endorsed 
by the Central Committee on the ’question of political and trade union 
pluralism1. Voted by 143 to 32 with 14 abstentions.
19th Party accepts the prospect of a legal "reintroduction ofpolitical pluralism
and the creation of new labour unions, including Solidarity," in return for:-
-all executive power to be retained in the hands of the Party
-laws to prevent the new unions from taking action that "might destabilise
the country."
-the severence of all oppositional links with foreign supporters and its
promise to refuse financial aid from abroad
-The opposition's oath of loyalty to the constitution.
27th Walesa and Kiszczak finalise details of the round table.
February
2-4th Third All-National Ideological-Theoretical Conference.
6th Start of round table. Kiszczak speaks of nonconfrontational elections 
and social consensus and about the support of society for political and 
economic reforms 
6-8111 Strikes at mines in Belchatow.
8-10th Sub-working groups begin their work at the round table.
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March
7th Polish government openly blames the USSR for the Katyn massacre. 
Urban states that the historical commission had found enough evidence 
to indicate that " the crime was committed by the Stalinist N K V D "
9th Initial agreement on political reform. Draft electoral laws introduced 
to the Sejm, however, appear at variance with agreement. They reduce 
the role and powers of the Sejm and make the Senate effectively 
powerless by reducing its power to veto.
Strikes by transport, postal and textile workers.
31st Central Committee Party Plenum (11th) - Czarzasty states that "little 
of essence of the new stage of the national agreement has reached Party members." 
Plenum reaffirms conclusions of the 10th Plenum.
29th Disagreements at the round table lead to new meeting between Walesa 
and Kiszczak, on questions of indexation, nomenklatura, sacked workers.
April
5th End of meetings of round table. Agreements on creation of Presidency, 
free elections to Senate and semi-free elections to Sejm.
17th Solidarity legalised (Rural Solidarity 3 days later).
May
17th Roman Catholic Church accorded status unparalleled in Eastern 
Europe. New legal framework for Church-State relations which 
guarantees freedom of conscience and of religious belief (for example, 
rights to run schools and social welfare and won back property 
confiscated in 1950's, own press).
29th Parliament pardons those convicted since the 1980 Gdansk Accords 
for strikes, demonstrations and supporting banned organisations.
June
4th and 18th Election to bicameral National Assembly. No Senate seats 
and only those reserved for them won by PZPR. National List (35 
unopposed seats for top government and Party leaders) rejected because 
majority of voters crossed out names. Fresh election of 33 vacant seats (2 
out of the 35 reserved seats won by PZPR, given 50% rule), following 
reconvening of round table Intervention Committee, which agreed to 
endorse a supplementary decree by Council of State.
National List candidates defeated included: Baka, Barcikowski, Ciosek, 
Czyrek, Kiszczak, Miodowicz, Rakowski, Siwicki, Malinowski (ZSL), 
Democratic Party leaders, heads of three pro-governmental Christian
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organisations (PAX, Polish Catholic Social Union PZKS and Christian 
Social Union Uchs.
6th Jaruzelski offers to include Solidarity in coalition government. It is not 
accepted by Solidarity.
7th Jaruzelski states that the PZPR would relinquish power in 1993 if it 
was defeated in free elections scheduled for that year.
30th PZPR fails to agree on candidacy for Presidency. Jaruzelski proposes 
Kiszczak but then stands himself.
July
8th Movement of the Eighth of July set up-advocating new party of the 
left-close links with PZPR Parliamentary Club of Deputies 
19th Jaruzelski wins election as President, uncontested (by the smallest 
possible margin, the vote being engineered by Solidarity to turn out as it 
does)
29th 13th Plenum of the Central Committee - representatives of local 
party aparat openly blame leadership for election failure.
Plenums proceedings produce political directives for the Party's activity 
which envisage "itsfundamental restructuring." Main emphasis is on the unity 
of the Party as the "instrument for the guaranteeing of Socialism in a modernised 
form." In preparation for the PZPR 11th Congress - a special, previously 
unpractised questionnaire opinion poll is issued concerning the 
procedure for the Congress, election of delegates, the manner in which 
competing programmatic, ideological and organisational-political 
platforms would be presented. Continues at the 15th Plenum in 
September.
29th Rakowski succeeds Jaruzelski as First Secretary of the PZPR. 
Politburo and Secretariat changes strengthen the reformist factions in the 
Party. OPZZ sets up Ruch Ludzi Pracy (Movement of Working People), 
to establish its independence and the basis for a new party of the left.
August
2nd Kiszczak elected by Sejm as Premier, but unable to form a 
government when SD and ZSL make deals with Solidarity.
14th Kiszczak proposes Malinowski (leader of ZSL) as premier.
17th After discussions between Malinowski and Jozwiak (leader of SD) 
the idea of a 'government of national responsibility' is accepted.
19th 14th Central Committee Plenum of the PZPR agrees to join a 
Solidarity led government provided it is adequately represented with 
more than defence and interior ministries.
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24th Mazowiecki elected premier and makes a speech stating his intention 
of "drawing a thick line" separating his responsibility from that of his 
predecessors. New Commission set up to investigate the activities of the 
Ministry of the Interior since 1981.
September
12th Sejm swears in Mazowiecki government-containing 4 reps of PZPR. 
15th Miller delivers a critical report to the Central Committee: the Party 
must transform itself into party of the Polish left if it is to avoid 
marginalisation, he says.
18th 15th Plenum, part 1 (second part 3rd October). Results of poll from 
13th Plenum: a decisive majority of party favoured radical version of 
proposed change 
29th ZOMO disbanded
October
3rd Part 2 of 15th Plenum. Incorporated most of the proposals submitted 
at the first stage: democratised selection of delegates, granting of passive 
and active voting rights to candidates, open discussion on competing 
programmes and the intention of transforming the Party, in programme, 
statute and name.
12th Government plans for rapid transition to market economy 
published-Balcerowicz and Sachs instrumental.
November
6th 16th Central Committee plenary session. One document under 
discussion is the dismantling of the PZPR and the creation of a new 
party not bound by the doctrines of Marx or Lenin. Rakowski talks about 
the future, as the past, he says, "is now being resolved."
8th German Chancellor, Kohl reassures Poland that the agreement of 
1970 will remain - West German parliament accepts borders.
PRON dissolves itself
23rd Mazowiecki assures Moscow that Poland is stable and continues to 
commit itself to the alliance.
24th Mazowiecki and Gorbachev exchange apologies about unnamed 
"past mistakes" and Mazowiecki for recent anti-Soviet attacks in Poland. 
Mazowiecki calls for a clearing up of history and a settling of accounts 
about Katyn and the deportations and persecution of Poles.
29th Rakowski visits Hungary and is “frightened by the 1Hungarian solutionm - 
that is, conflict between the left groups that splintered after the formal 
ending of the Hungarian Workers Party.
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December
12th Director General of IMF Michel Camdessus states that agreement 
had been reached on the austerity plan, the principle precondition of 
Western financial assistance. Assistance would include an IMF stand-by 
loan, restructuring loans, rescheduling of Polish debts and a $1,000 
million stabilisation fund set up by 24 Western nations.
13th PZPR buildings and offices attacked in various cities on 8th 
anniversary of Martial Law. EC approves an economic package of aid to 
Poland on condition that IMF stipulations are met.
14th The Polish government approves a draft austerity budget.
16th Parliamentary Clubs, including the PZPR, reject Walesa's plan to 
give the government more powers.
23rd Poland signs agreement with IMF.
29th Sejm amends constitution - all references to socialism and the 
leading role erased, the name of the country changed to the Republic of 
Poland, the national eagle has its crown restored. Supported by an 
overwhelming majority of the Sejm.
30th Walesa meets Rakowski, saying that it would be wrong to "rebuild 
Poland with a right but without a left leg."
1990
January6* 16th Central Committee Plenum. Approves plans to dissolve 
the party and create a new 'left wing party'. Approves a document stating 
that the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism are to 
be dropped and offering its support for free elections.
22nd Tiybuna Ludu criticises a draft bill presented on 9th January by 93 
deputies concerning the nationalisation of the PZPR's assets. It calls this 
a "Bolshevik act of revenge" and warns that it could upset the agreement 
between Solidarity and the Communists. Several local PZPR 
headquarters are occupied.
27-30* PZPR 11th (and final) Congress. PZPR is renamed Social 
Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP). Its property is transferred, 
with the support of 1533 delegates out of 1633. Kwasniewski is elected 
chairman and Miller general secretary. Walesa supports breakaway 
faction (PUS), saying that: the SdRP would "not stand the test of time."
